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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background to Research
Ever since IDGVC first established its venture capital fund in Beijing in
the late 1980's, venture capitalists (VCs) have been debating whether US
investment selection criteria should be revised for investments in China. On
the one hand, those VCs with a foreign venture capital background, such as
returnees (here referring to those Chinese with an educational background
from a developed Western country) and foreign VCs believe that they can
replicate their successful experiences of developed VC markets in China
without too many amendments. On the other hand, local VCs claim that US
practices do not suit China as they do not reflect sufficient knowledge and
understanding of Chinese business practices. Twenty years on, the debate
still shows no sign of abating. Indeed, investment competition between
foreign VCs and Chinese VCs remains as intensive as ever (Zero2IPO
Research Centre 2006).
In the last two years, China has experienced progressive development in
its venture capital presence internationally, largely due to the diversification
of industries and companies attracting investments. The segments enjoying
remarkable growth include high-tech enterprises as well as such industries as
the construction, hotel and leisure, and retail segments. Several other sectors
are also attracting increasing attention for VC investment, including outdoor
media, green technology and innovations, online education and
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supplementary schooling, software start-ups and the hospital care system.
Cleantech innovation is especially growing as the country rigorously
explores solar power generation, new materials and clean production,
seeking to ameliorate its water and air pollution, which far exceeds Western
safety standards.
The market has also matured significantly. Concerns about whether
foreign investments would only serve to enhance the personal interests and
pocketbooks of the local population, as opposed to enhancing the
development of the investments, have subsided. The continuous growth of
the Chinese economy and the middle class has also helped to prioritise
innovation and attract foreign investment to China. Notably, in the past most
economic improvements came from government-led programs; this trend is
beginning to dissipate as growing numbers of foreign financiers come to see
China's VC and PE market as a promising growth opportunity. No doubt the
PRC's government will continue to create barriers to unlimited foreign
investment in China, but many of the other factors that once hindered
foreign investment into the country have become much more manageable.
This thesis has its roots in the debate above and draws upon the
background and experiences of the researcher in the field of venture capital.
The researcher has over six years experience as an investment manager in
listed companies in Taiwan and for three years served as managing director
of Zero2IPO Research Centre, a leading venture capital and private equity
research institute in China. The researcher has a wealth of personal contacts
with VCs in China and this has proved invaluable in being able to conduct
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the empirical study that forms the basis of this thesis. In addition, as a
Taiwanese expatriate, the researcher also has the advantage of conducting
this study in the Chinese language in addition to having a comprehensive
knowledge of both Chinese and Western venture capital practices.
The background to this thesis is best understood by examining the
phenomenon of venture capital in China and previous research in the field.
Venture capital was first introduced to China in 1985. While the pace was
still sluggish before the 21st century, it began to soar following the recovery
of worldwide internet bubbles in late 2001. Nowadays, China1 has become
the world's second largest venture capital market in terms of total venture
capital investments, only second to the US (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2006,
2007). In fact, China has attracted the most foreign direct investments of all
developing countries in the past ten years according to the official
publications of United Nations (World Investment Report 2007). Venture
capital pool available for investments in mainland China totalled to 24.57
billion US dollars in 2007 (Figure 1.1), 2.4 times that of 2001. Venture capital
investments also soared to a historical high in 2007, more than three times
that of 2001 (Figure 1.2).
1 The research scope of this study covers only the venture capital activities in mainland
China excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Venture capital investors from Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Macau are viewed as foreign venture capital investors according to
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Figure 1.2 Total Venture Capital Investments in China (US$M)
Source: Zero2IPO Research Centre, Venture Capital Reports 2001-2007
Particularly, foreign-currency investments (primarily invested in US
dollars) accounted for 87.6% or 2.845 billion US dollars in 2007 from the base
of 258 million US dollars in 2001. Figures 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show that foreign
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VCs are the main driver of China's venture capital market contrasting to the
sluggish growth of Chinese venture capitals during the same period.
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Figure 1.3 Venture Capital investments: Foreign vs. Chinese (US$M)
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Figure 1.4 Percentage of Venture Capital Investments by Investor Type
(US$M)
Source: Zero2IPO Research Centre, Venture Capital Reports 2001-2007
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One of the main reasons for China's boom is that many early foreign
VCs were rewarded with handsome returns through various exit strategies
since the recovery, with trade sale and IPO the two most popular options
with investors, as shown in Figure 1.5. In addition, of the 40 interviewed
foreign VC firms operating in China, only two generated internal rates of
return (IRR) below 10% during the period of 1994 and 2005 (Figure 1.6). Such
strong profit track records helped China attract more interest from foreign
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2001-2007
Today, the venture capital industry in China and much of Asia remains
largely unexplored, except for Japan (Hurry et al., 1992; Ray and Turpin,
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1993). Although institutions have led to strong uniformity in VCs' behaviours
(Fried and Hisrich, 1995), Asia and China in particular, have institutional
environments that are distinctly different from that of the US or Europe
(Boisot and Child 1996, Peng 2000). Therefore it cannot be presumed that
venture capital operates in China the same as it does in the West (Bruton et al,
1999).
One notable limitation of previous comparative studies of venture
capital 'systems' has been the emphasis on assessing investment criteria
based on a small sample or a single country (predominately the US) and then
to extend this paradigm to all unveiled venture capital markets irrespective
of their institutional differences. Some studies argue that their findings can
represent the whole of Asia simply based on the sample of a few Asian
countries or suggest that their generalizations can be applied to all transition
economies based on the empirical evidence of one single country. For
example, Bliss (1999) examined the selection process of VCs in Poland and
hoped to include all transition economies in the model. Bruton et al. (2000)
argue that the values of venture capital professionals in Asia, US and Europe
are all shaped by normative institutional processes and how those views are
implemented around the world is shaped by cognitive/cultural institutional
forces in the given region of the world based on the statistics of a few
countries.
While this thesis suggests that findings can be validated in some specific
countries or similar cultural backgrounds, it is worth questioning whether
conclusions can be extended across boundaries undefined. It would be
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reasonable to expect there are differences not only between countries in a
similar geographical region, due to institutional, legal and regulatory aspects,
but between countries from different continents, given the diversity of
socio-cultural, historical and developmental factors.
Because the Chinese venture capital industry is relatively nascent,
institutional and legal infrastructures and assumptions on VC behaviour and
process - taken for granted in established, traditional "hot beds" of venture
capital such as Silicon Valley - are not likely valid in the Chinese context. In
fact, almost all foreign VCs in China that this researcher has engaged with in
private occasions have stated that they need to overcome various unique
challenges in China that are simply not challenges in their home markets. For
example, the promulgation of Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Circular 10) in 2006 have limited
foreign venture capitals to invest in Chinese firms with the so-called "red
chip model" i.e. investing in offshore holding entities and then to guide these
firms to overseas listings. To overcome this problem, foreign venture capital
firms have divided into opposing camps in their investment strategies. Some
foreign investors are much more willing to invest with Chinese Yuan
translated from foreign currency in ventures registered onshore holding
Chinese Yuan-denominated assets than they once were. There is also the
perception that it is easier for onshore funds to get deals approved. In fact,
investments by purely domestic funds do not require Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) approval, while investments by foreign-invested funds still need
approval as they are still "foreign" in the eyes of MOFCOM.
While some foreign venture capital funds still stay with the "red chip"
model, they hope to reduce foreign exchange translation exposure and avoid
the above mentioned offensive approval procedures. The other reason is that
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some "sensitive" industries are restricted or prohibited from foreign capital
investments, such as internet and portals, public media, formal schooling,
public utilities, banking and securities. Investing in an offshore-registered
entity ensures foreign venture capital investment free from the monitoring of
Chinese jurisdiction and avoids the restriction on investment category.
However, the fact is that only few Chinese ventures have established the
offshore holding structure before the release of Circular 10 in 2006. Therefore
many foreign venture capitals seek to raise onshore currency funds from
domestic investors or Sino-foreign venture capital funds2. Such local funds
are generally one of the funds under the same management regime of the
foreign venture capital firm but registered onshore and in the name of
Chinese citizens in order to enjoy preferential tax rates. However, they are
still noted "foreign" venture capitals at registration.
These diverse investment strategies of foreign venture capitals indicate
the complexity of Chinese venture capital in nature. It also reflects the
importance to get a full picture how foreign venture capitals strive to invest
in China and their investment strategies. Without a clear understanding of
these various forms of strategies, any conclusion on venture capital in China
will be likely to end in bias.
In fact, all government preferential policies and regulations provide
benefits only to venture capital firms registered onshore (Zero2IPO Research
Centre, 2008) i.e. onshore venture capital funds investing with Chinese Yuan,
no matter it is originated "foreign" or not. For example, the Notice of the
National Development and Reform Commission on Cooperating with
Finance Administrative Departments to Do a Good Job in the
2 A Sino-foreign venture capital fund in China has many different incorporation forms and
management styles, while here referring to the fund registered onshore and the whole VC
investment cycle completed in Chinese Yuan. A foreign investor of the fund has to put up
capitals translated into Chinese Yuan.
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Implementation of Preferential Tax Policies for Start-up Investment
Enterprises, only provide preferential tax benefits to venture capital firms
registered onshore and investment made within the designated high-tech
categories, while most foreign venture capital funds are still registered
offshore and invest through their agencies in China. Therefore they are not
qualified to enjoy any preferential legal status.
However, government protection is like a double-sword for purely
domestic or local venture capital funds i.e. non-"foreign"-initiated onshore
venture capital funds. Their investment cycle must be all completed in
Chinese Yuan from investment, exit to re-financing, because there is still no
guiding law for cross-boundary currency translations regarding domestic
venture capital funds. That is to say, domestic or local venture capital funds
will be exposed to foreign exchange exposure once the investment is made in
Chinese Yuan liquidated overseas and vice versa, while foreign venture
capital-initiated onshore local currency funds are still protected by foreign
exchange laws to freely exchange Chinese Yuan into foreign currency and
vice versa. In fact, the whole Chinese legal system holds the "ownership" as
judgement criterion for the management of venture capital firms.
Furthermore, most domestic venture capital funds were initiated by
local Chinese governments and SOEs before 2006 (Zero2IPO Research Centre,
2005). These state-controlled venture capital funds are generally guided to
invest in government projects while rewarding incentive is lesser. Successful
private companies and wealthy individuals have massively joined to raise
private-owned funds since 2006. These private-owned venture capital funds
are established with different purposes in nature from state-owned funds. If
state goals are not considered as guiding principals for private-owned funds
but rewarding incentive, how their investment criteria can be compared to
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those of foreign venture capitals and state-owned funds are worth
questioning.
This empirical study will explore how country-specific factors impact on
foreign venture capital investors and will examine and compare the real
investment criteria used by VCs operating in China. Indeed, this thesis
intends to challenge the applicability of the US model to other transition
economies3 and to China in particular, through a large empirical study of
venture capital in China. This study will include an assessment of successful
investments backed by venture capital firms closed before 2005. It is the first
attempt to generate such empirical evidence in the Chinese context and
aspires to offer new contributions for a stakeholder audience that includes
academics and researchers, new venture capital investors, practitioners and
policy makers from banausic viewpoints.
3 According to World Bank, the so-called transition economies are commonly understood to
refer to countries which have moved or are moving from a primarily state-planned to a
market-based economic system, with private ownership of assets and market-supporting
institutions. These countries include those of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and those of
Eastern and Central Europe closely allied with the Soviet Union, as well as more recently
countries in Asia and Africa undergoing market transformations of various degrees, such
as China, Mongolia and Vietnam (wwwl.worldbank.org/sp/safetynets/Transition.asp).
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1.2 Research Objectives and Method
There are three objectives of this study stated as follows:
As a venture capital practitioner in China, the researcher agrees the
conclusion in previous studies that China has the institutional environments
that are entirely different from the US where the venture capital selection
value is originated. The researcher also believes that these variances will
drive all venture capitalists operating in China to amend their original
decision making criteria in order to adapt to local environments. Therefore
the first objective of the study is to identify what unique factors affect
accept/reject funding decisions of venture capitalists (VCs) operating in
mainland China. The integration of unique Chinese factors affecting
investment decisions will help examine the applicability of the US model to
transition economies and to China in particular and explain the difference
and similarities.
Secondly, this study will examine unique China factors affect broadly
accepted investment criteria are reshaped based on developed VC markets
and the entry strategies of foreign venture capital investors into China.
At last, this study will distinguish what investment criteria are used by
VCs in China and the relative importance of these investment criteria to the
accept/reject decision of VCs. Results will also be compared to those
discovered in the US and other transition economies.
In order to fulfil each of the objectives above, the study must be able to
answer the following questions:
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1. What unique China factors should be considered? Why do they
influence the decision making of VCs in China, and how?
2. What strategies do foreign VCs employ to enter China market, and why?
3. Can venture capital firms operating in China be classified according to
the particular ownership and investment criteria and what are these
classifications?
4. Do diverse VCs operating in China share common investment criteria?
What are the differences and similarities? Does successful investment
experience in developed VC markets will affect VCs' decision values in
China? Do diverse ownership structures of venture capital firms in
China will produce different scenarios of investment criteria?
5. Further, what are the differences and similarities between the findings of
this study and the broadly accepted investment criteria based on
developed VC markets and previous generalisations of transition
economies?
This study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods in order
to satisfy the above research objectives. Traditional methods simply divide
venture capital firms operating in China into two types: foreign venture
capital firms and Chinese venture capital firms (White et al. 2002, Zeng 2004),
or offer no classification, which in turn will ignore the complexity of
ownership of venture capital firms operating in China. In comparison, a
grounded theory approach is adopted in this study to distinguish the various
14
entry strategies of foreign venture capitals and to examine the nature of
Chinese venture capital firms in order to categorise venture capital firms
operating in China. Given the fact that China is identified in this study as a
unique context for venture capital activity and there has been no established
study concerning the entry modes of foreign venture capitals into China, this
study cannot compare the insights provided by the first interviewee with
previous findings. Grounded theory is such a research method that aims at
presenting new theories that result from a thorough analysis of empirical
materials (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998,
Dougherty 2002) that best suit to develop a precise classification of China
venture capital firms according to their ownership structures through
face-to-face interviews with 124 VCs operating in mainland China.
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Delphi approach and Conjoint
Analysis are jointly applied to investigate the investment criteria of classified
venture capital firms. Specifically, AHP and Delphi approaches are jointly
used to discriminate the relative importance of first-tier (generic) investment
criteria while conjoint analysis is to identify the values of second-tier
(subordinate) investment criteria under their respective generic category.
There are two reasons for applying multiple methods in this study. The first
is to reduce the difficulty in conducting questionnaire survey when applying
conjoint analysis. With the adoption of both AHP approach and conjoint
analysis, comparisons of profiles can be reduced to a manageable level. The
second reason is to generate a saturation of analysis on each level of
investment criteria. The Delphi approach can assist in both the generation of
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an initial set of first-tier investment criteria for further testing in the pilot
study and in the summarization of conclusions when applying AHP
approach.
In addition, this study does not limit itself to any sampling method but
simply count on personal connections (guanxi) of the researcher in China
venture capital industry because VCs are generally poor informants in nature
according to the understanding and practical experience of the researcher.
Therefore any predetermined sampling method will face the risk to get
sufficient sample data.
The initial set of investment criteria for further testing is produced based
on the results of pilot study which includes three sources - broadly accepted
investment criteria discovered in previous studies, conclusions from the pilot
study and the observations of the researcher. Initial findings of this study are
sent to proportional interviewees participated in the survey for further
validation. The final outputs are analysed, explicated and compared to each
other and findings of past studies.
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1.3 Research Structure
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the
Introduction and includes the background and motivation, research
objectives and method and questions and structure of this study.
The second chapter is the Literature Review that establishes the
theoretical framework and methodological design for this study by
considering previous literature and research findings. In this chapter, the
researcher examined broadly accepted investment criteria based on
developed VC markets to consider whether US investment criteria can be
applied universally and in particular, to the Chinese context. The evidence
and how those institutional forces affect VC's decision making behaviours
were also systematically reviewed.
Chapter three describes the Research Design and Methodology. Various
approaches are described in details, including their pros and cons,
definitions, process, etc.; why and how they are applied in this research. The
chapter describes the development of a pilot study involving five VCs from
venture capital firms operating in China with different backgrounds and the
resultant preliminary model of investment criteria encompassing
China-specific factors and broadly accepted investment criteria. The chapter
also discusses how observations of the researcher are incorporated into the
analysis and describes the quantitative analysis method deployed with the
aid of SPSS.
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Chapter four includes the analysis and discussion of findings from the
study. The entry strategies of foreign venture capital firms and the
classification of Chinese venture capital firms are first examined and then
deployed within a comparative framework to assess the similarities and
differences between the investment criteria of the sample within the study.
Weightiness of each investment criteria for each category of venture capital
investors are identified and ranked as the basis for cross-category
comparison. The importance of unique Chinese factors to VCs' investment
criteria are evaluated and contrasted with broadly accepted investment
criteria and those of transition economies.
The final chapter concludes the thesis, identifies contributions to
knowledge and applicability of findings to theory, practice and policy. The
chapter also discusses the limitations of the research and offer suggestions
and guidelines for future research. The structure of the thesis is shown as
Figure 1.8. The structure shows that the pools of investment criteria used for
formal testing are derived from three sources - literature review, pilot study
and the observation of the researcher. Literature review helps the researcher
to collect generally accepted investment criteria while pilot study offers
distinctive Chinese factors that never mentioned in previous studies. The
study also adds the observation of the researcher in order to complete the
initial set of investment criteria for formal testing.
In order to conduct an in-depth study, the researcher purses a proper
classification of China venture capital investors as the basis for analysis. A
proper classification will help analyse the casual relationship between the
18
ownership of venture capital firm and its corresponding set of investment
criteria. Otherwise, the results will end in generality and ignore the diversity
of Chinese venture capital industry.
In addition, initial results are sent to a proportional sample for further
validation. The purpose of validity measurement is to examine to what
degree our results and findings can accurately address our research
objectives. Analysis, discussions and conclusions as well as suggestions are
all based on the validated results.
19
Figure 1.8 Research Structure
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Investment Criteria of Developed VC Markets
Since the early 80's, many studies have drawn various conclusions to
explain the decision-making process of VCs regarding developed VC
markets, especially the US. It appears that the earliest research on decision
making of venture capitalists is a study in Pittsburgh by Wells (1974)
concluding that only proposals that pass through the screening stage were
thoroughly investigated in the evaluation stage.
Venture capitalists are recognised as very successful in predicting
venture performance (Sandberg 1986, Kahn 1987). VCs strive to determine
the probability of success or failure by evaluating information related to the
particular new venture (Zacharakis 1995). However, funding can only be
made when entrepreneurs and their companies can pass through the
scrutinising activities of VCs. Venture capitalists rely on a largely subjective
assessment procedure based on the business plan presented by the
management team of the venture (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984). Tyebjee and
Bruno (1981) interviewed 46 US venture capitalists and concluded that
management skills were the most important factor influencing the
investment decision. Tyebjee and Bruno (1983, 1986) further used the sample
of 46 VCs to solicit responses of VCs. They attributed the 23 characteristics of
deals to five evaluation dimensions: (1) market attractiveness (represented
by size, growth and accessibility), (2) product differentiation (including the
uniqueness of the product, patent and profit margin), (3) managerial
capabilities, (4) environmental threat resistance, and (5) cash-out potential
(reflecting the likeness to liquidate the investment). They argued that VCs
are risk-averse and profit-oriented in their "accept/reject" decision, and
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willing to invest in risky deals if the risk is offset by the profit potential.
Expected return is determined by market attractiveness and product
differentiation while perceived risk is determined by managerial capabilities
and environmental threat resistance.
MacMillan et al. (1985) developed a list of 27 criteria classified under
five generic categories: 1) entrepreneur's personality; 2) entrepreneur's
experience; 3) product characteristics; 4) market characteristics; and 5)
financial considerations where the most significant subordinate criterion of
each generic category includes the entrepreneur and the team (personality
and experience), protectability of the product (product characteristics),
market growth (market characteristics) and the required rate of return
(distinguished as ten times that of the investment within five to ten years)
respectively. In fact, five of the top ten essential criteria suggested by the
authors are related to the entrepreneurs themselves i.e. the capability for
sustained effort, demonstrated leadership, track record relevant to the
venture, reaction to risk and capability to articulate the venture well. The
study also stress the problem that VCs may be influenced by their own
perception of the nature of a desirable response that is seen appropriate to
their position as representatives of the venture capital community, rather
than the investment criteria they actually use. A later study found that VCs
identify management staying power and familiarity with the market as the
two most important characteristics of a successful venture (MacMillan et al.
1987).
In comparison, the generic criteria identified by Fried and Hisrich (1994),
while similar to those of MacMillan et al. (1985), are not confined to new or
technology-based investments but encompass ventures in all development
stages and industries, concept, management and returns. Fried and Hisrich
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(1994) constructed a two-stage approach to categorise various investment
criteria. The initial-stage was a multiple-case study based on 18 VCs from
evenly three different geographical locations to gather information on which
to base the model. The second stage included five new VCs to verify the
initial model. This approach addresses the problem associated with
hypothetical or non-contingent responses, tendencies towards self-reporting
bias as the reward of the investment is unpredicted, and also helps increase
the accuracy of recollection. Fried and Hisrich (1994) suggest that many VCs
have firm-specific criteria on investment size, industries in which they focus,
geographic location of the venture and stage of financing. The screening
stage involves a cursory glance at the business plan without an extensive
investigation of the venture. Many proposals pass through the firm-specific
screen only to be rejected without detailed review when VCs analyse the
proposal with their generic criteria. The study distinguished fifteen
investment criteria, expanding on the three basic constructs identified by
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990). However, it did not verify whether VCs
would agree with such constructs.
Although various set of generic criteria have been identified in studies
over the past two decades, there is a frequent emphasis on the quality of the
entrepreneur and management team. For example, Hutt and Thomas (1985)
argue that "management's track record" is important to VCs as is the basic
market and product differentiation and knowledge of the competition. VCs
view "quality of management" as most important when making an
investment decision (Goslin & Barge 1986). Gorman & Sahlman (1986)
suggest that the major cause of venture failures is senior management
capabilities and product development strategy. Khan (1987) identified five
characteristics of entrepreneurs that appear as critical predictors to future
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venture success as: "entrepreneur's desire for success",
"creativity/ingenuity", "tenacity/courage", "enthusiasm/capacity for work",
"competence in field of endeavour" and "nature of product" where three
predictors are related to the quality of people. More specifically, it is the
quality of entrepreneur/management team.
A number of later studies focusing on the decision making of VCs have
generated various findings. Some are new, while some are related to the
same concept with new definitions or appeared in isomorphic norms. For
example, the context of "market" has been re-expounded under "continuity
of market", "market location" (Hisrich and Jankowitz 1990), "market
growth" (Riquelme and Rickards 1992), etc.; "product", "the use of
technology" (Hisrich and Jankowitz 1990), "patent protection", "functioning
prototype", "gross margin" (Riquelme and Rickards 1992), "long-term
growth of the industry" (Hall and Hofer 1993), etc. Goslin and Barge (1986)
identified the quality of management are most critical to VCs' investment
criteria in which it contains seven sub-categories: "general management
experience", "marketing experience", "a balanced team", "track record",
"financial experience", "realism" and "good references". These identified
investment criteria expressed in different nouns are in fact one same trait of
VCs' evaluation characteristics or can be grouped into one generic category.
Therefore generic definitions in previous studies appeared in isomorphic
forms of "Managerial Capabilities", for example, such as "management
skills" (Tyebjee and Bruno 1981; Meyer et al 1993), "management" (Hisrich
and Jankowitz 1990; Fried and Hisrich 1994), "entrepreneurs considered
management" (Bruno and Tyebjee 1983, 1986), "entrepreneur's knowledge
and management expertise" (Riquelme and Rickards 1992), "senior
management" (Gorman and Sahlman 1986) and "quality of management"
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Goslin and Barge 1986), are retagged as "Managerial Capabilities" in this
research in order to compare the findings across studies in details and as a
whole. In addition, for those subordinate criteria related to the quality of
entrepreneur and management are all re-categorised into the generic
criterion "Managerial Capabilities" in this research. Inferring from this,
retagging and re-categorisation are applied to other generic criteria and their
subcategories respectively in order to facilitate cross-research comparisons
and generalisations in this research.
Table 2.1 outlines such retagged generic categories (generic criteria) and
each of its subcategories (subordinate criteria) from the findings of previous
studies on developed VC markets. Table 2.2 summarises the literature on
VCs' investment criteria in developed VC markets and the methods, data
collection, sample and statistical analyses. It appears the selection criteria
"Managerial Capabilities", "Market Prospect" and "Product/Service
Differentiation" are most frequently mentioned in previous studies. Other
frequently mentioned generic criteria include "financial considerations" and
"exit potential".
The manifold methods to investigate VCs' investment criteria described
in the Table 2.2 can be divided into two types: post-hoc methods and
real-time methods. Studies used post-hoc research methods (see Tyebjee and
Bruno 1981, 1984; Bruno and Tyebjee 1985; Gorman and Sahlman 1986;
MacMillan, Siegel and SubbaNarasimha 1985; MacMillan, Zemann, and
SubbaNarasimha 1987; Kahn 1987) employing traditional ways of interviews
and/or surveys, may be subject to post-hoc rationalisation and recall biases
as people are poor at introspection (Huber and Power 1985; Golden 1992;
Sandberg et al. 1987; Shepherd and Zacharakis 1998). Post-hoc methods
typically ask VCs to list and rank decision criteria based on their assumed
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outcomes on the investment decision (Sandberg et al. 1987). Data collected
were often further analysed with a variety of statistical methods, such as
factor analysis and cluster analysis. Problems are associated with
retrospective reports because decision maker may be motivated to bias the
results (March and Feldman 1981), report their "espoused" rather than
"in-use" investment criteria (Shepherd 1999) as well as possible cognitive
and perceptual limitations (Fischhoff 1982). In addition, factor analysis was
often used in these studies but it is not appropriate to investigate VCs'
investment criteria when the sample is small (Mark 2008), while qualitative
methods are based on in-depth study of simply one or a few entities
(Briskman 1966; Driscoll 1974; Roberts 1991; Silva 2004) in order to presents
us a profile of the VC firm's operation. They both are limited to the size of
sample to generate meaningful conclusions.
Therefore later studies began to adopt real-time methods, such as
additive utility models (e.g. conjoint analysis) (see Riquelme and Rickards
1992; Muzyka et al. 1996; Zacharakis et al. 1998; Shepherd et al. 1998;
Shepherd 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis 1999; Zacharakis and Meyer 2000;
Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001; Shepherd et al. 2003; Bart et al. 2005) and
verbal protocol method (see Sandberg et al. 1988; Hall and Hofer 1993), to
investigate VCs' investment criteria. Sandberg et al. (1988) suggested that
verbal protocol analysis is a real-time experiments which require VCs to
"think aloud" as business proposals are being evaluated. Hall and Hofer
(1993) suggest that the verbal protocol method elicit richer knowledge and
understanding of the decision making process while post-hoc methods only
focus on the results. However, the problem associated with the verbal
expression (to "think aloud") of knowledge is still a difficult task for experts
(Patel and D'Souza 2008). Riquelme and Rickards (1992) criticised that the
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verbal protocol method is more than an "art" than a science while conjoint
analysis is more appropriate for the evaluation of VCs' investment criteria.
In addition, the analysis and interpretation involved in verbal protocol
techniques without being aided with other techniques, such as computer
algorithms, are likely to be subjective (Cooke and McDonald 1987; Riquelme
and Rickards 1992).
Conjoint analysis has been used in many fields in relation to decision
making science, especially in marketing where it has accumulated a strong
tradition (Steward 1988, Green and Srinivasan 1990). Conjoint analysis is a
general term referring to a technique that requires respondents to make a
series of judgments, based on profiles, from which their "captured" decision
processes can be decomposed into its underlying structures i.e. the
attributes' significance in the judgment, how these attributes affect the
judgment and the relative importance of each attribute in the decision
process (Shepherd and Zacharakis 1999). Riquelme and Rickards (1992) was
the first research, to the researcher's knowledge, applying conjoint analysis
to examine VCs' investment criteria, which allows the investigation of what
Argyris and Schon (1974) refer to as theories "in use" in contrast to
"espoused" theories of action. Conjoint analysis has its unparalleled
advantage over other methods and therefore is also adopted in this research.
Table 2.2 also indicates that there is no study basing on developed VC
markets ever mentioning how country-specific factors may influence VCs'
investment criteria. In fact, there is not any study providing us such insights
into VCs' decision making science so far. With the emergence of new VC
markets from NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries) in the 1980s' to BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) in the Millennium, it is worth wondering if
foreign/multinational venture capital investors will revise their investment
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criteria used in their home countries (generally developed VC markets) to
adapt to these emerging markets, particularly China, and how they can be
compared to those of local and joint venture capital investors. The purpose
and outcome of this study will add contribution to the field of VC's
investment decision science.
Table 2.1 Summary of Retagged Generic Category and Each of the Subcategories
Generic Criteria Subordinate Criteria
1. Management Commitment
2. Management Skill
3. Track Record of Management Team and
Entrepreneur
4. Demonstrated Leadership of Entrepreneur
5. Management/Entrepreneur's Personality
6. Management/Entrepreneurs' Experience
7. A Balanced Management Team
8. Realism
9. Capability for Sustained Effort
10. Management/Entrepreneur's Knowledge and
Managerial Capabilities Expertise of the Product/Service/Technology
11. Ma rketing Experience/Skill
12. Financial Experience
13. Good References of Management Team and
Entrepreneur
14. Staying Power of the Management
15. Familiarity with the Market
16. Entrepreneur's Desire for Success
17. Entrepreneur/Management Reaction to Risk
18. Creativity/Ingenuity of the Entrepreneur
19. Tenacity/Courage of the Entrepreneur







5. Product/service Development Failure
6. Functioning Prototype
7. Expected Gross Margin of Product/Service
8. Product/Service Timing
9. Product/Service Strategy, Capitalisation and
Implementation
Market/Industry Prospect





6. Unique (Market) Opportunity for the Venture




1. Expected/Appropriate/Required Rate of Return
2. Brilliant Financial Projections
3. Profitability of the Venture
Exit (Cash-out) Potential The likeness to liquidate the investment
Balanced Risk Consideration
1. Environmental Threat





1. Strategic Competitive Investors
2. Personal Chemistry between VCs and
Entrepreneur/Management
3. VCs' Gut Feel
4. Use of Technology of the Venture
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5. Deal (Term) Factors
Table 2.2 Summary of Findings on Investment Criteria in Developed VC Markets
Generic Criteria Summary of Findings Researcher Sample Method
1. Managerial Management commitment, Wells (1974) 8 US VCs Personal
Capabilities product and market are interviews
2. Product/Service three essential criteria to
Differentiation VCs' decision making.
3. Market Prospect
Managerial Management Skill is the Tyebjee & 46 US VC Percentage &
Capabilities most important criterion. Bruno (1981) funds Frequency
1. Market Prospect Entrepreneurs considered Bruno & 193 US Chi-square &
2. Managerial management, market Tyebjee Entreprene ANOVA
Capabilities potential, market (1983,1986) urs
3. Product/Service competition and product considered
Differentiation feasibility are major




1.Market Prospect Market attractiveness (size, Tyebjee & 46 US VC Factor,
2.Managerial growth, and accessibility), Bruno (1984) funds Regression &
Capabilities managerial capabilities, Discriminate
3. Product/Service environmental threats, Analysis
Differentiation product
4. Exit Potential differentiation/uniqueness
5. Balanced Risk and cash-out potential are
Consideration most important criteria.
(Environmental VCs are risk-averse and
Threats) profit-oriented in their
"accept/reject" decision,
and willing to invest in
risky deals if the risk is
offset by the profit
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potential. Expected return
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1. Business Proposal The quality of business MacMillan 27 US T-test &
2. Financial proposal (BP) is essential and Subba funded & F-test
Considerations to accept/reject decision. A Narasimha 57
quality BP should be well (1986) unfunded
balanced, professionally plans from
presented and of brilliant 5 US VC
financial projections. firms
Managerial They discovered the traits MacMillan et 150 US Factor,
Capabilities of a successful venture are al. (1987) investment Regression &
the staying power of the s from 67 Cluster
management and US VC analysis
familiarity with the firms.
market.
1.Managerial The most important traits Khan (1987) 36 US VC Regression
Capabilities to VCs are entrepreneur's firms from
2. Product/Service desire for success and A Guide to
Differentiation nature of product. The
creativity/ingenuity of the
entrepreneur is critical to
venture success, while VC's





1.Managerial The study stressed that Sandberg et 1 US VC & Verbal
Capabilities characteristics of the al. (1988) 3 business Protocol
2. Market Prospect industry, proposed proposals Analysis
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3. Proposed Strategy strategy and track record
of the entrepreneur and
team are most critical




sample was too small to
generate conclusions.
1. Managerial VCs based on intuitions to Hisrich and 5 US VCs In-depth
Capabilities make investment Jankowitz Interviews
2. Market Prospect decisions, which are 1990
3. Product/Service "personal chemistry" or
Differentiation "gut feel". Investment
decision constructs are




1. Managerial The general traits of the Hisrich and 5 US VCs Repertory
Capabilities entrepreneur, management Jankowitz grid, factor &
2. Product/Service team, continuity of market, (1990) Cluster
Differentiation product-market analysis
3. Market Prospect uniqueness, funding base
4. Balanced Risk and risk in evaluating
Consideration investment proposals are
(Funding Base & most critical investment
Risk) criteria. Other policies
include the business plan
itself, use of technology
and market location of the
venture. However, the





Managerial Skill is most
important to VCs'
investment evaluation.
Marketing skills are also
considered significant to
VCs' decision making.
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Hall and
Hofer (1993)



























expanded up on three
basic constructs: Concept,
Management and Returns









1. Management The study concludes Muzyka et 31 VCs Conjoint
Capabilities financial, product, market, al. (1996) analysis
2. Product/Service strategic competitive fund,
3. Market Prospect management team and
4. Financial competence and deal
Considerations factors are most critical to
5. Strategic VCs' investment decision
Competitive with the employment of
Investors trade-off conjoint method.
1. Managerial VCs exhibit substantial Bart et al. 68 Conjoint
Capabilities heterogeneity in (2005) European Analysis &
2. Financial investment selection early Cluster
Considerations behaviour. Three types of stage Analysis
3. Product/Service investors were identified: high-tech
Differentiation those who focus on VCs
technology, those who
focus on finance and those
who focus on people.
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2.2 Evidence on Applicability of US Investment Criteria
A large number of previous studies on decision-making criteria of VCs
are generally based on samples from developed VC markets, especially the
US, from the review above. From major initial developments in the US, there
has been a diffusion of the US venture capital model and expertise first to the
UK and then throughout Europe and beyond (Manigart et al. 2000). While
the U.S venture capital industry still represents about two-thirds of the
world's total, and is still 4-6 times the size of Western Europe's, other
countries have indeed been adopting many American investment and
fund-raising practices and at least a superficial case for convergence in
venture capital techniques can be made (Megginson 2004). To date, most of
our understanding of venture capital is based on the US venture capital
industry (Bruton et al. 2000). The US venture capital model has a high profile
since venture capitalists have funded such notable firms as Intel, Apple
Computer, Microsoft, Genetech, and Federal Express. In the U.S., typically
the venture capitalist invests and manages the investable capital as general
partner in a limited partnership. Most of the capital invested is provided by
institutional investors. The limited partnership has a finite life by the end of
which all of the investments must either be liquidated or distributed to the
partners. The venture capitalist chooses companies for investment and
negotiates the purchase of stock in private transactions. The U.S. industry is
noted for its strong interconnections between venture capitalists, (Bygrave,
1987); similar strong interconnections have also been found within Europe
(Sapienza et al. 1996). In part, such strong interconnections developed
historically due to the relatively small number of firms active in the industry
during its initial expansion. The small size of the industry at this time
encouraged venture capitalist to work and invest together to limit their risk.
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The interconnections are seen in the fact that venture capitalists in the U.S.
often communicate with each other about potential investments, frequently
seeking advice from each other (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). Additionally it is
common, particularly in early stage investments that venture capitalists seek
out other venture capitalists as co-investors (Reiner, 1989). Syndication
allows the venture capitalist to diversify their investment risk and to share
knowledge (Bygrave, 1987). Finally, after an investment is made, the venture
capitalists in the U.S. often cooperate in monitoring the investment (Bruton et
al. 1998).
From Table 2.2, it can also be concluded that US VCs frequently stress
the importance of "Managerial Capabilities" (the quality of management),
"Market Prospect" and "Product/Service Differentiation" to investment
decision. In fact, the selection criteria of US VCs and broadly accepted
investment criteria are almost synonyms in both academia and practice. For
example, Zutshi et al. (1999) suggest the similarity in institutional
environments between Singapore and western countries, such as the
financial markets, legal and accounting regimes. The authors contend that
entrepreneur's characteristics or top management's capabilities are seen as
being primary indicators of the venture's potential by VCs and found that the
investment criteria adopted by successful VCs were no different from those
adopted by less successful VCs. Under such circumstances, the study argues
that the venture capital industry in Singapore is simply a copy of the US and
Singaporean VCs evaluate a venture based on their investment preferences
and processes that are not very different from those adopted in the US.
On the other hand, some studies offer contradictive conclusions of
generic VC investment criteria based on the US model. For example, Kaplan
and Stromberg (2006) have re-examined the ongoing debate regarding VCs'
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predominant investment criteria. They suggest that different groups of VCs
may stress different sets of investment criteria, and that such an orientation
may serve as a meaningful predictor of a VC firm's success. VCs focused on
product/market criteria are more likely to be successful than VCs
concentrated on the entrepreneur. Keeley and Roure (1990) found that the
entrepreneur/management team is not an important predictor of VCs'
decision policies. Also, a study by Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) - that
involved VCs evaluating 50 firms in a decision-making experiment using
conjoint analysis - argue that the entrepreneur is not as critical as suggested
in post-hoc studies, while the factors of market and competition were found
far more important. Similarly, Hall and Hofer (1993) found that key
decision-making criteria are the expectations on long-term growth of venture
and profitability of the industry in which the proposed new venture would
operate, with the entrepreneur/entrepreneur team not regarded as an
important evaluation criterion.
Moreover, a number of other studies have found that the nature of
venture capital industry varies from country to country (Bygrave and
Timmons 1992; Fried and Hisrich 1994). The differences are reflected in the
organisational form of venture capital firms, sources of funding, disciplines
and sources of venture capital professionals, VCs' perception of local
environments and investment strategies, etc. Studies on the Asian venture
capital industry (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003, Boisot and Child 1996) also
suggest that investment criteria of VCs should not simply be applied
universally. For example, the incorporation form of a limited partnership as
the most popular form adopted by venture capital organisations in the US
are rarely used in China in which the incorporation form of a limited liability
constitutes the majority of venture capital organisations (Zero2IPO Research
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Centre 2007). In Japan, most venture capital firms are formed by financial
institutions and most of their investment personnel are seconded from the
investors for a few years then returned to organisations (Kenney and Han
2002). Kenney and Han (2002) contended that such deep-rooted connection
appears in the stronger commitment of Japanese investors' to venture capital
funds than US investors. Americans who joined the venture capital
subsidiaries of U.S. firms often resign to establish or join an independent
venture capital firm, while Japanese professionals who served in the venture
capital subsidiary nearly always returned to the parent firm. In this way, the
Americans did exhibit a long-term commitment to venture capital, even
though the institutions did not. The ultimate consequence was that the U.S.
accumulated a corps of trained venture capitalists, while in Japan this corps
formed far more slowly and applied different investment philosophy that is
more inherited from their parent firm. In this context, VCs are likely to
exhibit different evaluation skills and method depending on the focus and
nature of the VC industry in a particular country (Manigart et al. 2000).
In Poland, Bliss (1999) suggested that government influence and the
nascent legal system are major causes influencing VCs' investment decision
in Poland while these two factors have yet been proved significant in
previous research based on developed VC markets. Therefore such variations
indicate that VCs may be more flexible or develop different sets of
investment philosophy to adapt to local environments.
Guo (2008) suggests that VCs' investment strategies share both
commonalities and differences with the practices in the United States. VCs in
China also consider the characteristics of the entrepreneur as the most important
factor in their ex-ante project screening that is the same to the US practice.
Specifically, social network (guanxi) of the entrepreneur is stressed as attached
to the capability of the entrepreneur. In addition, VCs in China pay much more
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attention to the geographical location of the projects due to the concerns about
the public policies of local governments, a venture with high-tech concept and
the supply of human resources in different areas.
Knight (1994) conducted a cultural/cross-continental analysis of the
criteria used by VCs in Canada, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region to
evaluate venture proposals. The results were compared to that of MacMillan
et al. (1985) and concluded that high technology investments are not as
popular with VCs in other parts of the world as they are in the US. In
addition, Megginson (2004) found striking differences between American
and European practices, and indeed between VC practices in different
European markets. Manigart et al. (2000) suggested that VCs' choices vary by
region and/or country based on the sample of five countries (US, UK,
Holland, France and Belgium). The study concluded similar systems and
venture capital markets stress varying importance on different valuation
methods, with theoretically 'correct' methods not always being preferred in
practice. They further highlighted the differences between VCs of different
countries in investment valuation methods, which are ascribed to the
commanding corporate governance mechanism or the level of development
of the venture capital market even after taking into account between-country
differences in the relative importance of investment stages and venture
capital types (Manigart et al. 2000). Bygrave and Timmons (1992, 1999) found
US venture capital investments overall provide a greater proportion of funds
into early stage ventures than its European counterparts, which suggests the
greater need to stress the capabilities of entrepreneurs.
Such difference is also validated in transition economies. For example,
Bliss (1999) first, to the researcher's knowledge, examined the selection
process of VCs in Poland, categorised as a transition economy, and using the
model of Fried and Hisrich (1994), found the model to be transferable,
40
suggesting that reported differences are due to the unique characteristics of
Poland's transitional economy. Bliss contests that among the screening
criteria included in the Fried and Hisrich model, only deal size mattered to
Polish VCs. Therefore the firm-specific screening stage, where generic criteria
described by Fried and Hisrich (1994) are applied, was eliminated in his
model. Further, Bliss found that governmental influence and a nascent legal
system are important to investment criteria of VCs in Poland. Managerial
ability is difficult to measure in Poland as few Polish entrepreneurs have long
enough track records in a free-market environment. Moreover, Bliss found
that Polish entrepreneurs did not properly understand the role of a VC and
the whole venture capital cycle or how the relationship between the dyads of
themselves and VCs should be structured and managed. Hence Polish VCs
had to cultivate connections with related government officials in order to
solicit new deals - generally state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The result was
that many business proposals did not fit VCs' focused industry categories
and a dearth of deal sources in Poland.
Critically speaking, Bliss (1999) empirically examined the fitness of the
broad investment criteria and established a selection model for Poland that
identifies differences in decision making of VCs between the West and
Poland. Although his study is based on a relatively small sample of six
interviews with Polish VCs and offers no empirical testing, Bliss argues that
the total managed fund size is large enough in size to represent the large
proportion of the Polish venture capital industry. While his study attempted
to generate an evaluation model and a set of generic criteria for all transition
countries, such a model needs further validation and suggests that detailed
considerations in the diversity of transition countries in cultural
environments, level of economy development, legal and political system, etc.
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may be required.
In contrast, this research examines the applicability of investment
criteria based on developed VC markets, also classified as a transition
economy, and generalised different sets of investment criteria used by VCs of
various investor backgrounds in China. This research does not attempt to
generalise a universal set of investment criteria to represent all transition
economies or against widely accepted investment criteria in previous
researches. Rather, the researcher demonstrates that VCs will develop the
set(s) of investment criteria best suit local conditions and there are
differences in the use of investment criteria between various ownership
types of venture capital firms, even in one same country.
The study by Karsai et al (1997) on Hungary - another transition
economy in Central Europe, also suggests the diverse nature and differences
in VCs' selection philosophy between countries of similar institutional
backgrounds in the same continent. Their Hungarian venture capital
evaluation model overall demonstrates features that are neither similar to
that of Poland nor the West. In Hungary, VCs are particularly challenged by
adverse selection problems in screening investment proposals, with these
difficulties posed in screening the capabilities of management who typically
have not operated in a market environment before and where information
may be particularly subjective. Karsai et al. further argue that the most
important criteria when evaluating a venture by Hungary VCs are: (1) a
clearly defined timing and nature of exit; (2) a requirement for entrepreneurs
to have a thorough knowledge of their area; (3) a certain percentage of
ownership for the VCs; (4) a satisfactory financial ration benchmark; (5)
satisfactory reasons for the funding; and (6) mutual agreement about the
legal structure of the investment. While the study designed the questionnaire
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based on survey instruments carried out in the US and the UK adapted to
the circumstances in Hungary, the results stressed the exit feasibility and
ownership control over the venture in the Hungarian context, was not
mentioned in previous studies based on these two countries. However,
government influence on venture capitalists' selection criteria, as concluded
in Bliss's study (1999), were not accented by Karsai et al (1997).
The evidence on the difference in investment philosophy between
developed VC markets, especially the US, and transition economies was also
identified from venture capitalists operating in India - the world second
largest transition nation. Wright et al. (2004) compared foreign (primarily US)
venture capital firms in India, domestic venture capital firms in India, and
US venture capital firms in their domestic markets. The results showed that
foreign firms in India place significantly greater emphasis on product and
market factors as well as accountants' reports than domestic firms in India.
They lay significantly less emphasis on financial contributions of
management in assessing risk and own due diligence and information from
entrepreneurs than do U.S. firms in their home market. Venture capitalists
of foreign firms operating in India make more use of information from trade
publications relating to production capacity and technology and information
from accountants' reports than do domestic venture capital firms.
In sum, evidence from previous studies suggests that venture capitalists'
investment philosophy and venture capital industries of Asia, Central and
Eastern Europe are not necessarily equivalent to those based on the US
model - the typical developed Western venture capital market. While it is
true that a market-driven or capitalist state where the government generally
plays a relatively smaller role in many economy aspects than the socialist or
the less-developed economies, whether it does the same in venture capital
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investments remains unverified in previous research. The importance of
government influence to investment criteria, the inherent venture capital
institutional environments and how the ownership of a venture capital firm
may affect venture capitalists' decision-making behaviour have not been
stressed in previous studies based on developed VC markets. The body of
contradictory evidence identifies the need to further examine where
similarities or dissimilarities in investment criteria of venture capitalists exist,
not only between nations of the same continent (i.e. Poland, Hungary, Japan
and India), but also between countries or even regions with different levels
of economic development. In addition, the issue how the investment criteria
of multinational venture capital firms can be compared to the local
counterparts that has never been studied in previous researches, however, is
an indispensable part of this field. This research pioneers to conduct massive
field study on investment criteria aiming at different groups of venture
capital investors operating in China. The results ultimately contribute to
venture capitalists' decision-making science.
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2.3 Institutional Forces on Investment Criteria
Institution theory argues that beliefs, goals, and behaviours of
individuals and organisations are strongly influenced by subtle but pervasive
forces in the external environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Scott 1995).
Institutional theory also suggests that organizations often develop in an
isomorphic manner (Slack and Hinings 1994). Institutions are those
structures that provide stability and meaning to social behaviours (Scott
1995). Scott (1995) identifies three principal types of institutions affecting
organisational activities: normative, cognitive and regulatory, among which,
he argues, normative and cognitive institutional influences are most critical
to professionals. Differences in the institutional, legal and cultural
environment and in dominant corporate governance systems may
significantly influence the conduct of business (Hofstede 1984;
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1993). Professions develop isomorphic,
or similar, characteristics not only within countries but also around the world
(Bruton et al. 2000). The profession fabricates the principles, or guidelines for
action by the professionals within the industry (Scott and Backman 1990).
Further, strong trade and professional associations within the industry
encourage the consistency in behaviour (Oliver 1996). The beliefs of
participants about what conduct is expected in the industry affect the
behaviours of later entrants (March 1981).
Further, it is argued that cultural systems varied from country to country
form the institutional structures which influence organisational behaviours
(Friedland and Alford 1991) and enterprise strategy (Peng 2000). In respect of
the VC industry and its related intermediaries, past studies have also
identified the heterogeneity of such markets across differing countries
(Wright et al. 1992; Manigart et al. 1994; Sapienza et al. 1996). It is such
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variations lead to the difference in the evaluation process and method of
venture capitalists across countries (Manigart et al. 2000).
Fried and Hisrich (1995) argue that institutional factors have led to
strong uniformity in VCs' behaviours. Fried and Hisrich (1994) also
suggested that as the institutional environments vary from country to
country so does the nature of the venture capital industry. The similarities in
venture capital industry between the US and Europe have been found in
previous research (Sapienza et al. 1996) as culturally and historically the two
regions have strong connections. However, to date the behaviour of Asian
venture capitalists remain largely unexplored in academic research. Asian
culture as a whole is significantly different from the two regions (Bruton et al.
2000). Separately Asia obviously contains rich races, cultural systems and
political regimes and varying degree of economic and financial markets
development. Thus, it cannot be assumed that venture capital operates in
Asia, as it does in the West (Bruton et al. 1999). Institutional theory would
predict that the local culture should impact venture capitalists' behaviour in
regions/countries with strong cultural norms. The Asian emphasis on the
group may result in the venture capitalists' viewing their relationship with
the CEO (chief executive officer) of the firm not as an arms-length agency
relationship but as part of a relational contract (Bruton et al. 1999).
Bruton et al. (2000) in the study of the values of venture capital
professionals in Asia, US and Europe, argued that all are shaped by
normative institutional processes; and how those views are implemented
around the world is shaped by cognitive/cultural institutional forces in the
given region of the world. Asian venture capitalists despite sharing similar
views on their roles, implement those roles very differently due to the
emphasis on collective action in Asia (Bruton et al. 2000). Therefore it can be
46
argued that institutions are responsible for the difference or similarity
between nations in the selection values of venture capitalists. Critically
speaking, Bruton et al. (2000) pioneered to examine the behaviour of venture
capital professionals across continents utilising an institutional perspective.
However, the study lacks the evidence to support whether venture capitalists
of different countries with varying structures of institutional developments
within one single region/continent would all agree the conclusions. The
verification is especially important for Asian venture capitalists as the
continent contains richer cultural systems and political regimes than the US
and Europe, while the study simply count on three sample from East Asia
(Taiwan, Japan and South Korea). Similarly, it is worth questioning that
venture capitalists in Eastern Europe would all behave like their counterparts
in western European countries (UK, France and the Netherlands). In addition,
the study did not specify whether the regulatory force, such as the
government influence, will influence venture capitalists' investment selection
behaviour while it may be critical to a country in transition, like China and
India.
Studies suggest that the Chinese institutional environment differs
considerably from that of the West, due to the influence of a strong socialist
tradition and strong culture (Peng 2000, Boisot and Child 1996). It can be
argued that the venture capital industry in China will be an outcome of its
unique combination of political, economic, cultural and social institutions
and the nature of the broader changes it has been undergoing during its
transition from socialist central planning to a more market-based economic
system. Thus institutional factors in China have been creating a venture
capital industry with its own idiosyncratic characteristics.
Literature identifies a number of differences between China and the
47
developed VC markets. Firstly, White et al (2002) suggest that China's
regulatory system affects the venture capital industry through variations in
property rights, contract law and company law, tax law and foreign exchange
and capital market controls. Luo (1997) argues that property rights and
corporate governance are still underdeveloped in China (Luo 1997). Guo
argued (2008) Venture capitalists in China are more demanding than their
peers in developed countries, imposing more screening criteria as additional
conditions to reduce the problems raised from the weak regulatory
institutions. Consequently, some venture capitalists tend to invest in Chinese
firms registered in offshore holding vehicles under foreign jurisdiction, such
as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, in order to avoid constraints caused by the
inefficient domestic regulatory system (Guo 2008).
Secondly, there is still no generally accepted venture capital association
in China providing norms, action values and clear definitions on venture
capital compared to the US, UK or other developed VC markets (Zero2IPO
Research Centre 2006). Indeed, venture capital is still viewed as a tool to
promote technological development and serve for national strategic goals
(Zhuang 2003). Venture capital from the viewpoint of the central Chinese
government is seen not simply as a means to maximise profits for investors,
but overwhelmingly an important tool for connecting scientific and
technological capabilities and outputs on the one hand, with national and
regional/provincial economic and social development on the other (White et
al. 2000). Moreover, Professional financial advisors, managers and
accountants that are important for venture capital investment are extremely
rare (Farrel and Grant, 2005). Consequently, investment values of venture
capitalists in a state-owned venture capital firm in China greatly vary from
that of foreign venture capitalists bearing the duty to maximise profits for the
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good of fund investors.
Thirdly, key cognitive/cultural institutions in China are formed on the
basis of Confucian codes and doctrines on social roles and clan ties that are
not present in Western culture (Peng 2000). Confucian dynamism emphasises
ordered relationships and the impact of shame; these characteristics,
relatively less dominant in Western business practice, highlight the
dominance of group-related values in China and the lower role of
individualism that is so dominant in the West. Social networking (Guanxi),
face value (Mianzi), and excessive concern for family, which are all deep
rooted in Confucianism, carry much weight in Chinese society (Ford, 1997;
Graham and Lam, 2003). Chen (2001) also suggests that such core values,
including maintaining relationships or guanxi, quietly influence the
cognitive/cultural rules of the Chinese society. Given the influence of such
institutions, in order to engage in some transactions, an entrepreneur or
enterprise must maintain good personnel connections and this may matter
more than their capabilities (Boisot and Child 1996, Peng 2000).
From the perspectives of venture capitalists, guanxi, relationship or
social ties are also presented in the Western context. VCs frequently seeking
advice from other counterparts on a wide variety of issues is a common
practice for VC professionals (Fried and Hisrich 1994). The connection and
relationship among many venture capital firms often results in cooperation
in monitoring of investments (Bruton, Fried and Hisrich 1998) and
syndication investments of VCs (Makela and Markku 2006). Guo (2008)
argued that regulatory and cognitive institutions impact nearly all aspects of
foreign venture capitalists' investing activities in China, but normative
institutions only matter in the project screening, based on 37 venture
capitalists of 34 venture capitalist firms. In addition, based on interviews and
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secondary document analysis, Feng (2004) identified the impact of
institutional dynamics on the evolution of China's venture capital industry
with the focus on the changes of foreign venture capitalists' investment
strategies in China and the protection of property rights has a dominant
impact on investing behaviour whereas the agency perspective is not as
powerful in explaining FVCFs' investment strategies in China.
Further, guanxi is also vital for investors and venture entrepreneurs
during the period of post-investment management. The effects of such direct
and indirect ties may enhance the bilateral trust between investors and
entrepreneurs, especially in early stage investments. For example, Shane and
Cable (2002), drawing on organizational theory, argue that these ties provide
an important mechanism through which information asymmetry is
overcome between seed-stage investors and entrepreneurs.
At last, there are two fundamental problems confronting all venture
capital exits in China. The first problem is regulatory constraints. Following
Circular 75, seven Chinese government organs jointly released the
"Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors" (Circular 10) on August 8, 2006, which stipulates that any foreign
merger and acquisition of domestic entity are subject to rules of the
"Guidance Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries" (Article 4). To
practice the "red chip" listing model, the Chinese enterprise must receive the
approvals from both Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and State Administration
of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (Article 42). Moreover, the completion of the
whole listing requirements and official approval application procedure
needs to be met within one year following the issue of a business certificate
to the JV (joint venture) or WFOE (wholly foreign-owned enterprises) (After
acquisition by the offshore holding company, the domestic entity will
50
become a JV or WFOE). Otherwise the established shareholding structure
must be aborted and return to zero (Article 45 & 49). Besides, the lack of an
over-the-counter market also contributes to the low efficiency to exit through
domestic IPO. China has two types of stock market: A and B. The former is
traded in Chinese Yuan and the latter US dollars. A share market has
averagely much higher PE (price/earning ratio) and liquidity than B share
market (Zhu and Guo 2000). According to Zero2IPO Research Centre,
approximate 450 private small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) are in the
queue to list on A share market by 2006. However, whether it is A or B,
listing requirements are still too high for most SMEs, including many
venture capital-backed private enterprises (Kang 2007). This in turn drives
venture capital investors to seek liquidation through non-IPO options
including merger and acquisition, trade sale or local Assets and Equity
Exchanges, even though IRRs received through non-IPO options are much
lower than IPOs. According to China Venture Capital Performance Report,
1994-2005 (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2006), venture capital exiting through
merger and acquisition and trade sales have achieved IRR 9.45% and 15.6%
respectively, much lower than those of either overseas (54.5%) or domestic
(32.3%) IPO.
Previous discussion suggests that the challenges encountered by VCs
and the nature of the investment framework employed in China differs
significantly from that of the West as a result of the divergence in
institutional forces. The differences may lead to the alternative belief that
VCs will adapt themselves to the local institutional environments making
some changes in the process and creating a different application of selection
standards of venture capital (Bruton et al. 1999). However, how the
divergence in institutional environments will influence VCs by country, in
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contrast to the study by Bruton et al. (2000), and in turn their investment
criteria have never been further examined.
The first goal of this study is to critically review the fitness of broadly
accepted investment criteria based on developed VC markets in China by
many accredited studies and understand whether investment criteria used
may vary with the ownership structure or funding sources of venture capital
firms, while there is still very limited evidence so far comparing evaluation
approaches used by VCs in different countries and within one single
country.
Past literature has recognised that heterogeneity of institutional forces
across countries (Friedland and Alford 1991, Wright et al. 1992, Manigart et
al. 1994, Sapienza et al. 1996, Boisot and Child 1996, Peng 2000, Manigart et
al. 2000). Such variation leads to the difference in the nature of venture
capital industry (Fried and Hisrich 1994). Further, Bruton et al. (2000) argued
that the values of venture capitalists are shaped by normative institutional
processes; and how those views are implemented around the world is
shaped by cognitive/cultural institutional forces in the given region of the
world based on small samples across Asia, Europe and the US. However,
their conclusions have not been verified in China and those many emerging
VC markets. Being the largest transition economy in the 21st century, China
has attracted the most FDI (foreign direct investments, including foreign
venture capitals) in the past 10 years among all developing countries (World
Investment Report 2007). In this context, its venture capital industry is also
mixed of evolving Chinese and Western practices (Kang 2007). To study an
emerging venture capital market, the researcher hence suggests it is of
priority to distinguish the diverse nature of venture capital firms based on
their funding sources, as the selection values of venture capitalists cannot be
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assumed the same between venture capital firms of different origins.
This study will first examine what entry strategies foreign venture
capitals adopted into the mainland in order to secure their interests. The
researcher will also examine how selection criteria of different types of VCs
is influenced by a mix of institutional forces (using China as a case example)
and empirically establish the importance of such forces on VCs' investment
criteria. Findings of this study are compared to each other according to the
funding sources/ownership structure of venture capital firm and broadly
accepted investment criteria.
In addition, the current literature on venture capital generally assumes a
strong institutional environment: secure property rights, mature market
intermediate institutions, friendly government regulations, and an
independent judicial system. However, these conditions are normally not
satisfied in developing or transition countries. As a result, the study expects
to establish that the difference in investment criteria cannot be simply
explained by one single factor like region, cultural tradition, political regime
or the level of economic development.
Further, previous studies did not verify whether foreign/multinational
venture capital investors will revise their investment criteria used in their
home countries (generally developed VC markets) to adapt to emerging
markets, such as China. The body of contradictory evidence suggests the
need to further examine where similarities or dissimilarities in investment
criteria of venture capitalists exist, not only between nations of the same
continent (i.e. Poland, Hungary, Japan and India), but also between countries
or even regions with different levels of economic development. Further, the
issue how the investment criteria of foreign/multinational venture capital
firms can be compared to the local counterparts that has never been studied
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in previous researches, however, is an indispensable part of this field. This
research pioneers to conduct massive field study on investment criteria
aiming at different groups of venture capital investors operating in China.
Therefore the results ultimately contribute to venture capitalists'
decision-making science.
At last, the study only focuses on China and hence hopes to draw forth
continued research on other countries in the future and hence expand the
body of knowledge.
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Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Introduction and Choice of Methodology
3.1.1 Introduction
Research methodology can be generally categorized into two types. One
is quantitative research and the other is qualitative research. Hammersley
identified (1996) general points of the difference between the two and which
are:
• The tendency for theory to come prior to data collection in
quantitative research (hypothetical-deduction) and to be an emergent
property of qualitative research (analytical induction);
• The tendency for quantitative researchers to seek generalisable
findings (scientific laws) and for qualitative researchers to emphasize
contextual understanding.
Bryman and Burgress (1999) generalised the core characteristics of
qualitative research and suggested that qualitative research is a strategy of
social research which deploys methods and displays a preference for: the
interpretation of social phenomena from the point of view of the meanings
employed by the people being studied; the deployment of natural rather than
artificial settings for the collection of data, and generating rather than testing
theory. Compared to qualitative research, the strengths and weakness of
quantitative approaches are analysed. Quantitative research is also described
by the terms "empiricism" (Leach 1990) and "positivism" (Duffy 1985).
Quantitative methods describes, tests and examines cause and effect
relationships between variables (Burns and Grove 1987), using a deductive
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process of knowledge elicitation (Duffy 1985). The research processes used in
the quantitative approach include descriptive, correlational,
quasi-experimental and experimental research (Cormack 1991). The strengths
of such methods is that both true experiments and quasi-experiments
provide sufficient information about the relationship between the variables
under investigation to enable prediction and control over future outcomes
(Duangtip 2009). This relies on the ability of the researcher to manipulate an
independent variable in order to study its effects on the dependent variable.
Researchers employing quantitative methods test theory deductively
from existing knowledge, through developing hypothesized relationships
and proposed outcomes for study, while qualitative researchers are guided
by certain perspectives, ideas, hunch regarding the actors to be investigated
(Cormack 1991). The investigator's role in a quantitative study is detached
and objective in order to understand the facts (Duffy 1986). Researchers
collect information through postal questionnaires. Even in interview surveys,
contacts are not the main source to solicit information. In fact, interviews are
carried out by hired staffs (Bryman 1988). Such a detached solicitation skills
of information can generally greatly increase the objectivity of study.
However, some argued that such strength is the weakness of quantitative
approach, especially where organisational research is concerned (Duangtip
2009), as it ignores the experiences of the subjects and regards human beings
as merely reacting and responding to the environment (Cormack 1991). This
causes difficulties in organisational research, because organisation uses an
holistic view of people and their environment (Duangtip 2009) and according
to Briones and Cecchini (1991), quantitative approaches do not permit this
approach.
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In contrast, in a qualitative research, theory is developed inductively.
Researchers interpret and describe in the language employed during the
research process (Leach 1990), while findings are not intended to be
quantified or presented in numerical data. Therefore the investigator has to
establish a closer relationship with the subjects than that in a quantitative
research. More importantly, subjects' perspective is the target to be
investigated, not the researcher (Duffy 1987), because the aim of a qualitative
research is to describe certain aspects of a social phenomenon in which the
subjects' viewpoints matter to it. This methodology is also termed as
phenomenology (Duffy 1985) or as a humanistic and idealistic approach
(Leach 1990). However, the presence of the investigator and the relationship
between the investigator and the subjects may distort findings and damage
objectivity.
In addition, in a quantitative research, it demands random selection of
the sample from the study population and the random assignment of the
samples to the various study groups (Duffy 1985). The advantage of results
obtained from random sampling is that the likelihood to generalise findings
is increased, while the weakness of a random selection is time-consuming
with the result that many researches use more easily obtained opportunistic
sample (Duffy 1985). Especially, if the sample is too small, the possibility to
generalise findings is prohibited. On the contrary, a qualitative research
usually employs a small and selective sample (Cormack 1991) due to the
in-depth nature that is required by the study. Therefore the weakness of a
qualitative research is that the researcher could have been influenced by a
particular predisposition, affecting the generalisability of the small scale
study (Bryman 1988) and the population validity is hence influenced.
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However, when the sample is well defined, the generalisation can be greatly
validated.
Moreover, the reliability of a quantitative study is often regarded as
more reliable than that of a qualitative research. The reason why is that
quantitative methods aims to control or eliminate extraneous variables
within the internal structure of the structure of the study, and the data
produced can also be assessed by standardised testing (Duffy 1985). Besides,
the weakness in quantitative research is that the more tightly controlled
study, the more difficult it becomes to confirm that the research situation is
like real life (Duangtip 2009). The more similar the research experiment is to
the natural setting the greater is the validity and thus generalisability of the
finding (Campell and Stanley 1963). In contrast, the subjects in a qualitative
study are studies in their natural setting and encounter fewer controlling
factors (Sandelowski 1986), therefore there are fewer threats to external
validity.
3.1.2 Choice of Methodology
The choice of methodology in this study is determined by the nature of
this research and the pragmatic considerations, especially the access to
venture capitalists and research data. The manifold methods to investigate
VCs' investment criteria described in the Table 2.2 can be divided into two
types: post-hoc methods and real-time methods. Studies used post-hoc
research methods (see Tyebjee and Bruno 1981, 1984; Bruno and Tyebjee 1985;
Gorman and Sahlman 1986; MacMillan, Siegel and SubbaNarasimha 1985;
MacMillan, Zemann, and SubbaNarasimha 1987; Kahn 1987) employing
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traditional ways of interviews and/or surveys, may be subject to post-hoc
rationalisation and recall biases as people are poor at introspection (Huber
and Power 1985; Golden 1992; Sandberg et al. 1987; Shepherd and
Zacharakis 1998). Post-hoc methods typically ask VCs to list and rank
decision criteria based on their assumed outcomes on the investment
decision (Sandberg et al. 1987). Data collected were often further analysed
with a variety of statistical methods, such as factor analysis and cluster
analysis. Problems are associated with retrospective reports because decision
maker may be motivated to bias the results (March and Feldman 1981),
report their "espoused" rather than "in-use" investment criteria (Shepherd
1999) as well as possible cognitive and perceptual limitations (Fischhoff
1982). In addition, factor analysis was often used in these studies but it is not
appropriate to investigate VCs' investment criteria when the sample is small
(Mark 2008), while qualitative methods are based on in-depth study of
simply one or a few entities (Briskman 1966; Driscoll 1974; Roberts 1991;
Silva 2004) in order to presents us a profile of the VC firm's operation. They
both are limited to the size of sample to generate meaningful conclusions.
Therefore later studies began to adopt real-time methods, such as
additive utility models (e.g. conjoint analysis) (see Riquelme and Rickards
1992; Muzyka et al. 1996; Zacharakis et al. 1998; Shepherd et al. 1998;
Shepherd 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis 1999; Zacharakis and Meyer 2000;
Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001; Shepherd et al. 2003; Bart et al. 2005) and
verbal protocol method (see Sandberg et al. 1988; Hall and Hofer 1993), to
investigate VCs' investment criteria. Sandberg et al. (1988) suggested that
verbal protocol analysis is a real-time experiments which require VCs to
"think aloud" as business proposals are being evaluated. Hall and Hofer
(1993) suggest that the verbal protocol method elicit richer knowledge and
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understanding of the decision making process while post-hoc methods only
focus on the results. However, the problem associated with the verbal
expression (to "think aloud") of knowledge is still a difficult task for experts
(Patel and D'Souza 2008). Riquelme and Rickards (1992) criticised that the
verbal protocol method is more than an "art" than a science while conjoint
analysis is more appropriate for the evaluation of VCs' investment criteria.
In addition, the analysis and interpretation involved in verbal protocol
techniques without being aided with other techniques, such as computer
algorithms, are likely to be subjective (Cooke and McDonald 1987; Riquelme
and Rickards 1992).
The quantitative approach - conjoint analysis has been used in many
fields in relation to decision making science, especially in marketing where it
has accumulated a strong tradition (Steward 1988, Green and Srinivasan
1990). Conjoint analysis is a general term referring to a technique that
requires respondents to make a series of judgments, based on profiles, from
which their "captured" decision processes can be decomposed into its
underlying structures i.e. the attributes' significance in the judgment, how
these attributes affect the judgment and the relative importance of each
attribute in the decision process (Shepherd and Zacharakis 1999). Riquelme
and Rickards (1992) was the first research, to the researcher's knowledge,
applying conjoint analysis to examine VCs' investment criteria, which allows
the investigation of what Argyris and Schon (1974) refer to as theories "in
use" in contrast to "espoused" theories of action. Conjoint analysis has its
unparalleled advantage over other methods and therefore is also adopted in
this research.
This research employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to
answer the research questions of the study. Since that empirical research on
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venture capitals in China and the investment strategies of foreign venture
capitals are rare, and theory development in many areas has not been able to
elaborate scale development, this study tries to explore a number of novel
theoretical constructs, and hence is regarded as an exploratory research. A
qualitative approach - grounded theory method is adopted to distinguish the
various entry strategies of foreign venture capitals and to examine the nature
of venture capital firms operating in China in order to provide a precise
categorisation of venture capital firms operating in China. Regarding the
exploration of in-use investment criteria, quantitative approaches - Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP), Delphi approach and Conjoint Analysis are jointly
applied to investigate the investment criteria of venture capital firms. The
evaluation approach consists of two levels of investment criteria and their
measurement scales shown as Appendix I. Specifically, AHP and Delphi
approaches are jointly used to discriminate the relative importance of
first-tier (generic) investment criteria while conjoint analysis is to identify the
values of second-tier (subordinate) investment criteria under their respective
generic category.
There are two reasons for applying multiple methods in this study. The
first reason is to reduce the difficulty in conducting questionnaire survey
when applying conjoint analysis; 26 evaluation attributes (second-tier
investment criteria) are generated from the three resources - conclusion of
past studies, pilot study concluding five venture capitalists representing four
different incorporation forms of venture capital firms operating in China and
suggestion of the researcher, each having 2 to three levels, resulting in 226
combinations (profiles) produced for testing. With the adoption of both AHP
approach and conjoint analysis, comparisons of profiles can be reduced to a
manageable level. The second reason is to reduce the probability of
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misinterpretation and generate a saturated analysis on each level of
investment criteria. The Delphi approach can assist in both the generation of
an initial set of first-tier investment criteria for further testing from the pilot
study and the summarization of conclusions when applying AHP approach.
This research forwards the proposition that venture capital firms
operating in China are diverse in nature of ownership and that research
results on the effects of ownership on entry strategies and investment
processes cannot be interpreted without a proper classification of these
venture capital firms. Therefore this study will first attempt to classify
venture capital firms according to their diverse ownership structure.
As a venture capital practitioner in China, the researcher agrees the
conclusion generated from previous studies that China has the institutional
environments that are entirely different from the US where the venture
capital selection value is originated. The researcher also believes that these
variances will drive all venture capitalists operating in China to amend their
original decision making criteria in order to adapt to local environments.
Therefore the study will identify what unique factors affect accept/reject
funding decisions of venture capitalists (VCs) operating in mainland China.
The integration of unique Chinese factors affecting investment decisions will
help examine the applicability of the US model to transition economies and
to China in particular and explain the difference and similarities. Next, this
study will examine how broadly accepted investment criteria are reshaped
by these identified unique China factors compared to those based on
developed VC markets and how they affect the entry strategies of foreign
venture capital investors into China. At last, this study will distinguish what
investment criteria are used by VCs in China and the relative importance of
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these investment criteria to the accept/reject decision of VCs. Results will also
be compared to those discovered in the US and other transition economies.
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3.2 Grounded Theory Approach
3.2.1 Misconception of Traditional Venture Capital Classification
The researcher suggests that the literature cannot be ignored if the target
research area is located in well-tilled soil. China's venture capital industry
and the approach by which venture capitalists evaluate ventures are
emerging territory for researchers in recent years; with particular reference to
the diverse nature of venture capitalists operating in China, their funding
sources and their ownership structures.
As a venture capital practitioner in Taiwan before this study, the
researcher was interested in probing whether there are differences and/or
similarities between diverse venture capital types in terms of ownership and
funding source when the research questions were initially formulated. More
specifically, it became important from the researcher's perspective to identify
the relationship between VCs' investment criteria and their funding source or
ownership. To answer this question, the research should be able to provide a
clear category and definition of all venture capitals operating in China.
Particularly, the study seeks to contribute to the gap in understanding on
how foreign venture capitalists enter a developing country, such as China.
Without such a clear understanding on entry strategy, a well-defined
categorization of venture capitalists operating in China and a related
understanding of their particular investment criteria would end in generality
or mere fable. Extant research to date has contributed little to this area, while
studies on developed countries, such as Poland (Bliss 1999) and Hungary
(Karsai et al 1997), have not based their conclusions on a clearly defined
categorization of venture capitals operating in these respective countries.
Therefore it is worth questioning whether the broadly accepted investment
criteria based on the US, for example, will be applicable to a US venture
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capital fund operating in China or a Chinese venture capital fund operating
in the US. By contrast, this research immerses itself in studying the
phenomenon using grounded study before any conclusion can be made.
Without a proper classification and understanding of the nature of
various venture capital firms operating in China, an in-depth study on any
issue of China's venture capital industry will not be feasible. It would ignore
the diverse nature of casual relationship between VCs' selection values and
fund investors. Traditional methods simply divide venture capital firms
operating in China into two types: foreign venture capital firms and Chinese
venture capital firms (CVC) (White et al. 2002, Zeng 2004, Guo 2008), or
generally offer no classification. Even Chinese official publications on the
statistics of Chinese venture capital industry, such as "Venture Capital
Development in China 2004" published by Ministry of Science of Technology
(MoST), have been dogmatic in classifying Chinese venture capital firms into
foreign-invested venture capital enterprises (FIVCEs) and Chinese-owned
venture capital enterprises (COVCEs) simply relying on the criteria whether
they are from overseas or not.
The Chinese government, unlike most of its counterparts in developed
countries, has played an active role in the venture capital industry through
forming favourable policies and directly pooling money to establish
investment companies or into its investment arms. These
government-initiated venture capital organizations are usually founded for
the fulfilment of local or central governments' objectives and managed by
local management team recruited from security houses, banks or even
government officers, rather than venture capital professionals. Affiliated
SOEs or listed Chinese companies are often invited to jointly invest in these
venture capital firms holding minority positions. In comparison, in a
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private-owned venture capital firm comprised of mixed Chinese investors
where the government holds either a minority stake or no interest, venture
capitalists may show more discretion in investment decision-makings than
that involving more government interest. Therefore it is reasonable to
suggest if a venture capital firm is solely comprised of private Chinese
investors, it is likely that the casual relationship between the investment
criteria of venture capitalists and the funding sources will be different from a
venture capital firm with sole government participation. Consequently, it is
necessary to subdivide the Chinese venture capital firms into separate
categories that represent different casual relationship betweens
decision-making behaviours of venture capitalists and fund investors. The
key element to ensure a valid categorisation of Chinese venture capital firms
is to generate sufficient data on the share of government ownership and the
extent of government influence over the decision making of venture
capitalists. This problem can be solved if one can access their financial
statements and obtain relevant and open feedback from a large sample of
venture capitalists in these firms. The researcher is responsible for the
Zero2IPO Research Centre where it periodically collects such data from over
90% of venture capital firms operating in China.
The classification of foreign venture capitals is rather complex. Foreign
venture capital firms/funds have adopted various strategies to maximise
their interests and decrease potential risks in China since the first foreign
venture capital fund - IDGVC entered China in 1987. Various entry strategies
have appeared in the incorporation forms of venture capital funds and roles
of foreign venture capitals play in the venture capital organization. For
example, in some Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms, where the foreign
partners have fewer shares of holdings than their Chinese partners, they are
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granted the power to manage the funds under predetermined conditions
(Kang 2007). The role of the Chinese investor is similar to a limited partner
(LP) with the foreign partner a general partner (GP) under this model. In
some extreme case where the Chinese investor put up their foreign reserves
into a venture capital fund registered offshore (disguised as foreign venture
capital fund into China market, e.g. the Legend capital), they are exempted
from the foreign venture capital grouping in order to seal in the polytonality
of Chinese venture capital firms. The main reason to disguise itself as a
foreign investor is to avoid strict domestic jurisdiction in capital flows and
foreign exchange controls which are not common in other developed markets
(Kang 2007). The selection process and criteria of foreign venture capitalists
investing in China may be similar to those used in their home markets.
In addition, some Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms are co-initiated
by the Chinese government and foreign governments with both political and
economic purposes, such as the Sino-Swiss Partnership Fund. Their
management style and investment values may be totally different from other
joint venture capital firms.
The above discussion points out the complex nature of venture capital
firms operating in China. Investment criteria of venture capitalists may be
strongly influenced by the ownership structure. Therefore it is of priority to
distinguish and categorise venture capital firms operating in China before
further examination can proceed. One purpose of this study is to provide
later studies an appropriate categorisation on China venture capital firms
and enlighten the importance of classification of venture capitals studying
transition economies.
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3.2.2 Adaptability of Grounded Theory Approach
Grounded theory is identified as one of the family of qualitative research
methods appropriate for outlining a set of essential qualities of complex
social phenomena (Dougherty 2002). A grounded theory approach is the
theoretical underpinning to design the research, in which in-depth
interviews and fieldwork observations are adopted (Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Sofaer 1999; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Glaser et al. (1967) suggest that
grounded theory is applied when a researcher does not begin a project with a
preconceived theory in mind, but rather with an area of study where theory
is allowed to emerge from the data. Grounded theory is thus a research
method that aims at presenting new theories that result from a thorough
analysis of empirical materials (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin
1994, 1998; Dougherty 2002). In comparison, case study is viewed as a choice
of object of study, and not a research method per se, although it is often used
as a general euphemism for qualitative research (Yin 1984).
As Martin and Turner (1986) stressed, grounded theory is best used
when no explicit hypotheses exist to be tested, or when such hypotheses do
exist but are too abstract to be tested in a logical, deductive manner. This is
where grounded theory is most appropriate-where researchers have an
interesting phenomenon without explanation and from which they seek to
"discover theory from data" (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Therefore, (the
researcher realized that) to adopt grounded theory is not to test hypothesis,
either overtly or unconsciously, but observe directly. That was the reason
why the researcher left for China to directly contact China venture capitalists
between 2004 and 2008 in order to achieve such an ideal. In addition,
although the researcher was not native speaker and unfamiliar with China
venture capital industry, the researcher may still be influenced by preexisting
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conceptualizations of career training during the days in Taiwan. Therefore,
the researcher had been deliberately kept the attitude and capacity to make
"familiar strange" (Spindler and Spindler 1982) from the beginning.
In addition, a successful grounded theory research has a clear creative
component (Roy 2006). In order to answer the original research questions, the
researcher made substantial efforts to interpret at each stage of coding and
deliberately made key decisions about which categories to focus on and
where to collect the next iteration of data, while avoiding the rigid
application of grounded theory techniques. Such implementation is termed
by Glaser (1978) as "theoretical sensitivity" to describe the essential tension
between the mechanical application of technique and the significance of
interpretive insight.
This research adopting grounded theory is built upon two key concepts:
constant comparison, in which data are collected and analyzed
simultaneously, and "theoretical sampling", in which decisions about which
data should be collected by the theory that is being constructed (Glaser and
Strauss 1967). Therefore it can be distinguished from phenomenology, which
attempts to capture the rich detail of interviewees' live experiences.
Phenomenologists often present data in relatively raw format to demonstrate
their authenticity and to permit a holistic interpretation of the subjects'
understanding of experience (Roy 2006). In a typical phenomenological study,
in-depth interview is the major means of probing interviewees' subjective
experiences (Wimpenny and Gass 2000), while in-depth interview is a means
of eliciting information on the targeted area of study in our grounded theory
approach. The purpose is to move from relatively superficial observations to
more abstract theoretical categories (Roy 2006). This is achieved by the
constant interplay and the manipulation of coding techniques between data
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collection and analysis. In our grounded theory approach, the researcher
continued to collect data until no new evidence appears. This process is
called "category saturation" and is one of the primary means of verification
in grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1988).
The most important question employing grounded theory is when to
capture the precise signals of saturation. According to Glaser and Strauss
(1967), saturation is a practical outcome of a researcher's assessment of the
quality and rigour of an emerging theoretical model: The criteria for
determining saturation are a combination of the empirical limits of the data,
the integration and density of the theory and the analyst's theoretical
sensitivity. Pragmatically, the researcher captured the signals of saturation in
this study including the repetition of some specific information and
confirmation of existing repetition of information and confirmation of
existing conceptual categories. In our grounded theory approach, the final
identified categories were also presented to subjects for their validation.
3.2.3 Grounding process
Interviews are one of the most intensively used methods of data
collection (Bryman and Burgress 1999). In qualitative research, there are three
major categories identified as "the family of qualitative interviews": the
structured (formal, standardized) interview, the non-directed (informal,
unstandardised interview, and semi-structured (semi-standardized)
interview (Berg 2000). The individual in-depth interviews which the
researcher conducted are face-to-face and semi-strucutured in nature, which
is one of the most common approaches to interviewing in qualitative
research (Bryman and Burgress 1999). This type of interview involves the
implementation of a number of predetermined interview guidelines.
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This study employs the replication logic to investigate the entry modes
of foreign venture capital. This method is broadly consistent with a
grounded theory approach to data gathering, analysis and interpretation
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Fried and Hisrich (1994)
used a similar method in examining venture capital decision making in the
US.
Interviews with venture capitalists in this study were guided by the
interview guidelines (see Appendix II), containing open-ended questions and
were tape-recorded for transcription, from which a list of domains of study
was generated. Totally 65 venture capitalists, out of 124, participated in Part
II of the Interview Guideline, as shown in Appendix II, were asked "How do
they invest in China?" before they were categorized as FVCFs or SJVCFs. All
individual interviewees are face-to-face and lasted on between one hour and
two hours. These questions are typically asked of each interviewee in a
systematic and consistent order, but the interviewer are allowed freedom to
disgress. That is, by using opened questions and both planned and
unplanned prompts, the interviewers are permitted to probe far beyond the
answers to their prepared and standardised questions (Berg 2000). Khera et
al. (2001) indicated that such semi-structured interviews allow the
respondents to determine the direction and content of the interview within a
broader framework provided by the interviewer.
Considering the very limited time that venture capitalists are willing to
spend in the interviews, even though the researcher can take advantage of
his "guanxi" during the post as their peer at Zero2IPO, the questions are
structured serially and condensed to a relatively comfortable level to
interviewees. Interview guidelines were divided into two main categories:
"About the Venture Capital Firm" and "How does your firm/fund invest in
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China?" and the later is divided into seven respective subsequent questions
as themes for coding. Such structured interviews allowed more systematic
and strategic data analysis later on. Besides, given the fact that China is
identified in this study as a unique context for venture capital activity and
there has been no established study concerning the entry modes of foreign
venture capitals into China, this study cannot compare the insights provided
by the first interviewee with previous findings. Therefore, seven essential
themes, as shown in Appendix II, were pre-determined by the researcher,
and they are:
• Do you have an offshore vehicle? If Yes, where is the offshore
vehicle?
• Do you manage the fund yourself? If no, who manage it for you?
Please describe in details how they manage it for you.
• Do you manage the fund for other venture capitals? If yes, who do
you manage it for? Please describe in details how you manage it for
them.
• Please describe in details how you invest in China from deal
origination to closing.
• How is the decision-making committee structured? Or what is the
decision-making mechanism?
• How do you manage the portfolio? What value-added activities do
you provide to portfolio companies?
• How do you exit?
The perceptions supplied by the first interviewee were viewed as a basic
model and presented to the next interviewee for validation, and the
framework was updated as necessary as the research progressed. All the
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interviews were taped-recorded and transcribed into verbatim transcripts. In
addition, content analysis was used to analyze the verbatim transcripts into
different themes, as an abundance of transcripts were used. Transcripts and
field notes were reviewed line by line and generated into themes by the
researcher and three part-time MBA students hired from Beijing University,
guided and reviewed by the researcher. Initial findings were sent to a 38
venture capitalists randomly selected from each category of venture capitals
operating in China for further validation.
By using thematic analysis, the interview data can be parsed into
information-rich quotations that were ultimately placed into thematic
categories. Data were therefore categorized and important concepts
pertaining to themes were emergent. The researcher also utilised the "open
coding" analytic techniques to categorise data and gradually important
concepts pertaining to themes were emergent.
Moreover, in order to clarify missing points or confirm some key
concepts, follow-up questions were asked by the researcher generally via
telephone or email, but few were through face-to-face interviews. Repeating
the course, data was condensed and made systematically comparable and a
consistent picture of entry strategy of foreign venture capitals into China
began to develop.
The final results were present to respondents themselves in order to
secure validity. In addition, "trustworthiness" should be a criterion of good
qualitative research (Bryman and Burgess 1999). Therefore, to assure the
trustworthiness and authenticity of our thematic analysis approach, the
researcher asked one of the hired MBA students (the new Coder) to re-code
the interviews. The new Coder thoroughly reviewed all tapes and transcripts
and selected all statements pertaining to the themes. The new Coder
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reviewed each statement to assess whether the statement reflects the relevant
themes. Any disagreement about the selection of statements was discussed
until consensus was reached. In addition, the researcher also adopted
Bryman and Burgess's (1999) suggestion to ask informants for checking the
credibility of our interpretation. At last, the reliability of statement was
increased by the use of semi-structured interview involving very specific
prompts, which facilitate the abstraction of relevant statements.
In addition, foreign venture capitals (excluding the capitals invested by
Sino-foreign joint venture capitals) investing in China together account for
79% of total investment volume in 2007 (Zero2IPO China Venture Capital
Annual Report 2007). These foreign investors come from the US, UK, France,
Germany, Japan, Taiwan, Israel, South Korea, etc., with different incentives,
entry and exit strategies. However, they commonly face regulatory restrains
in foreign exchange translation and control over capitals flowing outbound
as well as the lack of confidence in the consistency of China policy-execution
(Zero2IPO Research Centre 2008, Kang 2007), which may drive them utilise
various means to overcome these difficulties to gain their exposure in China.
The researcher considered it is a very unique Chinese factor that may
significantly affect the investment values of venture capitalists. Therefore the
researcher also took field notes, focusing on the complex and important
issues, including "How foreign venture capitals structure their investment
shareholding structure?", "Why foreign venture capitals consider
co-initiating joint venture capital funds with local partners, or why not?",
"Who the co-investors of the Sino-foreign joint venture capital funds are?
How the fund is managed, and by who?, "How they help Chinese investees
structure and list overseas, and why?", etc. This is especially essential to rule
out the possibility of misinterpretation and generalise their ideas. Without a
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clear understanding of these issues, it is unlikely to generalise meaningful
conclusions.
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3.3 AHP Method for First-tier Criteria
3.3.1 Introduction
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach was first introduced by
Thomas. L. Saaty in the 1970s (Saaty 1977, 1980). AHP is a multiple criteria
decision-making method combining quantitative and qualitative analysis
and simulates how human being solves a problem with the process of
decomposition, comparison and conclusion (Saaty 1980). In the typical AHP,
the decision maker is first asked to establish a hierarchy with at least two
levels for evaluating candidate alternatives. Each level includes many
competing criteria, each of which is assumed to be linearly independent from
one to another. Second, the decision maker should subjectively make
pair-wise comparison matrixes for their relative importance to the criterion
of the upper level and give scores from one to nine, each of which should
pass the consistent test. Third, the decision maker is supposed to judge the
relative importance (weight) among many competing criteria in each level
and finally the hierarchical additive weighing method is used to find the
priority of each alternative.
3.3.2 Process of Applying AHP Approach
To establish the AHP hierarchy is to discompose our target problem into
different dimensions, then each dimension into more subordinate pieces
until all factors are independently presented (Saaty 1980). The AHP
hierarchy for decision making can be illustrated as Figure 3.1 (Saaty 1980). In
this study, the number of subordinate factors to each respective dominant
factor was controlled less than nine in order to reduce the difficulty making
pair-wise comparisons and remaining judgment consistency. This is also
stressed by Saaty (1980).
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Figure 3.1 AHP Hierarchy of Decision Making
Principal eigenvector of the pair-wise comparison matrix derived from
the scaling ratios is used to find the relative importance among the criteria of
the hierarchy system. The AHP uses pair-wise comparisons to compare n
elements under given conditions and then convert initial verbal response
into a 9-point linguistic scale. Paired comparisons are based on standardised
evaluation scheme with 1 = equal importance, 3 = weak importance, 5 =
essential importance, 7 = demonstrated importance, 9 = absolute importance,
exhibited as Table 3.1. The results of the pair-wise comparisons are used to
construct a judgement matrix, and then the normalised eigenvector
corresponding to maximum eigenvalue (A max) can be calculated.
Table 3.1 Scale Definition of AHP Method
Scaling Definition
Summary of Evaluator's Experience and
Judgment
1 Equal Importance Two options have same contributions.
3 Weak Importance
One of the two options is moderately
favoured over the other.




One of the two options is very strongly
favoured over the other.
9 Absolute Importance
One of the two options is extremely favoured
over the other.
2,4,6,8 Intermediate Value When compromise is needed.
To calculate the relative importance of CI, C2, Cn to Bs of the upper
level, factors of level C are compared in pairs, shown as the following matrix:
C, 1 cl2 ••• CXn
Jg _ C21 C2\ C2n
_Cn\ Cn\ Cnn _
A consistent judgment matrix B should have the following characteristics:
CD cn=i
(2) Cij=l/ Cji
(3) Gj= Cik / qk (i, j, k=l, 2, ...n)
AHP method does not pursue absolute consistency but "closeness" to
consistency i.e. the results should meet basic requirements on consistency. In
addition, with the scale definition and decision-making hierarchy, Product
and Root method are used to calculate the relative importance (weights) of
subordinate factors to the dominate (upper level) factor. The calculation steps
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are stated as follows:
1. Multiply each factor in judgment matrix B by column to get a column
vector Bi;
2. Calculate the square-root of each factor in Bi and get the square-root
column vector B2;
3. Normalise B2 and get the weights of each factor





Suppose there is a set of n criteria in pairs according to their relative
weight (importance) scaling. Denote the criteria by c17 c2, cn and their
weights by w17 w2,...., wn. If w = ( wix w2,...v wn)£ is given, a matrix A of
the following equation can represent the pair-wise comparisons.
(A-AmaJ)w = 0
Where A is the matrix of the pair-wise comparison value derived from
the intuitive judgments. Then we can find the eigenvector w with its A max
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which satisfies Aw =A
max w. It has been shown that people usually judge with
a certain degree of inconsistency. Saaty (1980) used the consistency index
(C.I.) as an indicator of "closeness" to consistency, that is
C.I. = (A max -n)/(n-l)
As the larger the number of n the more difficult to arrive at consistency
of the judgment matrix, Saaty (1980) suggested to use R.I. (random index of
various kinds of scale system) to revise C.I. The values of R.I. are shown as
Table 3.2 for n = 1 to 15:
Table 3.2 Values of R.I. (for n=1 to 15)
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R.I. 0.0000 0.0000 0.5149 0.8931 1.1185 1.2494 1.3450
n 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
R.I 1.4200 1.4616 1.4874 1.5156 1.5405 1.5583 1.5779
where n<3, judgmentmatrix is consistent;
Or n>3, C.R. (consistency ratio) = C.I. / R.I.;
And the judgment matrix is consistent when C.R.<0.10, otherwise the
judgment matrix should be rebuilt. The derived value is zero if the
evaluator's judgment is totally consistent or one if inconsistent. The value of
A
max can be accepted if C. I. is not greater than 0.1.
Take the calculation process for the group FVCFs (foreign venture
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capital funds) as an example, the computation results shows:
A
mav = 10.12, which satisfies Aw = A w.Ill A lUctvv
The normalised eigenvectors w = (26.26%, 12.61%, 10.06%, 10.47%,
26.74%, 5.05%, 4.14%, 3.61%,
1.06%)
Moreover, C. I. is used to examine the consistency of the judgment
matrix, where C.I. = (Amax- n)l(n-l). R.I. is used to revise C.I, calculated as
follows:
A - n 10.12 - 9
C.R. = C.I. / R.I. = = = 0.09545 <0.10
RI(n - 1) 1 .4616(9 - 1)
Therefore the matrix can be trusted as judgment consistency. (Please also





The objective of Delphi applications is the reliable and creative
exploration of ideas or the production of suitable information for decision
making (Cornish 1977). It has been widely used to generate forecasts in
technology, education and other fields in decision science. The Delphi
method has been developed in order to make discussion between experts
possible without permitting a certain social interactive behaviour as happens
during a normal group discussion and hampers opinion forming (Wissema
1982). In fact, decision-makers usually have to rely on their own intuition or
on expert opinion (Baldwin 1975). The Delphi method is based on a
structured process for collecting and distilling knowledge from a group of
experts by means of a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled
opinion feedback (Adler and Ziglio 1996). Specifically, it comprises rounds (a
series) of questionnaires sent either by mail or via computerised systems, to a
group of experts which represents a certain set percentage of the original
sample. These questionnaires are designed to elicit and develop individual
responses to the problems posed and to enable the experts to refine their
views as the group's work progresses in accordance with the assigned task.
The main point behind the Delphi method is to overcome the disadvantages
of conventional committee action. Therefore Delphi represents a useful
communication device amongst a group of experts and facilitates the
formation of a group judgment (Helmer 1977).
This study follows typical Delphi process which includes three key
points: (1) structuring the ways of communication, (2) feedback to the
participants, and (3) anonymity for the participants. Apparently, these traits
may provide distinct advantages over the traditional face-to-face conference
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as a communication tool. The final conclusions generated in this study are
the results saturated through the repeated process of inquiries and feedbacks;
therefore they are trustworthy and representative. Further, the interactions
among participants are controlled by the researcher (Martino 1978). The
common problems of group dynamics are hence managed, controlled and
potentially bypassed.
3.4.2 Steps to Conduct Delphi Method
Delphi method is adopted to conclude the statistical results derived
from AHP approach. The most important issue in the Delphi process is the
understanding of the aim by all participants comprised by a group of experts
no more than 20 (Delbecq et al 1975). Otherwise the participants may answer
inappropriately and become frustrated or even lose interest. To overcome
this problem, all participants in this study were given detailed explanation
through emails or phone calls on why the Delphi process was exercised and
how and when questionnaires were delivered for the first time. The steps
applying Delphi approach in this study is constructed as follows:
1. The researcher first had to invite each 20 venture capitalists from the
participants of the three categories - FVCFs, GVCFs (Chinese
Government-controlled venture capital funds) and NGVCFs
(Non-Chinese government-controlled venture capital funds), and 8 from
the group SJVCFs (Sino-foreign joint venture capital funds). (This
research has successfully categorised venture capitals operating in China
into four categories with the employment of grounded theory. The
classification will be expounded in Chapter Four.) To apply the method,
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it requires participants providing more time and insights. As venture
capitalists may not agree to join in, the researcher did not have a
predetermined list of invitation but randomly make a few calls and send
invitation emails from returned questionnaires until the target number
of participants have reached. Therefore it is not an easy job to gather
enough participants in short time. It spent about two weeks to confirm
all the participation of venture capitalists.
2. Develop the first round Delphi questionnaire based on the original
statistical results compiled from the returned questionnaires applying
AHP approach and deliver the first round Delphi questionnaire to the
participants. Next, the researcher had to collect the questionnaire; then
analyse, draw the difference and similarity and summarise the results.
The purpose is to collect the response of the participants on the relative
importance among generic (first-tier) criteria derived from the
application of AHP approach. It took about two weeks to collect all
feedbacks from participants, as there was much time spent on
communication with participants.
3. Repeat the same process of the first round in the second round to record
the responses of participants on this subject. Each participant was
provided the summary derived from the first round summary in this
round. All participants' comments are anonymously exhibited. They
were asked to comment critically and compare the viewpoints of others,
and then revise the original viewpoint of his/her own. However, Chinese
venture capitalists tended to give their opinions in a euphemistical way,
even though the statements are shown anonymously. The researcher
had to spend even much more time on communication in order to
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confirm precise meanings with participants behind simply wordings.
Therefore it took about 8 weeks to collect all feedbacks.
4. Prepare the final report on the relative importance of generic (first-tier)
investment criteria. The conclusions are used for further analysis and
comparison.
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3.5 Conjoint Analysis for Second-tier Criteria
3.5.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework of conjoint analysis, or conjoint measurement,
was first developed by Luce and Turkey in 1964 and later introduced to the
marketing research community by Green and Rao in 1971. Judging by the
thousands of conjoint applications that have been conducted since 1970, it
has also become the most popular multi-attribute decision making model in
marketing (Wittink and Cattin 1989).
Conjoint analysis is one of the many techniques for dealing with
situations in which a decision maker has to choose among options that
simultaneously vary among two or more variables. Therefore it involves the
measurement of psychological judgments, such as subjects' preferences, or
acceptability, or perceived similarities or differences between choice
alternatives. The method utilises a combination of statistical skills, including
analysis of correlation, analysis of variance (ANOVA), scaling and rankings,
etc., to attribute all latent internal and external factors affecting decision task
of a subject and detect how these factors impact decision making behaviour.
3.5.2 Comparison of Conjoint Analysis and Traditional Methods
Traditional methods, such as regression analysis and discriminant
analysis, have been proved their shortcomings on decision science. This
study hopes to identify the real investment criteria used by venture
capitalists and examine the difference between diverse ownership structures
of venture capital funds operating in China. The accept/reject decision task
for venture capitalists can be viewed as a bundle of attributes. Investment
decisions can be made only when ventures pass the scrutiny activities of
venture capitalists (Fried and Hisrich 1994). These scrutiny activities include
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a series of assessment utilising the investment criteria firmly held by venture
capitalists. However, one of the limitations in decision science is that people
are poor at introspection and often suffer from recall and post-hoc
rationalization biases among others (Shepherd and Zacharakis 1998).
Traditional methods typically ask subjects to list and rank decision criteria
for decisions made in the past. Therefore traditional methods to identifying
VCs' investment criteria can end in the production of the "espoused" or
"self-explicated" investment criteria rather than the 'in-use" (Zacharakis and
Meyer 1998; Shepherd 1999). Such self-reported information or retrospective
reports are likely to produce biased results (Huber and Power 1985; Golden
1992; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998), due to the motivation of decision makers
to discriminate the result (March and Feldman 1981) or due to possible
cognitive and perceptual problems (Fischhoff 1982). For example, a
fast-growing venture ready for the debut on a stock market in the near future
will be not likely to be offered its shares at a low price per share to investors,
although both attributes (a fast-growing venture and low investment price)
may be claimed necessary by venture capitalists. Anttila (1992) argues the
advantage of Conjoint analysis over traditional methods, is that the former
can be used to evaluate the importance/utilities/part-worths of both
qualitative (such as brand name) and quantitative attributes. For example,
the prerequisite of regression analysis is the existence of a linear relationship
between total utility and product attributes and such a relationship derived
from past data is so stable that can be used to predict future situation.
However, the assumptions can not adapt well to estimate the mercurial
human or VCs' mentality in this research.
The process of data collection in conjoint analysis is rather simple.
Venture capitalists are only required to subjectively give scores and make
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pair-wise comparisons to different profiles influencing their accept/reject
decision. The overall evaluation results are discomposed into part-worths in
order to precisely gauge the utilities of each investment criterion and the
delineate whole the preference structure. Given that there may be certain
relationships between the criteria, researchers employing traditional methods
cannot distinguish the relationship between the scoring and these factors in
appearance. In comparison, Conjoint analysis solves the problem by
analyzing the marginal influence of one criterion each time on the overall
decision task while others remain unchanged. When all factors are
investigated, the relative importance of each factor to the decision task can be
derived. Therefore the utility value of each investment criterion in Conjoint
analysis can be compared to one another, including non-quantitative
attributes conforming to the nature of decision science. In addition,
traditional methods on multi-attribute decision-making problems are used to
observe the behaviour of a subject and synthesise all into a model, while
conjoint analysis assesses the evaluation results collected from each
individual to produce respective independent models as well as a compound
model.
This study adopts Conjoint analysis, a real-time method recognised by
Shepherd and Zacharakis (1998) that can eliminate many of these
aforementioned biases in the investigation into VCs' decision science, to
examine the "in use" investment criteria of venture capitalists operating in
China.
3.5.3 Steps to Conduct Conjoint analysis
The process to apply Conjoint analysis involves five steps in this study.
The first step is to define the attributes of investment decision. Traditional
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ways to achieve this may be through brainstorming, focus groups,
face-to-face interviews and findings of past studies. In addition to these
methods, observation of the researcher and a pilot study (deploying the
Delphi method) are used in this study to identify attributes for investment
decision making. Each attribute contains two to three levels. The total
number of attributes and their respective levels determine the number of
scenarios (profile) to be considered.
The second step is stimulus (profile) construction. In general, there are
two models to construct stimulus: pair-wise (or two-factor evaluation) and
full profile. In the pair-wise model, subjects are asked to evaluate two
attributes at a time and repeat the process till all attributes are done. In full
profile model, or multi-factor evaluation, a profile is a combination of a level
of all attributes and represents a set of investment criteria (or a
product/service). Like real world alternatives, full profile descriptors present
an integrated multi-attribute concept (Green, 1974). The model attempts to
represent decision alternatives in a realistic manner and has the advantage
that the respondent evaluates each profile holistically and in the context of all
other profiles. However, one weakness is that the burden on the subject
grows dramatically with the number of profiles that must be ranked. This
study employs the full profile model to construct profiles (stimuli) and
adopts an orthogonal design using SPSS to associate attributes and their
levels and determine the minimum required profiles to presenting in order to
reduce the burden of respondents. An orthogonal design is simply one in
which the levels of different attributes across profiles are uncorrelated
(Huber 2005). Such designs assure that an estimate of one attribute is
unaffected by the estimate of other attributes. The ability to implement a
design having larger numbers of attributes and levels (reduced through
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orthogonal array) has made this methodology the defacto standard for
conjoint analysis.
The third step is data collection. Each profile (a set of investment criteria)
is described by the levels of the features that it contains. Venture capitalists
are asked to give scores to all profiles based on their preferences and equal
scores to different profiles are allowed.
The fourth step is the analysis of data. In conjoint analysis, part-worths
are identified for the factor levels such that each specific combination of
part-worths equals the total utility of a given profile. Several approaches
can be applied to achieve this step, including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS),
Monotone Analysis of Variance (MONANOVA) and Logistic Regression
(LOGIT). The OLS approach to conjoint analysis is adopted in this study for
it offers a simple, yet robust method of deriving alternative forms of
respondent utilities. Johnston (1972) explained that the OLS procedure is the
most appropriate when a study includes a dependent variable that is interval
scaled. It also has the advantage of providing standard errors for the
estimated parameters (Gogan 1996-97). The objective of OLS conjoint
analysis is to produce a set of additive part-worth utilities that identify each
respondent's preference for each level of a set of decision criteria. In
application, the OLS model solves for utilities using a dummy matrix of
independent variables. Each independent variable indicates the presence or
absence of a particular investment criterion level. The dependent variable is
the respondent's evaluation of one of the profiles described by the
independent variables.
The fifth step is to assess the validity and reliability of statistical results
at one single subject level and aggregate level. While there are many
methods that can be used, the test-retest method is applied in this study. The
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method asks the same subjects proportional to the holistic sample to
re-evaluate the profiles or make pair-wise comparisons of attributes and then
examine the correlation between the two set of results derived at different
time. It is validated if most of the participants agreed on the results. The
purpose is to examine the reliability of overall results.
If the final results deviated from the principles of validity and reliability,
the original model must be reviewed and revised. The cycle to generate a real
set of investment criteria is re-entered in case of failure until the statistical
results are validated and trustworthy.
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3.6 Application of Software Tools
Software tools are deployed in this study including Microsoft Excel and
SPSS(13). As conjoint analysis in this study involves a series of quantitative
approaches, such as orthogonal design and OLS, it would be an
unmanageable task without the help of computer software. In AHP approach,
the researcher employs Microsoft Excel to compute the eigenvectors of the
9*9 matrix.
Specifically, the function "Categories" of SPSS(13) to assist data analysis
includes three independent processes used for conjoint analysis: "Orthplan",
"Plancards" and "Conjoint". The function "Categories" uses orthogonal
array in full profile method to reduce the profiles for the assessment of
respondents. "Orthplan" assists to frame partial or minimum required
profiles for testing. "Plancards" process help establish the cards where
selected profiles are recorded. OLS method is used in "Conjoint" process and
it allows subjects to give scores to profiles/cards.
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3.7 Pilot Study
The purpose of the pilot study was to produce an initial and
comprehensive set of (second-tier) investment criteria for further testing and
discover unique factors to investment criteria not mentioned in previous
studies. The set of investment criteria for formal testing was produced based
on three sources. Those broadly accepted investment criteria concluded from
the review of literature were first collected. Second, the investment criteria
not mentioned in previous studies concluded from five participating venture
capitalists operating in China. Third, "Background of Entrepreneur" and "A
Proven Business Model in Developed Countries" were also added to the
initial list of investment criteria for further testing from the observations of
the researcher. The former is added due to the observation of the researcher
as a venture capital practitioner in China. From hundreds of ventures
looking for funding each year, the researcher observed that many successful
entrepreneurs do not begin with "zero" but solid background or guanxi of
himself or his family. The latter is initiated as 79% of venture capital
investments in China are directly conducted by foreign venture capitals
(Zero2IPO China Venture Capital Annual Report 2007). Therefore the
researcher tries to test whether a successful business model based on
developed VC markets is transferrable to China (a transition economy) and
whether such successful experience will become valued in the decision
behaviour of venture capitalists in China.
The initial set of investment used for further testing are composed of
three resources - the broadly accepted investment criteria concluded from
the literature review, the in-use investment criteria of five pioneer venture
capital participants operating in China generated from pilot study, and the
observation of the researcher. The researcher has concluded the broadly
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investment criteria in Chapter 2 as shown in Table 2.2. The task now is to
solicit the in-use investment criteria from five participating venture
capitalists from the pilot study.
To follow the Delphi method, a team including five venture capitalists
was formed for the pilot study in the first place. These five VCs are all
acquaintances of the researcher during the post at Zero2IPO. The main
reason why selecting them is that they have each invested in at least 5 deals
in the past one year before this study and represented four different
incorporation form of venture capital firms. Therefore, their contribution can
reflect the investment criteria used by each type of venture capital firms to a
large extent.
The participants are explained in details about the objectives of this
study and the significance of their insights as well as how the researcher will
conduct this survey. The participants' experience and background are
summarised as Table 3.3 below (as required by the participants, only
surnames can be disclosed here).












Nationality Taiwan US China China US











Years of Experience 8 9 12 5 4
Deals invested in
the past one year
before this study
7 11 5 6 7
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The process collecting their inputs applying the Delphi approach mainly
counts on rounds of questionnaire. The first round Delphi questionnaire was
developed and e-mailed to the five participants; responses were collected
and analyzed. Each round of questionnaire was also analysed with the
assistance of excel.
The participants were requested to give their selection criteria that were
used in each of the invested ventures one year before this study and the
reasons that they use each of the criteria. The reasons provided are important
for further analysis and summarization. The participants did not know who
else participated in the pilot study. It must be noted that the researcher did
not provide any pre-held investment criteria or opinions for selection. Every
investment criterion write down by each participant are required to denote
the related deal invested.
The first round questionnaire took about one week to collect all feedback
from participants upon their receipt of the questionnaire. 25 investment
criteria were generated from the first round questionnaire. The results and
analysis were sent to the five participants in the second round questionnaire
as shown in Table 3.4. The Table exemplified the feedback of a Taiwan
venture capitalist representing WI Harper, incorporated in the form of a
foreign venture capital firm.
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Table 3.4 Results of First Round Questionnaire
Criterion Mentioned






l.Team sense of business
l 1.4
0.5 l.Yes V 3
environmental risks 5 2.No 2
2,Outside appraisal of entrepreneur l 1.2
0.4 l.Yes V 4
5 2.No 1
3.Relevant experience and recognised
l 1.0 0
l.Yes V 5
expertise of team 2.No 0
4.Administrative skills of team l 1.4
0.5 l.Yes 3






5 2.No V 2
6.Ease of market entry 2 1.6
0.5 l.Yes 7 2
5 2.No 3
7.A fast-growing market in several
1.2




8.Leadership in the market 1 1.4
0.5 l.Yes 3
5 2.No V 2
9.Product/service distinction I 1.2
0.4 l.Yes 7 4
5 2.No 1
lO.Product/service margin 2 1.6







12.Possibility to exit during a
1 1.2
0.4 l.Yes 7 4
tolerable period of time 5 2.No 1
13.Exit option practicable in the
1 1.4
0.5 l.Yes 7 3






15.Free from government restrictions l 1 0
l.Yes V 5
2.No 0





17.Level of venture equity valuation i 1.4






shareholders 5 2.No 2
19.Degree of involvement in venture 2 1.6
0.5 l.Yes 2
5 2.No V 3
20.Ralion of venture stake 2 1..6
0.5 l.Yes 2
5 2.No 7 3
21.Referred by other connections l.Yes V 3





22.Referred by fund investor other
1 1.6
0.5 l.Yes 3
than government 5 2.No ■J 2
23.Referred by relevant government
1 1.6
0.5 l.Yes 3
official other than fund investor 5 2.No ■J 2
24.Geographical location of the
1.8
0.4 l.Yes 1
venture 5 2.No V 4
25.Related to the concept of "high
2 1.6
0.5 l.Yes 2
tech" 5 2.No V 3
Second round questionnaires were delivered to each participant, which
record the responses of both other participants and their own responses
about the subject. Participants were asked to comment the viewpoints of
others and revise that of their own accordingly. When one participant's view
is very different from those of others, the participant is asked to provide an
explanation that the researcher sends to all the participants. Similarly, all
participants in this round were anonymous. It took about another efficient
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week to collect all five questionnaires. In this round questionnaire, the
criteria circulated by the participants were reduced to 24, in which
"Geographical location of the venture" disregarded as the criteria in use.
Repeating the analysis as the first round, results of second round
questionnaire, shown as Table 3.5, were presented to the five participants for
the third round. The first round results were also presented for the
comparison of participants. Table 3.5 shows that the participant has revised
its previous selection criteria in "1", "4", "6", "8", "10" and "21".
Table 3.5 Results of Second Round Questionnaire
Criterion Mentioned






l.Team sense of business
2 1.6 0.55
l.Yes 2
environmental risks 2.No 7 3
2,Outside appraisal of entrepreneur 1 1.2 0.45
l.Yes 7 4
2.No 1
3.Relevant experience and recognised
1 1.0 0
l.Yes 7 5
expertise of team 2.No 0









6.Ease of market entry 2 1.6 0.55
l.Yes 2
2.No 7 3








1 1.2 0.45 l.Yes 7 4
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2.No 1
lO.Product/service margin 2 1.6 0.55
l.Yes 2
2.No V 3
11.Proprietary product/service 2 1.6 0.55
l.Yes V 2
2.No 3
12.Possibility to exit during a














15.Free from government restrictions 1 1.0 0
l.Yes 7 5
2.No 0
16.Expected investment returns 1 1.4 0.55
l.Yes 7 3
2.No 2








19.Degree of involvement in venture 2 1.2 0.45
l.Yes 1
2.No 7 4
20.Ration of venture stake 2 1.2 0.45
l.Yes 1
2.No V 4
21.Referred by other connections










23.Referred by relevant government










25.Related to the concept of "high
2 1.2 0.45
l.Yes 1
tech" 2.No V 4
Repeating the same process, in the third and fourth round, the results
were not different. The results were sent to each participant and the
researcher followed to validate such results with each participant. It is worth
noted that "Geographical location of the venture" was not favoured by any
of the five participants in the third and fourth round. Therefore it should be
excluded from our final list of investment criteria.
After four rounds of questionnaire implementation, the conclusions
derived from the Delphi method were generated as shown in Table 3.6, in
which "2" under the "Source" column denotes the conclusion of the Delphi
method. It is important to mention that the conclusions of each investment
criterion employing Delphi method received at least one "yes" answer from
one participant. In total, 24 in-use investment criteria were concluded from
the Delphi Method.
Table 3.6 exhibits 26 of investment (second-tier) criteria incorporating
the conclusions derived from pilot study employing Delphi method, broadly
accepted investment criteria and those suggested by the researcher are
prepared for further testing. These 26 investment criteria will be used as the
basis for further testing.
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Second-tier (Subordinate) Criteria Source
Managerial
Capabilities
Team sense of business environmental risks 1,2
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur 1,2
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of
team
1,2
Administrative skills of team 1,2
Leadership potential of entrepreneur 1,2
Market
Prospect
Ease of market entry 1,2
A fast-growing market in several years 1,2






Related to the concept of "high tech" 1,2
Exit
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time 1,2
Exit option practicable in the future 2
Government
Influence
Government supported/protected industries 2
Free from government restrictions 2
Financial
Considerations
Expected investment returns 1,2
Level of venture equity valuation 1,2
Shareholding
structure
Background of venture shareholders 2
Degree of involvement in venture 2
Ration of venture stake 2
Guanxi
Referred by other connections other than
government and fund investor
2
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Referred by fund investor other than government 2
Referred by relevant government official other
than fund investor
2
Background of entrepreneur 3
Others A proven business model in developed countries 3
Note: "1" represents the second-tier criterion mentioned in past studies, "2" the conclusions
derived from pilot study and "3" the researcher.
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3.8 Sample and Data Collection
3.8.1 Sample
This study does not limit itself to any sampling method but simply
count on personal connections (Guanxi) of the researcher in China venture
capital cycle because venture capitalists are generally poor informants in
nature for academic researches according to the understanding and practical
experience of the researcher. Therefore any predetermined sampling method
will face the risk getting insufficient sample data.
Zero2IPO Group has played an influential role in China venture capital
industry. Zero2IPO Research Centre provides the one and only research
information and deals' database for all China venture capital practitioners. In
addition, Zero2IPO China Venture Capital Annual and Semi-annual Forums
held periodically are the largest events in this cycle. In addition, the Group
also manages a venture capital fund and provides financial advisory services
for ventures at all stages and various transaction types. Therefore during the
post as the managing director of Zero2IPO Group, the researcher can
establish good personal connections (guanxi) to many (senior) venture
capitalists operating in China. With the assistance of guanxi of the researcher
and Zero2IPO China Venture Capital and Private Equity Directory 2007 as
well as the online Zero2IPO China Venture Database, the researcher can get
access to almost all venture capital investors active in China.
According to Zero2IPO Research Centre, there are 288 venture capital
firms operating in China pooling the total capital available for investment in
the mainland of US$19,086 billion by the end of 2006. Although the number
of foreign venture capital firms (FVCFs) and Sino-foreign joint venture
capital firms (SJVCFs) together account for only 27.28% (80/288) of total
venture capital firms operating in mainland China, they stand for 72.49% of
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total capital available for investment in China by 2006. Thus FVCFs and
SJVCFs are the main driver of China's venture capital investments.
Our fieldwork interviewed 124 VCs representing 112 firms, mostly
centred in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen as shown in Table 3.7, that
represent a total capital pool of US$16.10 billion available for investment in
mainland China by the end of 2006. Over 70% of FVCFs and SJVCFs
participated in the survey, representing 94.12% and 67.20% of total capital
available for investment in mainland China respectively. Likewise, the
number of non-Chinese government-controlled venture capital firms
(NGVCFs) and Chinese government-controlled venture capital firms (GVCFs)
interviewed accounted for 27.18% and 23.81% respectively, but they both
represented over half the total capital available for investment in the
mainland respectively, illustrated as Table 3.8. Therefore the sample size and
conclusions generated in this survey can be considered significant in
representing China venture capital industry.
Table 3.7 Geographical Location of Respondents by Investment Type
Type
Location
FVCF SJVCF NGVCF GVCF Total
Beijing 24 12 8 6 50
Shanghai 18 2 10 3 30
Shenzhen 3 6 6 2 16
Hu Nan 0 0 0 2 2
He Bei 0 0 0 1 1
Tien Jin 0 0 0 3 4
Zhe Jiang 0 0 5 2 4
Shan Dong 0 0 0 2 3
Guang Dong 0 0 2 2 7
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Si Chuan 0 0 0 2 4
Hu Bei 0 0 0 1 2
Chong Qing 0 0 0 2 1
Total 45 20 31 28 124
Table 3.8 Number of Respondents, VC Firms and Total Capital Available for
Investment in Mainland China
Type No. of
Interviewees
No. of Interviewed/ Total
VC Firms in Mainland
China (%)
Interviewed/Total Capital
Available for Investment in
Mainland China (%) (US$M)
FVCF 45 40/56 (71.43%) 12,488/13,268 (94.12%)
SFJVCF 20 19/24 (79.17%) 381/567 (67.20%)
NGVCF 31 28/103 (27.18%) 2,598/4,095 (63.44%)
GVCF 28 25/105 (23.81%) 635/1,154 (54.99%)
Total 124 112/288 (38.89%) 16,101/19,086 (84.36%)
The average age and experience of venture capitalists in FVCFs and
SJVCFs are older and longer than those of NGVCF and GVCF included in the
sample, since China's venture capital industry started much later (1985) than
their foreign counterparts as shown in Table 3.9. In addition, Table 3.10
shows that the participants of the survey are with the positions of senior
investment manager and above.
Table 3.9 Average Age, Average Years of Experience in VC Industry and VC Firm by
Respondent
Type Average Age of
Interviewees
Average Years of
Experience in VC Industry
Average Years of
Experience in the VC
Firm
FVCF 34.2 6.5 3.3
SFJVCF 41.1 8.1 4.5
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NGVCF 28.7 2.3 2.1
GVCF 30.1 3.1 2.5








FVCF 24 9 12 45
SFJVCF 12 4 4 20
NGVCF 2 13 16 31
GVCF 0 11 17 28
Total 38 37 49 124
3.8.2 Data Collection
Both face-to-face interviews and questionnaire surveys were used to
collect data in this study. Interviews were conducted intensively in Beijing,
Shanghai, Shenzhen and some second-tier provincial cities, such as
Hangzhou and Tianjing. Questionnaires were given after the interviews.
There are four reasons for applying this dual data collection method. Firstly,
face-to-face conversation is an essential and appropriate step to establish
bilateral trust in China excelling telephone or email contacts. A traditional
Chinese saying "Jian Mian San Fen Qing", which means "meeting in person
greatly enhances the relationship", best explains why face-to-face
conversation can produce unexpected chemical reactions and interpersonal
credits in the Confucian society. The guanxi established through the
interview is also helpful for the later communication and collection of
questionnaire. Secondly, the strong connections of Zero2IPO Group and the
researcher self with venture capital firms and VCs respectively also
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encouraged the use of face-to-face interview. Thirdly, face-to-face interview
allows spontaneous discussion of problems arising during the interview
process. Lastly face-to-face interviews are most relevant in applying a
grounded theory approach as the method requires participants offer their
insights in details on a designated topic.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, interviews with venture capitalists
were guided by interview guidelines containing open-ended questions and
were tape-recorded for transcription, from which a list of domains of study
was generated. Such structured interviews allowed more systematic and
strategic data analysis later on. The researcher also needed to take
observation/field notes, focusing especially on complex issues, such as the
investment structures of foreign venture capital firms. This was especially
essential to rule out the possibility of misinterpretation and to ensure data
quality. Following the interview guidelines, the researcher got a thorough
understanding of the research questions during the interviews.
The interview was structured into three parts. Firstly, each interviewee
was provided an initial classification of venture capital firms by the
researcher: FVCF, SJVCF, NGVCF and GVCF. Each subject was asked to state
their fund/firm ownership and management structure. Then they were asked
to classify themselves into one of the groups based on the synthesised
consideration of fund/firm ownership and management control. If the subject
was with a FVCF or SJVCF, he/she was given the further question to depict
how they entered the Chinese market and how they structured capital flows
into China. The initial framework discussed with the first interviewee
represented the base model employed. The model with information supplied
in previous interviews was presented to the next interviewee for validation,
and the framework updated as necessary. Insights provided by each
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interviewee were also compared to the established Western framework of
venture capital during the interviews. Deals origination mentioned in the
interviews were recorded in order to understand the relationship between
the type of venture capital firms and deal informants and between
informants and selection process.
Secondly, at the end of each interview, the subjects were given a
questionnaire in both printed and electronic versions for the other research
questions on investment criteria. The researcher explained in details to each
subject about the questionnaire survey. They were all given two weeks to
finish the questionnaire.
Finally, every interviewee was asked to confirm his/her answer on the
categorisation of their venture capital firm. This question is especially
important for Chinese venture capitalists as some of them may be inclined to
deny the influence of government power. Chinese venture capital firms are
generally incorporated in the form of limited liability rather than limited
partnership, with funding source either from the government or the private
sector. Indeed, two venture capitalists chose to be with NGVCF at first but
changed to GVCF at the end of interview.
In total, 124 VCs were interviewed with each interview lasting between
one hour and two hours, with 110 interviews conducted in Chinese language
and 14 in English. All interviews were taped and transcribed after each
interview. Follow-up questions were mostly conducted through email and
telephone. Two venture capitalists had second interviews as the interviewees
were forced to leave for other interrupted appointments in the first interview.
In addition, the researcher generally attempted to interview the most
senior person in the firm, such as a partner or managing partner. However,
some of these people preferred to keep a low profile and therefore asked
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their colleagues to take the interview instead. It is also worth noting that the
researcher luckily had only two refusals requesting interviews. This is likely
the result of the strong guanxi possessed by the researcher with the subjects
and the influence and reputation of the Zero2IPO Group in China venture
capital cycle.
3.8.3 Questionnaire Design
Two different set of questionnaires, as shown in Appendix VII, were
designed for the application of the AHP method and conjoint analysis
respectively in order to investigate the relative importance among first-tier
(generic) criteria and among their second-tier (subordinate) criteria.
3.8.3.1 Questionnaire for AHP Method
To classify the relative importance among generic criteria, the AHP
judgment matrix was designed to generate required data, and the
questionnaire created accordingly.
The essence of this questionnaire is to make pair-wise comparisons of
the generic investment criteria, illustrated as follows (Please also refer to
Table 4.2 for the results applying AHP judgmentmatrix):
Part I. Please Make Pair-wise Comparisons of the Generic Investment Criteria
Provided in the Matrix
Instructions:
Please use 1, 2, 3,....9 or 1, 1/2, 1/3,....1/9 to specify the relative
importance of one generic investment criteria to the other and fill in the
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blank. For example, "1" means they both are equally important to investment
decision-making, while "9" means the former is extremely more important
than the latter. In comparison, 1/2 means the former is somewhat less
important than the latter and 1/9 the former is extremely less important than
the latter.
Question 1: Managerial Capabilities vs. Market Prospect
3
Question 2: Managerial Capabilities vs. Product/Service Differentiation
5
Question 3: Managerial Capabilities vs. Exit 4
3.8.3.2 Questionnaire for Conjoint Method
Conjoint analysis is employed to calculate the relative importance of
second-tier (subordinate) evaluation criteria relative to their respective
first-tier (generic) category. There are nine generic categories containing 26
subordinate evaluation criteria summarized as Table 3.5, among which eight
generic categories are comprised of two to five subordinate evaluation
criteria and one generic category has only one. Therefore eight different
questionnaires were prepared for the investigation. Each questionnaire is
consisted of several cards and each card is an association of various levels of
subordinate evaluation criteria representing one generic category as shown
in Table 3.11.
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1 Moderate Fair Medium Fair Strong
2 Moderate Good Weak Good Weak
3 High Fair Weak Good Medium
4 Low Poor Weak Poor Strong
5 High Good Strong Good Strong
6 High Good Medium Poor Strong
7 Low Good Medium Good Weak
8 High Poor Strong Fair Weak
9 High Poor Medium Good Medium
10 Moderate Poor Strong Good Strong
11 Low Good Strong Fair Medium
12 Moderate Good Strong Poor Medium
13 High Good Weak Fair Strong
14 Low Fair Strong Good Strong
15 High Good Strong Good Strong
16 High Fair Strong Poor Weak
Such associations and the number of cards in each card were all
produced through orthogonal array in order to reduce the frequency of
comparison to the manageable level. For example, to evaluate the importance
of the five subordinate evaluation criteria of managerial capabilities and each
criteria has three levels, 35=243 combinations are needed to be investigated
which is mission impossible for subjects in application. With the assistance
of orthogonal array, just sixteen associations are enough to represent the
whole ones.
Furthermore, subjects were asked to give one score to each sixteen cards
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from one to nine according to their preferences with 1 representing the most
preferred and 9 the least, as illustrated below.
Part II. Please give one score to each of the following sixteen cards for the
measurement of "Managerial Capabilities".
Instructions: Please give one score to each of the following sixteen cards from
one to nine where 1 represents the most preferred and 9 the least.
Card 1
■ Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
■ Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Fair
■ Relevant experience & recognised expertise of team Medium
■ Administrative skills of team Fair
■ Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Score
Card 2
■ Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
■ Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
■ Relevant experience & recognised expertise of team Weak
■ Administrative skills of team Good
■ Leadership potential of entrepreneur Weak
Score
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3.9 Measurement of Reliability and Validation
Reliability Measurement
The purpose of reliability examination is to test the consistency of a
study or questionnaire. Kirk and Miller (1986) identify three types of
reliability referred to in quantitative research, which relate to: (1) the degree
to which a measurement, given repeatedly, remains the same (2) the stability
of a measurement over time; and (3) the similarity of measurements within a
given time period. Charles (1995) adhered to suggest that consistency with
which questionnaire items are answered or respondents' scores remain
relatively the same can be determined through the test-retest method at two
different times. Therefore a measurement is proved to be reliable or
consistent if the measurement can produce similar results in similar
circumstances i.e. the results are repeatable. Reliability can be estimated in
several ways, such as split half reliability, test-retest reliability and inter-rater
reliability method.
Test-retest reliability refers to the estimation based on the correlation
between two (or more) administrations of the same item, scale, or instrument
for different times, locations, or populations, when the two administrations
do not differ on other relevant variables (typically, the Spearman Brown
coefficient). The appropriate length of the interval depends on the stability of
the variables which causally determine that which is measured. Statistically,
test-retest reliability is treated as a variant of split-half reliability and also
uses the Spearman-Brown coefficient. Inter-rater reliability, measuring
homogeneity, is administering in the same form to the same people by two or
more raters/interviewers so as to establish the extent of consensus on use of
the instrument by those who administer it.
Split half reliability is a measure of internal consistency where a test is
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split in two and the scores for each half of the test is compared with one
another. It is administering two equivalent batteries of items measuring the
same thing in the same instrument to the same people. The magnitude of the
Cronbach alpha estimates is appropriate for the proof of the reliability
(Henson, 2001). Cronbach's alpha can be interpreted as the percent of
variance the observed scale would explain in the hypothetical true scale
composed of all possible items. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the
correlation of the observed scale with all possible other scales measuring the
same thing and using the same number of items. Alpha is calculated as
follows:
a ——^, Where
1 + (k -1)r
k is total number of items;
F is the average inter-item correlations
Assisted by SPSS(13), split half reliability is entrusted in this study. Basic
construct of split-half reliability measurement is to divide the retrieved
questionnaire into half (62-62) and calculated both of their coefficients of
Cronbach's Alpha. Alpha equals zero when the true score is not measured at
all and there is only an error component. Alpha equals 1.0 when all items
measure only the true score and there is no error component. Generally, if
Cronbach Alpha is greater is greater than 0.9, the questionnaire is judged as
"very reliable"; if it is between 0.9 and 0.8, it is regarded as "reliable". If it is
between 0.8 and 0.7, it is considered as acceptable but there may be some
problems in questionnaire design. If it is below 0.7, it implies serious
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problems in the questionnaires and should consider redesign or revise the
questionnaire.
In SPSS(13)/ select "Analyze", "Scale", "Reliability Analysis"; "list
variables"; "click Statistics"; select "Item Scale"; select "Split-Half" from the
Model drop-down list. SPSS(13) takes the first half of the items as the first
split form, and the second half as listed in the dialog box as the second split
form. In this study, Cronbach Alpha coefficients obtained for the two
questionnaires adopting AHP method and conjoint analysis are 0.8154 and
0.8367 respectively. Therefore both of questionnaires applied in this study
can be regarded as "reliable", according to definition of Kerlinger (1986).
However, the researcher suggests that sample size does matter to the
replication of the research results, the proper classification of China venture
capital firms and ultimately the success of this study. The key to conduct this
research is that the researcher has strong personal connection/guanxi with
venture capitalists operating in China and the influence of the Company
(Zero2IPO Group) the researcher works with. Therefore the researcher
suggests that the study can be difficult to replicate due to the problem to
produce the same sample size.
Validity
The purpose of validity measurement in this study is to examine to what
degree our results and findings can accurately address our research
objectives. There are two basic requirements to recognise the validity of the
study: if our measures actually measure what the study intends to (Joppe
2000, Meister 2004, Suter 2006), and if there is no logical error in drawing
conclusions from the data.
The grounding results on the entry strategy of foreign venture capitals
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and categorization of China venture capital firms as well as the findings on
investment criteria are sent to a selected number of VCs in four categories for
further validation through emails. In total, 38 VCs ( 13 FVCFs, 8 SJVCFs, 8
NGVCFs and 9 GVCFs) participated in the validation. None of the feedbacks
from these participants were negative to our results and conclusions.
Therefore it can be asserted that our questionnaire and research methods
properly and accurately address validity and reliability challenges within our
research design.
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Chapter 4 Results and Findings
In this chapter, findings first presents the diverse entry strategies of
foreign venture capital investors into China according to the grounding
results and classified all venture capital firms into four categories: foreign
venture capital firms (FVCFs), Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms
(SJVCFs), Chinese government-controlled venture capital firms (GVCFs) and
non-Chinese government-controlled venture capital firms (NGVCFs). Based
on the statistical results, sets of investment criteria used by various groups of
venture capitalists operating in China are generated, compared to one
another and those developed in developed venture capital markets as well as
transition economies. Viewpoints given by interviewees are incorporated
into the results in order to present readers most close interpretations of the
conclusions and address the research questions.
4.1 Entry Modes of Foreign Venture Capitals and Classification of
Venture Capitals in China
4.1.1 Significance of Classification
The grounding results indicate that most foreign venture capital
investors do not directly register venture capital funds/firms in mainland
China. Instead, they register offshore especially in the so-called 'tax heavens',
such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda and BVI (British Virgin Islands), in the
incorporation form of a limited partnership or limited company while
establishing a branch office onshore and generally hiring returnees with US
venture capital experience to manage all investment and post-investment
management activities. Further, as exits in local markets are still difficult for
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foreign venture capital investors - due to the legal hurdles to setting a foreign
venture capital firm, high domestic listing requirements, foreign currency
translation and capital controls - these foreign venture capital investors
demonstrate innovativeness to enable foreign listings via the so-called "red
chip" model (Chinese companies listing on foreign capital markets through
overseas holding vehicles). In addition, as Chinese enterprises generally lack
the experience and knowledge about international financial market practices
(Kang 2007), substantial efforts must be added to portfolio companies for
foreign listings. Generally, venture capitalists with US experience and
practice are more familiar with US listing requirements and inclined to
liquidate their investment on US capital markets (Zero2IPO China Venture
Capital Annual Report 2006).
Findings from foreign venture capitalists and the understanding of the
researcher from practical operation experience, the researcher suggest five
reasons for this circuitous investment strategy. Firstly, under such a model,
the foreign venture capital fund itself can be formed and managed in a
foreign jurisdiction where the conventional structure can be applied without
the legal barriers and foreign exchange and capital controls. The essence of
the investment structure is to utilise a foreign legal system to create certain
investors' rights, such as the conventional privileges attached to preferred
shares, tag-along rights, registration rights, etc, which are not presented
under Chinese laws. An offshore vehicle may adopt a stock option scheme,
which is also not available under Chinese laws.
Secondly, with overseas vehicles, foreign venture capital investors can
sell their interests via IPO on overseas markets or trade sale to the overseas
third party for liquidation. The investment cycle is hence completed wholly
in foreign currency (mostly US dollars) eluding the predicaments involved
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with local currency (Kang 2007).
Thirdly, domestic money, including funds of Sino-foreign joint venture
capital firms, is not allowed to invest in an offshore company, unless
approved by Moftec (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation).
The reasons behind the control are that Chinese policy encourages domestic
listing and attempts to curb capital flights. In other words, if a foreign
investor invests in a Sino-foreign joint venture capital firm, they invest in an
entity registered onshore with Chinese Yuan, while venture capitals invest in
a Chinese venture registered overseas with foreign currency.
Fourthly, raising new funds in China for foreign venture capital
investors is very difficult. As the government policy still encourages using
foreign capitals, local LPs (generally local governments and large-scale SOEs)
are very reluctant to invest in foreign venture capital funds. In contrast,
through the offshore holding structure, venture capital firms can freely raise
new funds from worldwide LPs. Lastly, as the intellectual property (IP)
protection in China is still very weak (White et al 2000), by investing in an
offshore company, the IP owned by Chinese enterprises or individuals can be
protected and freely transferred under foreign jurisdiction.
Why do foreign venture capitals choose to establish a Sino-foreign
venture capital firm/fund instead a wholly foreign-owned venture capital
firm? The researcher suggests that the motives can be classified into three
categories. Firstly, it is to avoid political interference. For example, Taiwan
venture capitalists have been active in China since the mid-90s'. With the aid
of same language, cultural origin and well-trained venture capitalists
practicing US disciplines, Taiwan venture capitalists have gained inherent
advantages over their foreign counterparts in China. However, the Taiwan
government has put up strict restrictions against the direct transfer of
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venture capital money into the mainland. Therefore, some Taiwanese venture
capital firms, such as Fortune Venture Investment Group and the Singapore
listed Hotung Group (SGX. Hotung) chose to establish Sino-foreign joint
venture capital firms with local governments or their investment affiliates to
compensate for the deficiency of funding sources.
Secondly, it is to seek economic cooperation in China with both
diplomatic and economic motives. The Chinese government has established
three such venture capital funds with Switzerland, Israel and Belgium
respectively. Thirdly, it is to utilise the local connection of Chinese partners to
originate deals, especially state-owned companies. Many venture capitals
from US and Europe adopted this strategy since the mid-90s' in order to
bridge the gap in cultural and regulatory environments based on Zero2IPO
China Venture Database. However, rarely has this strategy been replicated
since the recovery of worldwide internet bubble when more potential private
enterprises emerged and many returnees with US venture capital practice
have returned to China market.
In comparison, Chinese venture capital firms, whether they are Chinese
government-controlled or not, tend to only possess capital denominated in
Chinese Yuan and are only allowed to invest in ventures registered in the
mainland unless government approval is received. With these limitations,
they usually seek exit through domestic capital markets or assets and equity
exchange centres located in first-tier Chinese cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai
and Wuhan. Further, some Chinese venture capital investors may seek to
establish Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms with foreign counterparts
because they generally lack the expertise of experienced venture capitalists to
run a fully state-owned venture capital firm. While the incorporation form as
a Sino-foreign joint venture capital firm is much smaller a group in quantity
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than other forms of incorporation, it is a form that many foreign venture
capitals first consider when diversifying into China. However, the worries
over the discrepant investment values and whether a harmonious
decision-making structure can be produced between the dyads account for
the relinquishments from the observation of the researcher.
4.1.2 Entry modes of Foreign Venture Capitals
The researcher interviewed a total of 65 foreign venture capitalists
representing 40 FVCFs and 19 SJVCFs for the entry model of foreign venture
capitals with the grounded theory approach. Venture capitalists were asked
to depict how they entered the Chinese market and how they structured
capital flows into China. The initial framework discussed with the first
interviewee represented the basic model employed. The model with
information supplied in previous interviews was presented to the next
interviewee for validation, and the framework updated as necessary. Each
respondent was also required to confirm their category of venture capital
firms. Findings were examined and ten distinct entry modes were identified
as being deployed by foreign venture capitalists when they first enter the
Chinese market. The ten modes are discussed respectively as follows:
Mode 1 - The Common Entry Mode
Figure 4.1 shows the most common entry mode of foreign venture
capitals. As shown, a foreign venture capital firm/fund is registered offshore
and sets up an onshore branch office and management team responsible for
investment and post-investment management activities in China. Foreign
venture capital firms generally are backed by pension funds, insurance
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companies, fund of funds, banks and so forth, purely focused on future
financial returns (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2007).
Offshore Onshore
Figure 4.1 Common Entry Mode
When a Chinese venture is granted funding, foreign venture capitalists
will help the venture establish the offshore holding structure and invest in
the offshore holding vehicle. Then the offshore vehicle will acquire the
onshore operation entity by means of a shares exchange or cash purchase.
After the acquisition, onshore Chinese venture will become a
foreign-invested enterprise (FIE), a Sino-foreign joint venture (JV) or a
wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) depending on the shareholding
ratio of the offshore company from a wholly Chinese-owned enterprise
(WCOE). The investment contract is entered between the offshore entity and
the foreign venture capital investor which entails the terms on both parties.
The domestic entity is responsible for all business activities and transactions
after the acquisition, rather than the offshore vehicle. With this structure, the
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foreign venture capital investor can easily exit from the investment through
the sale of interests in the offshore company to a third party or overseas
listings.
Mode 2 - The Derivate of Mode One - Investing in a Restricted Industry
Mode 2 is the derivative of the common entry mode which explains how
foreign venture capitals can invest in Chinese ventures of restricted
industries including portals, media, some categories of Telecommunications,
education, etc. Figure 4.2 explains how Sohu.com (NASDAQ. SOHU), a
famous Chinese online portal and media services company, received funding
from Intel Capital and Dow Jones in 2003. Sohu.com (Beijing) was initiated
and registered in the name of a Chinese citizen, the entrepreneur, Chao-yang
Zhang, in the PRC in the beginning in order to legitimately own the portal
license.
The contract between Sohu.com (Beijing) and Sohu.com (Cayman
Islands) stipulates that ITC (Beijing), 100% owned by Sohu.com (Cayman
Islands), is the one-and-only technical services provider and the sales agent
to Sohu.com (Beijing). Through complicated and detailed legal and
commercial arrangements, these three companies become one of unity in
substance, but are three legally independent entities on the surface that do
not break Chinese laws. Under this model, consultant fees are incurred on
Sohu.com (Beijing) in return and almost all sales and profits of Sohu.com
(Beijing) are transferred to Sohu.com (Cayman Islands). Sohu.com (Beijing)






Figure 4.2 The Derivate of Mode 1 - Investing in a Restricted Industry
Mode 3 - Dual-currency Strategy Utilised by Investment Arms of
Industrial Conglomerates
Investment arms of industrial conglomerates can be divided into two
types by investment purposes. For some industrial conglomerates that invest
purely for financial returns, such as iDTech (affiliated to Acer), their
investment mode is similar to Mode One. Some others, such as Intel Capital,
Qualcomm, Microsoft, Samsung, etc, invest in China with development
guidelines of their parent companies and minor financial incentives. These
guidelines include consolidation of market share (Qualcomm, Microsoft and
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Intel), utilisation of local brainpower in research and development (Microsoft,
Intel and Samsung), or supply of key components (Intel, IBM and Samsung).
These two types of investment arms commonly generate revenues
denominated in Chinese Yuan and venture capital funds registered outside
China. Therefore they can invest in Chinese ventures registered either
onshore (with Chinese Yuan) or offshore (with US dollars) in their best
interests. Mode 3 is illustrated as Figure 4.3.
Offshore Onshore
Holding
Figure 4.3 Dual-currency Strategy Utilised by Investment Arms of Industrial
Conglomerates
The flexibility of a dual-currency strategy and the possibility of being
directly acquired by the parent conglomerate in the future have greatly
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increased the attractiveness of such foreign investors to Chinese ventures
compared to other types of venture capital firms.
Mode 4 - Investing in Spin-offs of Research Institutes
Foreign venture capitalists interested in spin-offs of government projects,
university or research institutes may choose to directly establish a joint
venture. For example, Intel Capital and Dragon Tech Ventures co-initiated
ChinaTech with the state-owned Institute of Software of Chinese Academy of
Sciences (ISCAS). As shown in Figure 4.4, ChinaTech, that included related
scientists of the project, was spun off from ISCAS. Onshore ChinaTech
received venture capital investment through ChinaTech (Cayman Islands)
from Dragon Tech and Intel Capital, while ISCAS invested in onshore
ChinaTech with its intellectual property in exchange for 25% of shareholding
of the joint venture.
Offshore Onshore
Figure 4.4 Investing in Spin-offs of Research Institutes
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Under the trilateral agreements, equity interests or bonus can be
transferred to the scientists/entrepreneurs as rewards to compensate for their
contribution in the creation of intellectual property.
Mode 5 - Play the Role as a GP in an Onshore Sino-foreign Joint Venture
Capital Firm
As mentioned earlier, some foreign venture capitals are restricted to
invest in China due to political reasons, such as Taiwan, or limited in funding
sources. They may choose to establish Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms
(SJVCF) with Chinese partners that are registered onshore. Under such a
model, the foreign venture capital side holds minority interests in the fund
and manages the SJVCF like a general partner. As show in Figure 4.5, Taiwan
Sino-Century Assets Management (TSCAM) is established with a solid track
record in both Silicon Valley and Taiwan but had limited capital sources to
directly invest in China under the. strict control of the Taiwan Government.
Therefore they initiated four onshore SJVCFs with local Chinese
governments of Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Xian respectively in the mid
1990's. Local governments were attracted to their strong profit record and
similarity of cultural background.
In this model, TSCAM acts as a GP offering senior venture capitalists,
expertise and limited capitals, while local governments were the main capital
contributor similar to the LPs. As the SJVCFs were registered in the PRC, the
capital of TSCAM was translated into Chinese Yuan. According to the
bilateral initiation agreement, venture capitalists from TSCAM can conduct
investment activities freely at professional judgements.
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Offshore Onshore
Figure 4.5 Play the Role as a GP in an Onshore Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital
Firm
Mode 6 - Play the Role as a GP in an Offshore Sino-foreign Venture
Capital Firm
In comparison with mode 5, the SJVCF in mode 6 is registered offshore
and legally protected under foreign jurisdiction. As in mode 5, foreign
venture capital generally plays a role similar to a GP and Chinese investors
or fund of funds the LPs.
Under this model, the main capital contributor is not confined to (local)
Chinese governments but extended to international fund of funds or




Figure 4.6 Play the Role as a GP in an Offshore Sino-foreign Venture Capital Firm
Mode 7 - Establishing a Virtual Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital Firm
(VSJVCF)
VCJVCF is one of the choices of foreign venture capitals to expand the
flexibility of exit and exploit local experience of Chinese partners. "Virtual" is
so structured that a Sino-foreign joint venture capital firm does not exist
substantially but practically perform the functions. For example, Acorn
campus possessed US dollars while Shanghai City Government held Chinese




Figure 4.7 Establishing a Virtual Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital Firm (VSJVCF)
Under this model, both parties were bound to set up a VSJVCF
co-operated onshore for investment and post-investment management
activities and investments were only made upon mutual agreements. Acorn
Campus invested in the offshore company with US dollars, while the
Shanghai City Government invested in the onshore Chinese venture with
Chinese Yuan. After acquisition by shares exchange, the onshore Chinese
venture became a foreign-invested enterprise/joint venture. The offshore
holding company can be used as a carrier to list on an overseas capital
market.
Mode 8 - The Derivate of VSJVCF Model
The derivative of VSJVCF model explains how foreign venture capital
funds are managed by Chinese VCs. For instance, Shenzhen Capital Group
was renowned for its sound performance for the period of 1994 and 2005 in
which IRR reached 35.4% (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2006) and for its strong
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local connections. As shown in Figure 4.8, Shenzhen Capital Group was
commissioned to manage a US dollar fund raised by Singaporean United
Overseas Bank (UOB) registered offshore. Shenzhen Capital Group also
simultaneously raised a Chinese Yuan-denominated fund registered onshore.
The investment category and selection values were negotiated and stipulated
in the contract. Both funds were under the management of VSJVCF deployed
by Shenzhen Capital Group. Management team of VSJVCF was granted to
make independent investment judgment with either currency that best suited
the candidates. Profits are shared between the two parties according to
pre-determined ratios and conditions.
Offshore Onshore
Chinese Yuan Chinese Yuan
Figure 4.8 The Derivate of VSJVCF Model
There are three major differences between Mode 7 and 8. Firstly, the
incorporation of a wholly-foreign owned enterprises (WFOE) registered
onshore is not possible in Mode 7. Secondly, the foreign venture capital fund
in Mode 8 is under the wholly management of Chinese partner, while
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investment decisions can only be reached upon mutual agreement in Mode 7.
Thirdly, Mode 7 requires both foreign venture capital (with US dollars) and
its Chinese partner (with Chinese Yuan) inject capitals into ventures while
the VSJVCF in Mode 8 can invest in either currency in its best interests.
Mode 9 - A Joint Venture Capital Fund between Foreign Government
and Chinese Government
Foreign governments started to co-initiate Sino-foreign venture capital
funds with Chinese (central) government since the mid-90s' based on
Zero2IPO China Venture Database. These funds are all established for both
diplomatic and economic cooperation motives. Currently there are only
three such funds: Sino Swiss Partnership Fund (SSPF), Sino Israel Fund and
FFaitong-Fortis Private Equity Fund (China-Belgium). As investment
proceeds are reinvested into the fund i.e. revolving funds, they have no fixed
term of duration.
Shown as Figure 4.9, for example, SSPF was set up in 1997 with an initial
fund size of CHF93.75M, with the Swiss government putting up 80% of the
capital which was translated into Chinese Yuan. While it is characterised as a
"partner" fund, it does not operate like a limited partnership organisation.
China development bank is the fund manager, responsible for deal
origination, evaluation, post-investment management activities and
preparation of investment reports. All investment and liquidation decisions
are made by the investment committee in cases where the Swiss own
more-than-half votes. Further, the investment candidate must conform to the
pre-determined industry categories in business between China and
Switzerland. The other two such funds have similar operational structures
and selection criteria.
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Figure 4.9 A Joint Venture Capital Fund between Foreign Government and Chinese
Government
Mode 10 - "Tourist" Venture Capital Investment
Those foreign venture capital funds that do not have any China office
and management team but simply count on frequent visits to China to
conduct investments are often described as "tourist VCs". Some "tourist
VCs" even rarely "travel" to China. Rather, they establish and manage their
exposure in China simply through their partners in China, including other
foreign venture capital investors, legal councils and auditing houses.
To sum up, three essentials/characteristics emerge that can distinguish
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amongst the above ten entry modes of foreign venture capital: (1) whether
the foreign venture capital has a Chinese partner or not; (2) who is entrusted
to manage the firm i.e. who determines the decision-making value and/or
how they are decided? (3) whether the fund/firm is registered onshore,
offshore or as a virtual entity. The ten entry modes are summarised
accordingly in Table 4.1.







Registered Onshore, Offshore or
Virtual Entity
Yes No Mixed Foreign Chinese Onshore Offshore Virtual
1 FVCF ✓ ✓ ✓
2 FVCF ✓ ✓ ✓
3 FVCF ✓ ✓ ■/ ✓
4 FVCF ✓ V ✓
5 SJVCF / ✓ V
6 SJVCF V ✓ ✓'
7 VSJVCF ✓ ✓ V
8 VSJVCF ✓ ✓ V
9 SJVCF ✓ ✓ S
10 FVCF ✓ ✓ ✓
In discriminating amongst the various entry modes, foreign venture
capitals can be divided into two categories: FVCF and SJVCF. The virtual
Sino-foreign joint venture capital firm (Mode 7 & 8) is grouped into SJVCF,
because whether it is formally registered does not affect the decision-making
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value of venture capitalists.
Chinese venture capital firms are re-divided into GVCF and NGVCF
based on the degree of government influence over the fund/firm. The degree
of government influence on the investment activities, especially deal
origination and investment decision making, is measured by the ratio of
government shareholding. More importantly, to avoid classification errors
resulting from subjective classification, the results of initial classification
were also presented to interviewees for further confirmation. Thus venture
capital firms investing in China can be objectively reclassified and defined as
the following four categories:
1. Foreign venture capital firm (FVCF): It is a wholly foreign-owned venture
capital enterprise managed by foreign venture capitals. It can be
registered onshore or offshore and established in any organisational
structures, including limited partnership and limited company.
2. Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital Firm (SJVCF): A SJVCF, including VSJVCF,
whether incorporated in the form of limited partnership or limited
company, and registered onshore or offshore, is a venture capital
enterprise consisting of at least a foreign venture capital investor and a
Chinese partner where joint interests and responsibilities are stipulated in
the contracts.
3. Chinese Government-controlled Venture Capital Firm (GVCF): It is a venture
capital enterprise consisting of Chinese investors where the Chinese
(central/local) government exerts direct or indirect influence over
investment activities. Generally, the Chinese government has relatively
larger shares of holding in the firm in a direct or indirect way.
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4. Non-Chinese Government-Controlled Venture Capital Firm (NGVCF): It is a
venture capital enterprise invested by Chinese investors, not limited to
private or state investors. State interests in the firm are much smaller than
the rest held by private Chinese investors. Government influence is
therefore confined to the shares of holding (minority interests) or seat(s)
in the board of directors.
The section analysed the ten solutions used by foreign venture capitals
investing in China, based on the grounding results. Foreign venture capitals
can avoid the legal barriers to setting a foreign venture capital firm, high
domestic listing requirements, foreign currency translation and capital
controls. In addition, foreign venture capital fund itself can be formed and
managed in a foreign jurisdiction where the conventional structure can be
applied. The essence of the investment structure is to utilise a foreign legal
system to create certain investors' rights, which are not presented under
Chinese laws and facilitate exits through the "red chip model" on foreign
capital markets or trade sale.
The results also form the basis to properly classify venture capital funds
operating in China into four categories: foreign venture capital funds
(FVCFs), Sino-foreign joint venture capital funds (SJVCFs), Chinese
government-controlled venture capital funds (GVCFs) and Non-Chinese
government-controlled venture capital funds (NGVCFs). Such a classification
and the analysis on how foreign venture capitals enter China - a transition
economy has never been found in previous studies. The classification
provides the solid basis for the understanding, analysis and comparison of
investment criteria used by various types of VCs operating in China.
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4.2 Measurement of Investment Criteria
4.2.1 Measurement of First-tier (Generic) Criteria Relative to Overall
Accept/Reject Decision
The study employs dual methods - AHP and Delphi to investigate the
preferences on the first-tier (generic) investment criteria of venture capitalists.
The classification of China venture capital firms and self-designed programs
constructed on Excel help classify the findings on the relative importance of
first-tier investment criteria into the identified four categories. Take the
computing process of FVCFs as an example, computation results shows:
^ m,v= 10.12, which satisfies Aw = A w.IlldX UlciX
The normalised eigenvectors w = (26.26%, 12.61%, 10.06%, 10.47%,
26.74%, 5.05%, 4.14%, 3.61%,
1.06%)
Moreover, C. I. is used to examine the consistency of the judgment
matrix, where C.I. = (Amax- n) / (n-1). R.I. is used to revise C.I, calculated as
follows:
A - n 10.12 - 9
C.R. = C.I. / R.I. = — = = 0.09545 <0.10
RI{n - 1) 1 .4616(9 - 1)
Therefore the matrix can be trusted as judgement consistency as C.R. is
smaller than 0.10. The weights of the first-tier investment criteria of FVCFs
on overall accept/reject decision is shown as Appendix III. Applying the same
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computation process, weights of first-tier investment criteria of SJVCFs,
NGVCFs and GVCFs can be derived as exhibited in Appendix IV, V and VI
respectively.
The results are illustrated as the judgment matrix in Table 4.2. The AF1P
uses pair-wise comparisons to compare the nine first-tier (generic)
investment criteria and then convert the initial verbal response of VCs into a
9-point linguistic scale. Paired comparisons are based on standardised
evaluation scheme with 1 = equal importance, 3 = weak importance, 5 =
essential importance, 7 = demonstrated importance, 9 = absolute importance
(Please also refer to Table 3.1). For example, the Table shows that Managerial
Capabilities is "moderately" favoured over Market Prospect by venture
capitalists of FVCFs; Government Influence is "moderately" favoured over
Exit; Product/Service Differentiation is "strongly" favoured compared to
Financial Considerations or Guanxi; Shareholding Structure (of the vertical
column) is "equally" favoured over Shareholding Structure (of the horizontal
column) by venture capitalists of FVCFs.
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4.2.2 Measurement of Second-tier (Subordinate) Criteria Relative to
Ruling First-tier (Generic) Criteria
Conjoint analysis, aided by SPSS(13) (the module "category"), is utilised
to analyze the relative importance of second-tier investment criteria. A
Syntax document is helpful for the conduct of SPSS(13) Conjoint in this
research. Syntaxes are established to calculate the weights of subordinate
(second-tier) criteria on the respective ruling generic (first-tier) criteria. The
function "Syntaxes" allows the researcher to save jobs in a syntax file so that
analysis can be repeated at a later time. For example, the syntax document





/rank= pi to pl6
/plot=all
/util='E:\result.sav' .
Click "Run", the weights of subordinate criteria on the ruling generic
criterion "Managerial Capabilities" for FVCFs is shown as Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Weights of Second-tier (Subordinate) Criteria on the Generic Criterion -
"Managerial Capabilities"
Second-tier (Subordinate) Criteria Weights
Team sense of business environmental risks 6.90%
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur 19.59%
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team 24.42%
Administrative skills of team 30.48%
Leadership potential of entrepreneur 18.61%
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Weights of each subordinate criterion on their respective generic criteria
can be all computed repeating the "Syntaxes" process for the four categories.
4.2.3 Measurement of Second-tier (Subordinate) Criteria Relative to
Overall Accept/Reject Decision
The results of data processing, as described in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2,
demonstrate the relative importance of first-tier (generic) investment criteria
and that of second-tier (subordinate) investment criteria to the respective
ruling generic criteria. The next step is to calculate the importance of each
second-tier criterion relative to the whole evaluation system at the top i.e. the
accept/reject decision of venture capitalists. For example, the importance of
"Team Sense of Business Environmental Risks", subordinate to the generic
criterion "Managerial Capabilities", to the accept/reject decision of venture
capitalists of FVCFs is calculated as 6.90%*26.26%=1.81%. The importance of
each second-tier investment criterion relative to the accept/reject decision of
VCs in FVCFs can be obtained repeating the same calculation method.
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4.3 Results Discussion and Comparison
The complete measurement of investment criteria and their respective
weights and rankings are shown as Appendix III, IV, V and VI. Table 4.4
summarises the ranking/weights of investment criteria on overall
accept/reject decision of venture capitalists. The Table exhibits that
Managerial Capabilities is the most important first-tier (generic) investment
criteria (24.85%) for the overall accept/reject decision of venture capitalists of
SJVCFs, while Government Influence (26.74%), Shareholding Structure
(25.04%) and Guanxi (25.95%) are most essential to venture capitalists of
FVCFs, NGVCFs and GVCFs respectively. The results are analysed and
expounded respectively.
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The study findings suggest that "Government Influence" is the most
important criterion for venture capitalists of FVCFs and rates as the
runner-up, sixth and sixth place among the first-tier investment criteria of
NGVCFs, SJVCFs and GVCFs respectively. Breaking down "Government
Influence", "Free from Government Restrictions" is most valued to the
accept/reject decision of FVCFs, while it ranked the 4th, 7th and 10th in
NGVCFs, SJVCFs and GVCFs. It is not surprising that venture capitalists of
FVCFs view "Government Influence" as the most important criteria, as
foreign investments in China are all guided by the Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, amended in 2006, which
classifies Chinese industries against foreign investments into three categories:
the "Encouraged", "Restricted" and "Prohibited" (Kang 2007). Many popular
industries of venture capital investments in developed VC markets including
Internet portal, media, retailing, telecommunications, etc. and those defined
as "national industries", are either restricted or prohibited from receiving
foreign capitals. Therefore FVCFs created a new investment structure to
circumvent the rules, as exemplified by the entry Mode 2. As said by the
investment director of Intel Capital (FVCF), China:
"
Although we have successfully created the investment structure to invest
in Sohu.com and skilfully evade the monitoring of Chinese regulations, it does not
guarantee that this structure will still work next time... What if a new regulation
were to be released tomorrow and be given retroactive effects? Therefore you have to
abort your current investment structure? So, it is better not to offend Chinese laws
or walk the razor's edge..."
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Furthermore, most GVCFs and NGVCFs are incorporated in the form of
a limited company rather than a limited partnership. In GVCFs, most
investments are made under the guidance of government policy because
such investments are considered as strategic or conducive to long-term
national welfare. In addition, investing in "Government Supported/Protected
Industries" implies the latent benefits both the investor and investee will
receive. For example, a venture in an industry supported/protected by
government policy can enjoy a beneficial tax rate for a certain period of time
and be provided with preferential rents in land that facilitates acquirement or
even direct financial subsidy, while the investor will also enjoy tax deduction
or refund up to 70% of total investments. As well, taxes paid at the firm level
will not be double taxed at the individual level according to the newly issued
Regulations on Venture Capital Investments. Therefore fund investors of
NGVCFs (mostly private-owned enterprises and rich individuals) regard it
as a legal and effective tax dodging option and it is one of the most important
criteria (3rd) for NGVCFs. Such a preferential policy is most straight forward
from a financial management standpoint.
In addition, the fact that rankings of "Government Influence" in
NGVCFs, SJVCFs and GVCFs are not as high as FVCFs does not imply it is
less important, but rather a reflection of the background of funds and the
basic values in communist China. As explained by the Investment Director of
Shandong High Tech Investment Co. Lt.:
"...It is funny to ask if we care about government restrictions. We are funded
by the government. We will never go beyond the bottom line..."
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This viewpoint has been acknowledged by almost all VCs in China no
matter what type of venture capital firms they belong to. That is to say
investing in ventures of industries supported/protected by the government
and keeping a distance from those prohibited is a central premise for all
Chinese individuals or companies while it is a must-have lesson for FVCFs.
In comparison, the first-tier criterion "Government Influence" was also
mentioned in the study on Poland by Bliss (1999), however, with different
connotations. Bliss argued that government's involvement in a deal as a
"yellow flag" i.e. a signal that the quality of the deal is poor, while GVCFs in
China are generally guided to invest in government-supported projects
which will be beneficial to national/local welfares. Advanced projects aimed
at next generation technology are generally supported by related
government organisations, universities or research affiliates. The common
characteristics of these ventures are that they are generally developed in the
seed or start-up stage, located in government-funded science parks and
receive direct government subsidy or equity investments. With these
preconditions, these ventures tend not to accept the term sheets offered by
FVCFs and NGVCFs but will more readily accept those of GVCFs. If the
venture conforms to the essential requirements of SJVCFs established
between the Chinese government and foreign governments, they may also be
invested in by SJVCFs through the referral of related government
organisation. For example, Sino Swiss Partnership Fund (SSPF) is
commissioned to invest in ventures which contribute to the technology
communication and economic developments between China and Switzerland.
Hence ventures comply with the requirements may be referred to SSPFs.
Managerial Capabilities
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"Managerial Capabilities" is composed of five second-tier criteria "Team
Sense of Business Environmental Risks", "Outside Appraisal of
Entrepreneur", "Administrative Skills of Team" and "Leadership Potential of
Entrepreneur". The importance of "Managerial Capabilities" to the
accept/reject decision of VCs has been often stressed in past studies in
various terms or phrases as reviewed in Chapter Two. In this study, the
importance of "Managerial Capabilities" is also validated in FVCFs (2nd),
SJVCFs (1st) and NGVCFs (3rd) among the nine first-tier criteria. Particularly,
the weight of "Administrative Skills of Team" ranked second among all
second-tier investment criteria for both FVCFs and SJVCFs.
In fact, interviewed venture capitalists of FVCFs were either directly
trained in the US (15.56%, 7/45) or educated to follow investment disciplines
of US (62.22%, 28/45) or other fund-originated countries (22.22%, 10/45).
Therefore the results are consistent with the findings on Managerial
Capabilities in past studies based on developed (US) markets and a recent
report suggesting that 80.94% of total foreign venture capital pool available
for investment in mainland China is from the US (Zero2IPO Research Centre
2007). Moreover, although SJVCFs may differ from FVCFs in terms of
incorporation forms, contract structure binding GP and LP, deal sources,
investment decision making structure etc., SJVCFs are mostly managed by
foreign partners (few are managed by Chinese partners) due to the lack of
local investment talent and greater trust based on the longer track record of
foreign partners. Thus the finding that venture capitalists in SJVCFs place
such high value as FVCFs on "Managerial Capabilities" is not surprising.
In comparison, findings show that "Managerial Capabilities" ranks only
the 5th, behind "Guanxi", "Product/Service Differentiation", "Financial
Considerations" and "Shareholding Structure" in GVCFs. GVCFs in China
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are mostly investment affiliates to local governments. Financial rewards and
management team are usually not first considered by GVCFs when making
investment decisions as the company incorporation constitution generally
states that promoting the social welfare and economic development of the
nation/province/municipal city are of the utmost importance. Senior
management of SOEs are often appointed directly by the government, rather
than professional managers. Consequently the quality of management is not
the main concern for GVCFs. As stated by the investment director of Beijing
Fiigh Technology Venture Capital Co. Ltd. (GVCF),
"
Generally investments are made through direct reference from my boss or
other government organs. ...For example, my boss said he was referred a case in the
opto-electronics sector which is very much supported by Beijing Municipal Science
and Technology Commission in Chongguangchun (Beijing)... Sometimes I felt easy
to make an investment decision because personal judgment is unnecessary... "
Market Prospect
Findings show that "Market Prospect" ranked the 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th of
the nine generic criteria by FVCFs, SJVCFs, NGVCFs and GVCFs respectively.
FVCFs are burdened with targets like financial rewards and NGVCFs
(mostly funded by private enterprises and rich individuals) market share
consolidation or advanced technology acquisition required by their fund
investors. Particularly, "Ease of Market Entry" and "Leadership in the
Market" are more stressed by FVCFs (the 5th) and NGVCFs (the 7th)
respectively among the 26 second-tier investment criteria. The managing
partner of Sequoia, China (FVCF), stated:
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"...'We invested in many promising ventures and were rewarded with handsome
returns since our inception in China, such as Ctrip and Home Inn. Many of them are
non-TMT (Technology, Media and Telecommunication) companies...We see
non-TMT opportunities will bring rich rewards for us in the next several years just
like TMT...The points is whether the candidate has its own obvious advantage over
other competitors in any forms. Such an advantage should be strong enough to
prevent from replication for a certain period of time. You know, too many copies in
China..."
Similar viewpoints on "Ease of Market Entry" and "Leadership in the
Market" are also shared by other FVCFs, including the managing partner of
IDG (FVCF), the partner of CDH (FVCF), the managing partner of Integral
Group (FVCF) and China's chief representative of JAIC.
Supporting the evidence above, the investment director of Founder
Capital (NGVCF, the investment arm of Founder Electronics) described their
investment strategies as follows:
"...We are funded by Founder Electronics, so our guiding policy is to invest in
a venture with advanced technology or significant market status/share relevant to
our group business scope. Investments should be conducive to future group business
expansion..."
Product/Service Differentiation
The "Product/Service Differentiation" segment is composed of
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"Product/Service Distinction", "Product/Service Margin", "Proprietary
Product/Service", and "Related to the Concept of High-tech". Although
China has signed a series of the international treaties on the strike against
plagiary on intellectual property rights and greatly revised its Patent
Protection Law in 2000 in order to tally with the requirements of WTO, the
criticism from China's trading partners regarding China's poor protection of
intellectual property rights continues. This is evident when considering that
any new film recently produced in Hollywood, whether it is officially
published in China or not, will be available in DVD in most shops around the
debut. The fashion of plagiary can also be found in many social and
economic aspects from world branded wallets to new business models. A
combination of factors are suggested for such plagiarism phenomenon in
China, that include a prevailing lack of respect for intellectual property, a
weak regulatory system against plagiarism and miniscule penalties and
punishment for pirates and counterfeiters (Chia-Yueh Liao 2005). Therefore
"Proprietary Product/Service" ranked fourth of all second-tier investment
criteria by both FVCFs and SJVCFs. As stated by the former managing
director of Intel (FVCF) on Intel's investment policy:
"...There are many opportunities undiscovered from the traditional sector to
TMT (technology, media, and telecommunication) in China. However, we invest
mainly in start-ups in TMT for both proprietary products or technology and
handsome financial returns. And the former will be helpful for the competitiveness of
the whole Intel group. It is also one of the most important criteria we hold...We want
a technologically advanced venture with lead time in the prototype of product or
technology at least one year ahead of its competitors...."
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However, findings show that both FVCFs and NGVCFs do not attach
high importance to the criterion "Related to the Concept of High-tech",
which ranked the 14th and 17th among all second-tier investment criteria.
Literature suggest that a combination of factors that may contribute to this
finding, that include weak protection of intellectual property of high-tech
products, an inferior competing position to access spin-offs of research and
university institutes possessing compelling technology or products and the
lack of global competitiveness of Chinese enterprises (China Science and
Technology Development Report 2005, 2006). Findings, however suggest that
the main reason is the relatively low level of economic development with
many investment opportunities hidden in non-high-tech or traditional
industries. The Partner of Granite Global Ventures (FVCF) stated:
"...There are numerous investment opportunities in both TMT and non-TMT
areas because China is rather immature in the level of economic development
compared to the US. It may take 30 years or even longer to catch up with the US at
the individual wealth level, while the national economy scale may be much larger
than the US by then. During the transition, China will gradually develop its mature
service and traditional industries, not only high-tech companies...That is why we
invest more than half ofour fund money in non-TMT ventures in the first half year
(2007)..."
In comparison, venture capitalists of GVCFs are usually guided to invest
in government-supported projects, which are characterised by high-tech or
next-generation concepts (Wang 2004). This phenomenon is also verified in
the findings on the selection value of GVCFs. "Product/Service
Differentiation" ranked the 2nd place among the nine first-tier investment
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criteria of GVCFs, because government-initiated projects are the main
investment candidates. Many of these projects are "Related to the Concept of
High-tech" (ranked the 7th among the 26 second-tier investment criteria).
Exit
The "Exit" category comprises two subordinate criteria - "Possibility to
Exit during a Tolerable Period of Time" and "Exit Option Practicable in the
Future". Findings on the entry strategies of foreign venture capitals suggest
that most SJVCFs or VSJVCFs are partnered with Chinese governments or
related organisations as discussed in Mode 5, 6, 7 and 8. In most SJVCFs
where the Chinese partners act as fund investors, investment capital of the
Chinese side is generally invested by government projects or yearly budgets
based on the joint venture capital firm's partnership initiation plan and
development goals (Zhuang 2003). The SJVCF is obligated to report the
operation results periodically to both sides. In order to meet the fund
schedule predetermined by two sides, venture capitalists of SJVCFs are more
strongly directed to liquidate all investments by the fund termination date
for they are mostly project or budget-based, except for the three SJVCFs
co-initiated by Chinese government and foreign governments with both
diplomatic and economic cooperation motives, than the other three types of
venture capital firms. The Chinese bureaucratic system is also featured by
such a strong reporting tradition (Zhuang 2003). Therefore SJVCFs place
"Exit" and "Possibility to Exit During a Tolerable Period of Time" as the
most important generic and second-tier investment criteria respectively.
Findings show that FVCFs rank "Exit Option Practicable in the Future"
the 6th among 26 second-tier investment criteria. As discussed earlier, as most
FVCFs generally register their venture capital firms offshore but count on a
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representing office and team with foreign venture capital practice to conduct
investment activities, the "red chip" model is viewed as an effective option to
exit from investments in China. However, newly released regulations, such
as the Circular 10, and administration system and time constraints have all
brought about huge uncertainties or even a threat to their investments in
China. The managing partner of iDTech (FVCF, investment affiliate to Acer
Computer), identified the intention of the Chinese authority and their
countermeasures in this context as follows:
"...Circular 10 has almost pushed foreign venture capitals to an dead end.
Lawyers serving the trade and all foreign VCs are all very worried about it. What the
government intended to do is firstly to keep Chinese companies, especially those with
nation-wide reputation or state shareholdings, to list on A share market (domestic
stock market with trading currency the Chinese Yuan in contrast to B share market
with trading currency the US dollars). Second, the government hopes to indirectly
foster the competitiveness of Chinese venture capital firms, including both NGVCFs
and GVCFs, against FVCFs...For now, the best solution is to find Chinese ventures
that have already set up overseas shareholding structure with which we still can exit
through overseas IPO. In the next round, we consider raising a Chinese
Yuan-denominated venture capital fund from local LPs and registering onshore,
although it is much harder than raising funds from overseas LPs. Therefore we can
exit through domestic capital markets...."
A number of the researcher's observations as a venture capitalist are
relevant to this discussion. Before the promulgation of "Circular 10, FVCFs
generally sought for overseas listing through the "red chip model". Today,
many venture capitalists of FVCFs often ask entrepreneurs the question
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when they first meet: "Have you established an offshore shareholding
vehicle in Cayman Islands?" This question indirectly suggests the dilemma
faced by FVCFs and the importance of a viable option for a future exit. In the
long run, FVCFs will consider raising onshore funds denominated in Chinese
Yuan from local sources which are hopefully still managed by foreign VCs. In
addition, as China Company Law only permits venture capital investments
in common shares of Chinese companies. Many frequently used options of
equity certificate viable for venture capital investments in developed VC
markets, including preferred shares, convertible bonds, conditional loans,
and convertible preferred, are not presented in the Chinese context. Hence
the downside risk of venture capital investors is greatly escalated.
Financial Considerations
The category of "Financial Considerations" consists of "Expected
Investment Returns" and "Level of Venture Equity Valuation". Findings are
rather surprising that GVCFs have stressed so much the importance of these
two criteria, which seem to be in conflict with their investment decision
making style - a top-down management system where venture capitalists
generally follow government policy and internal referral system for deal
origination and investment decision. The explanation is that how thoughts
and behaviours of an individual in SOEs are affected by the bureaucrat
tradition under a Communist ruling system, as explained by the investment
director of CITIC Capital (GVCF):
"...As a loyal member of the Communist Party, I even organised the
Communist branch unit for CITIC just like every SOE... Under the Communist
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system, we annually review the performance of each employee every year. If yon
perform well, you will be given credits and the honour "A Distinctive Person". If
you hope to get promotion, you have to show the Communist leaders "how good you
are". But, it is not only about you. It means you need to do your job good enough to
let your boss and the company feel "you mian zi (be given the face or pride) "...What
I do is that I usually encourage our investment managers to bargain with ventures or
their shareholders on the investment price though we may be already decided to
invest in that venture... Ifour overall performance is good at the end, I will feel "you
mian zi". If I am rewarded, I will share it with my staffs as well...For staffs ofjunior
level, what they care is whether they are "A Distinctive Person" while I care if I have
the "mian zi"..."
The above statement suggests that personal promotion in a communist
system, including GVCFs, is usually based not only on personal
accomplishment but also on "mian zi" incurred on the organization and the
"boss".
In comparison, findings identify "Level of Venture Equity Valuation" as
the second most critical criterion for NGVCFs among the second-tier
investment criteria to their accept/reject decision. The reason suggested for
this finding is that NGVCFs are generally funded by Chinese private
enterprises and rich individuals who tend to haggle over every financial
performance index of funded firms (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2005, Kang
2007). The founder, president and board chairman of Shenzhen Fortune
Capital (NGVCF) testified as follows:
"...Before I became a VC, I worked for the Chinese government... Shenzhen
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Fortune Capital now have two funds. Fortune I is inveted by several Chinese listed
and unlisted companies. We started to raise money from some rich individuals for
Fortune IF... Now I feel more pressure to make money, lots of money, than the time
when I work for SOE...We have to deliver reports to our investors every three months,
recording our investment performance, every penny we spent and every new deal
invested. Just like those foreign venture capital firms..."
Shareholding Structure
Overall, findings show that "Shareholding Structure" is not highly rated
by FVCFs and SJVCFs, yet it is the most important first-tier criteria for
NGVCFs. The suggested reason is that many NGVCFs are given strategic
assignments and the investment candidates may be involved with various
kinds of business relationships (Guanxi) or strength that fund investors
would value and need. The criteria "Background of Venture Shareholders" is
hence viewed as the most important criteria among all second-tier criteria.
Such a business relationship is also one of the basic concerns (6th) of GVCFs.
The Investment Director of AnCai High-tech Investment Co. Ltd. (NGVCF,
the investment arm of AnCai Group, one of the largest flat-panel TV
producers in China) stated:
"...We are assigned the mission to invest in ventures that will help the vertical
and horizontal expansion of the group in technology research & development, sales
channels or market share. However, we do not have political connections to acquire
all the resources we need. Through every transaction, we hope to establish some sort
of alliance relationship with other shareholder(s) of the candidate and expand our
business network. It is one ofour basic selection principles..."
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Findings also suggest that GVCFs generally do not want to conduct
syndication investments with FVCFs or NGVCFs for the many differences in
nature, such as investment values, fund origins, incorporation structure, etc.
One respondent stated:
"We generally do not co-invest in a venture with foreign or private
investors....They are very different from us in nature, such as investment values,
fund investors, incorporation structure..."
It is important to note that the criterion of "Background of Venture
Shareholders" has not been identified or discussed in past studies.
Guanxi
The generic criterion "Guanxi" is broken down into "Referred by
Relevant Government Official Other Than Fund Investor", "Referred by
Fund Investor Other Than Government", "Referred by Other Connections
Other Than Government and Fund Investor" and "Background of
Entrepreneur". Findings show that GVCFs view "Guanxi" as the most
important generic criterion among all first-tier criteria and the rankings of its
subordinate criteria are also higher than those of other types of venture
capital firms. This is the first time that "Guanxi" overall has been recognised
in the accept/reject decision of venture capitalists. In comparison, the
importance of "Guanxi" to the accept/reject decision of FVCFs, SJVCFs and
NGVCFs is not significant among the nine first-tier investment criteria. In
addition, the findings on the entry modes of foreign venture capitals, as
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summarised in Table 4.1, indicate that the decision values of FVCFs remain
"foreign" and that of SJVCFs is mixed. This result connects to the fact that
there is not any previous studies, as reviewed in the literature, on other VC
markets suggesting "Guanxi" an important criterion to the accept/reject
decision of venture capitalists. In addition, as discussed earlier, NGVCFs are
mainly funded by rich individuals and/or non-Chinese
government-controlled organisations. Therefore the finding can be
interpreted as the consequence of their initial funding motives: they invest in
venture capital fund pursuing either financial rewards or strategic targets of
organisations, while relying on "Guanxi" may not help satisfy such goals.
Particularly, "The Ventures Referred by Other Connections Other Than
Government Officials or Fund Investors" is most valued by GVCFs. "Other
Connections" refer to the deals originated directly from
government-supported projects or research institutes and universities. The
suggested reason is that these candidates are generally located in local
science parks established by local governments/municipal cities. Venture
capitalists of GVCFs have generally the access to the database of ventures
located in the respective province/municipal city (Venture Capital
Development Report in China 2004). Investing in these ventures is basically a
"yes" investment decision for venture capitalists of GVCFs from the
standpoints of fund investors. Therefore "the question is how to select ventures
from the list consisted of hundred or even thousands of candidates." said the
president of a Beijing XXX High-tech Investment Co., Ltd (GVCF)
(respondent unwilling to disclose the company name). The respondent
further stated:
"...From time to time, if I receive the invitation from titled government
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bureaucrat(s) for a dinner in a fancy restaurant, then I knew there must he
something needing my help... But you have to go (in order to give "mian zi").
Usually they will recommend a candidate to me in that occasion after 'the wine has
been cheered three rounds' (means half drunk). Sometimes the entrepreneur was also
invited, then it is even harder to reject. But if the venture is on my investment list, I
will consider. If not, I will not reject them immediately, I will still say: Iwill consider
about it... You know, we are strictly guided by our fund policy. ..I have lots offriends
in the (local) science park, the universities and research institutes. They usually
provide me the access to good ventures (on the list)...Most of my investments are
done with their referrals..."
Findings show that the "Background of Entrepreneur" is also accented
by GVCFs (5th), SJVCFs (6th) and NGVCFs (8th). One respondent pointed out:
"Background of a person in China is often viewed a critical factor to the business
success in China. "Having background" means you can get the Guanxi necessary to
expand your business...". The recognition on background/Guanxi of a person
explains why many multinational companies in China have invited
well-known Chinese people with strong political connections as partners or
consultants who usually have no experience in the industry. For example,
Mian Heng Jiang, the son of the former general secretary of Communist
Party Zemin Jiang, was invited to join Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing
Corporation (GSMC), one of the largest IC makers in China founded by
Taiwan industrial tycoon, Mr. Wenyang Wang, as group vice chairman when
the company was established in 2003
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/24/eng20030924_124848.shtml)
Later, the company attracted substantial amounts of venture capital
investments from Flotung Group, Global Investment Floldings, Global
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Strategic Investment Fund, the angel Jia Cheng Li (the richest man of Hong
Kong) and Silicon Storage Technology, etc (Zero2IPO China Venture
Database). The president of Hotung Group (FVCF) commented on his
investment value as follows:
"Although I wonder if he has the expertise and track record in the IC industry,
with his (Jiang Zemin) background, you can imagine GSMC will be able to enjoy all
favourable policy benefits, needed information and orders from government affiliates
and even direct government subsidy. This is one of the most important reasons we
decided to invest in GSMC..."
In addition, some venture capitalists frankly indicated that investing in
an influential person is investing in their own benefits, such as the expansion
of relationships with the Chinese authorities to render their investee
companies more substantial help (mentioned by the president of China
Science & Merchants (NGVCF), president of China Merchants & Fortune
Assets Management Ltd. (SJVCF), or business developments in all
dimensions (mentioned by director of AnCai High-tech Investment Co. Ltd.
(NGVCF)), etc.
Others - "A Proven Business Model in Developed Economies"
This criterion has never been suggested in past studies on VCs'
investment criteria in both developed VC markets and transition economies.
As foreign venture capitals investments account for 79% (Zero2IPO China
Venture Capital Annual Report 2007) in 2007, this criterion is initially
proposed by the researcher to test whether venture capitalists will invest in a
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business model in China (a transition economy) that has been proved
successful in other (developed) countries. Findings suggest that such
assumption does not exist in China. The results show that investing in a
venture that has been proved successful in a developed economy is least
important to the accept/reject decision for all types of VCs in China. There
are two arguments for this finding. Firstly, there is huge and cheap labour
force in China. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 620
million farmers, out of the total 850 million, living in the rural area with GDP
per capita well below US$200 dollars a year, hope to change their livings to
manufacturing or service industries. The investment director of Qualcomm
Ventures stated: "those business models utilizing massive labour may not be less
competitive than those of capital or technology intensive companies in China in the
next three years, as China has huge and cheap labour force underdeveloped". For
example, Blue Wave (BW) tried to replicate their successful experience in the
chain operation of car wash in US and Taiwan into China since 2003, aimed at
the fast growing middle class with cars. Therefore they invested in 520 sets of
car wash machines with each set cost US$30,000. According to their initial
estimate, they will be able to recover all their investments in just six months
if it is priced at 30 Chinese Yuan each car, at the turnover of 60 cars per
machine set per day.
However, three months later after they began to serve in Shanghai,
Beijing and Shenzhen, almost two times that of their total car wash stores
emerged and priced at 10 Chinese Yuan each car. These competitors do not
use machine but only labour. Their competitors brag about "Hand-wash
Gives Your Baby More Care" targeting at BW's business model. By Dec. 2007,
only less than 60 sets of car wash machines are still running in China. The
researcher suggests that BW is doomed to fail since they ignored the cheap
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Chinese labour factor in establishing their business.
Secondly, there is a strong fashion of imitation in China. The institutional
environment of China differs significantly from that of the West (Peng 2000,
Boisot and Child 1996). Institutional factors have led to strong uniformity in
VCs' behaviours (Fried and Hisrich 1994). The worries over the imitation
behaviours have strongly influenced the decision values of venture
capitalists operating in China on the assessment of "Me Too" business
models (copies). Findings also suggest proven business models in developed
venture capital markets do not guarantee the success in China due to the
differences in institutional environments. Therefore it is not surprising that a
duplicate of "A Proven Business Model in Developed Economies (ranked the
last of all first-tier investment criteria)" in China does not draw the eyeballs
of all types of venture capitalists. As stated by the managing partner of H&Q,
Asia:
"If one business model succeeds in the US, there will be hundreds of copies in
China in halfa year".
Therefore, "it is difficidt to judge whether the venture we invest with YouTube
or MySpace like model will survive in China, as there are over 500 companies doing
the same thing", said Mr. Song, managing partner of IDG, China.
On the other hand, it can be argued that business models that survive in
China do not guarantee they can be duplicated in developed economies. One
respondent stated:
"...some business models initiated and have been proved successful in China
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may not work well in the US. For example, we invested in Linktone providing
downloads of ring tones and SMS (short message services) in 2000 when 70 million
Chinese people had cellular phones. I observed that Chinese people like to send text
messages instead talking directly over the phone due to the high rates using cellular
phone...Today, people get much richer but I do not see any change in the habit of
using text message...But I wonder if this model can be duplicated in the US as most
people like to talk...."
Findings verifiy that such a "sheep flock" effect does not exist in the
decision behaviours of venture capitalists operating in China, given that
China has an institutional environment different from that of other countries
(Peng 2000, Boisot and Child 1996). Therefore it can be inferred that the
success of a business model developed in a developed economy may not be
transferrable to a transition economy due to the discrepancy in institutional
environments. However, it cannot be inferred that a successful business
model is not transferrable between developed VC markets, especially
between US and (Western) Europe, given the similarities in venture capital
industry between the US and Europe have been found in previous research
(Sapienza et al. 1996).
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Suggestion
5.1 Summary of Findings
The thesis aims to identify whether there are differences or similarities in
investment criteria between those used by China venture capitalists and the
broadly accepted investment criteria based on developed countries and
other transition economies. The research employs both qualitative and
quantitative methods to arrive at the saturation of each research question.
As a venture capital practitioner, the researcher is very clear about
importance of distinguishing the diverse entry strategies of foreign venture
capitals before the study can truly classify venture capital firms operating in
China and understand the difference and similarity of in-use investment
criteria held between each venture capital ownership category. As there is
no previous study focusing on this subject, the researcher adopted the
qualitative method - grounded theory to solve this task. Based on the
conclusion of broadly accepted investment criteria examined in literature
review and the pilot study as well as the insights of the researcher, the
research produced the initial set of investment criteria for further testing
with both AHP and Delphi methods. With conjoint analysis, the research
can distinguish the relative importance of the (first and second-tier)
investment criteria in use for each venture capital category and avoid the
self-reported bias to a large extent.
Research findings produced at each stage are all validated by
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participants. Further, Cronbach Alpha coefficients obtained for the two
questionnaires adopting AHP method and conjoint analysis are 0.8154 and
0.8367 respectively. Therefore both of questionnaires applied in this study
can be regarded as "reliable", according to Kerlinger (1986). However, the
researcher suggests that sample size does matter to the replication of the
research results, the proper classification of China venture capital firms and
ultimately the success of this study. The key to conduct this research is that
the researcher has strong personal connection/guanxi with venture
capitalists operating in China and the influence of the Company (Zero2IPO
Group) the researcher works with. As venture capital firms operating in
China are divided into four categories, researcher should also consider the
samples size of each category. Therefore, to replicate the study and to
achieve external reliability researchers should first consider the issues of
guanxi of researchers themselves.
5.1.1 Entry Strategies of Foreign Venture Capitals
To distinguish the entry strategies of foreign venture capitals is to
accurately classify and define the ownership structure of foreign venture
capital firms. With a proper classification, research findings can be
compared between diverse categories and saturated at a deeper level.
Studies focusing on developed countries have concluded broadly accepted
investment criteria, as summarized in Table 2.2, while VCs' ownership
nature were ignored. Some argue that the reason behind is the highly
standardized venture capital incorporation form and mature venture capital
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profession and agencies (Guo 2008) in developed countries. However, such
arguments need more evidence to support, for example, that the investment
value of a venture capital firm affiliated to Intel, a large scale industrial firm
investing for purposes of corporate expansion and/or technical acquisition,
will be identical to that of Sequoia Capital, investing purely for financial
motives. Moreover, other studies on transition economies, such as Poland
(Bliss 1999), China (Guo 2008), Hungary (Karsai et al. 1997) and India
(Wright et al. 2004), did not stress the importance of distinguishing
ownership structure and classification of venture capital firms, while
venture capitals are generally mixed of "foreign" and "domestic"
incorporation forms in transition economies. Therefore whether the research
findings based on developed countries or transition economies are truly a
mix of all types of VCs' investment value remains an unsolved issue.
This study argues that most foreign investors do not directly register
venture capital firms in China. Instead, they register offshore in so-called
'tax heaven', such as Cayman, Bermuda and BVI, in the incorporation form
of a limited partnership or limited company and simultaneously establish a
branch office onshore and generally hiring investment experts of returnees
with US venture capital practice to manage all investment and
post-investment management activities in China, in order to avoid
constraints of the inefficient domestic regulatory system (Guo 2008).
Findings from foreign venture capitalists and the understanding of the
researcher from practical operation experience, the researcher suggest five
reasons for this circuitous investment strategy. Such strategy is de facto the
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product of the regulatory constraints as discussed in the literature review.
Firstly under such a model, the foreign venture capital fund itself can be
formed and managed in a foreign jurisdiction where the conventional
structure can be applied without the legal barriers and foreign exchange
and capital controls.
Secondly with overseas vehicles, foreign venture capitals can sell their
interests through IPO on overseas markets i.e. the so-called "red chip"
model or trade sale to overseas third parties for liquidation. Such an
investment structure is therefore completed wholly in foreign currency
(mostly US dollars) eluding the predicament involved with local currency
(Kang 2007). Thirdly, domestic capital, including funds of Sino-foreign joint
venture capital firms, is not allowed to invest in an offshore company, unless
approved by Moftec. The reasons behind the control are that Chinese
government policy encourages domestic listing and attempts to curb capital
flights. In other words, if a foreign investor invests in a Sino-foreign joint
venture capital firm, they should invest in an entity registered onshore with
Chinese Yuan, while venture capitals invest in a Chinese venture registered
overseas with foreign currency.
Fourthly, raising new funds in China for foreign venture capital
investors is very difficult as the government policy still encourages using
foreign capitals and therefore local LPs are reluctant to invest in foreign
venture capital funds. In contrast, through the offshore holding structure,
venture capital firms can freely raise new funds from worldwide LPs. At last,
investing in an offshore company the intelligence property owned by
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Chinese enterprises or individuals can be protected and freely transferred
under foreign jurisdiction, while the intellectual property (IP) protection in
China is still very weak (White et al 2000).
Overall, the diverse regulatory barriers in China have substantially
affected the incorporation structure and entry strategies of foreign venture
capitals (Kang 2007). Such barriers are associated with the socialist ruling
system and beliefs.
In addition, findings suggest three reasons why foreign venture capitals
choose to establish a Sino-foreign venture capital firm/fund instead a wholly
foreign-owned venture capital firm. Firstly, it is to avoid political
interference, such as Taiwan venture capitals. Secondly, it is to seek
economic cooperation in China with both diplomatic and economic motives.
Chinese government has established three such venture capital funds with
governments of Switzerland, Israel and Belgium respectively. Thirdly, the
purpose is to utilise the Guanxi of Chinese partners (Guo 2008) to originate
deals, especially state-owned companies. Many venture capitals from US
and Europe have adopted this strategy since the mid-90s' in order to bridge
the gap in cultural and regulatory environments.
In comparison, Chinese venture capital firms, whether they are Chinese
government-controlled or not, tend to only possess capital denominated in
Chinese Yuan and are only allowed to invest in ventures registered in the
mainland unless government approval is received. With these regulatory
limitations, they usually seek exit through domestic capital markets or large
scale assets and equity exchange centres located in first-tier Chinese cities
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(Kang 2007). Further, some Chinese venture capital investors may seek to
establish Sino-foreign joint venture capital firms with foreign counterparts
because they generally lack the expertise of experienced venture capitalists
to run a fully state-owned venture capital firm.
Under such a unique regulatory environment, ten distinct entry modes
deployed by foreign venture capitals were identified and sent to
participants for validation. The ten entry modes are stated as follows:
Mode 1 - The common entry mode. The investment structure is that a
foreign venture capital firm is registered offshore and set up an onshore
branch office and management team responsible for investment and
post-investment management activities in China. This mode is most
frequently adopted by foreign venture capitals.
Mode 2 - The Derivate of Mode One - Investing in a Restricted Industry.
This strategy is the derivative of Mode 1 which explains how foreign
venture capitals can invest in Chinese ventures of restricted industries, such
as portals, media, some categories of Telecommunications, education, etc.
Mode 3 - Dual-currency Strategy Utilised by Investment Arms of
Industrial Conglomerates. Investment arms of industrial conglomerates can
be divided into two types by their investment purposes. For some industrial
conglomerates invest purely for financial returns, their investment mode is
similar to Mode One. While some others invest in China with development
guidelines of their parent companies while minor financial incentives. These
guidelines include consolidation of market share, utilisation of local
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brainpower in research and development, or supply of key components.
These two types of investment arms commonly generate revenues
denominated in Chinese Yuan and venture capital funds registered outside
China. Therefore they can invest in Chinese ventures registered either
onshore (with Chinese Yuan) or offshore (with US dollars) in their best
interests. The flexibility of dual-currency strategy and the possibility of
being directly acquired by the parent conglomerate in the future have
greatly increased the attractiveness of such foreign investors to Chinese
ventures compared to other types of venture capital firms.
Mode 4 - Investing in Spin-offs of Research Institutes. This strategy is
used by those foreign venture capitals interested in spin-offs of government
projects, university or research institutes. Under this model a Sino-foreign
joint venture registered onshore is established.
Mode 5 - Play the Role as a General Partner in an Onshore Sino-foreign
Joint Venture Capital Firm. Under this model, the foreign venture capital
holds minority interest in the onshore SJVCF but is entrusted to manage the
firm like a general partner. Foreign venture capitals may utilise this strategy
when they are subject to political constraints, like Taiwan. Under this model,
equity interests or bonus can be transferred to the scientists/entrepreneurs
as rewards to compensate for their contribution in the creation of
intellectual property.
Mode 6 - Play the Role as a General Partner in an Offshore Sino-foreign
Venture Capital Firm. In comparison with mode 5, the SJVCF is registered
overseas and legally protected under foreign jurisdiction and invest with US
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dollars. Under this model, the main capital contributor is not confined to
(local) Chinese government, but extended to international fund of funds or
large-scale Chinese companies with foreign reserves, etc.
Mode 7 - Establishing a Virtual Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital Firm
(VSJVCF). "Virtual" is so structured that a Sino-foreign joint venture capital
firm does not exist substantially but practically perform the functions.
VCJVCF is one of the choices of foreign venture capitals to expand the
flexibility of exit and exploit local experience and connection of Chinese
partners. Under this model, both parties were bound to set up a VSJVCF
co-operated onshore for investment and post-investment management
activities and investments were only made upon mutual agreements.
Mode 8 - The derivate of VSJVCF model. This model explains how
foreign venture capital funds are managed by Chinese VCs. There are three
major differences identified between Mode 7 and 8. Firstly, the
incorporation of a wholly-foreign owned enterprises (WFOE) registered
onshore is not possible in Mode 7. Secondly, the foreign venture capital
fund in Mode 8 is under the wholly management of Chinese partner, while
investment decisions can only be reached upon mutual agreement in Mode
7. Thirdly, Mode 7 requires both foreign venture capital (with US dollars)
and its Chinese partner (with Chinese Yuan) inject capitals into ventures
while the VSJVCF in Mode 8 can invest in either currency in its best
interests.
Mode 9 - They are joint venture capital funds co-initiated by foreign
governments and the Chinese government. These funds are all established
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for diplomatic and economic corporation purposes and have no fixed term
of duration or designed to be revolved on a predetermined length of time.
Investment proceeds will be reinvested into the fund.
Mode 10 - "Tourist" Venture Capital Investment: Those foreign venture
capital funds that do not have any China office and management team but
simply count on frequent visits to China to conduct investments are often
described as "tourist VC". They establish and manage their exposure in
China simply through their partners in China, including other foreign
venture capital investors, legal councils and auditing houses.
By and large, three essentials/characteristics emerge that can
distinguish amongst the above ten entry modes of foreign venture capital: (1)
whether the foreign venture capital has a Chinese partner or not; (2) who is
entrusted to manage the firm i.e. who determines the decision-making value
and/or how they are decided? (3) whether the fund/firm is registered
onshore, offshore or as a virtual entity.
5.1.2 Classification of Venture Capital Firms in China
In discriminating amongst the various entry modes, foreign venture
capitals can be divided into two categories: FVCF and SJVCF. The virtual
Sino-foreign joint venture capital firm (Mode 7 & 8) is grouped into SJVCF,
because whether it is formally registered does not affect the
decision-making value of venture capitalists as they remain "foreign".
Chinese venture capital firms are re-divided into GVCF and NGVCF based
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on the degree of government influence over the fund/firm. The degree of
government influence on the investment activities, especially deal
origination and investment decision making, is measured by the ratio of
government shareholding.
To avoid classification errors resulting from subjective classification, the
initial classification were also presented to interviewees for further
validation. Therefore venture capital firms investing in China can be
objectively reclassified and defined as the following four categories:
1. Foreign venture capital firm (FVCF): It is a wholly foreign-owned venture
capital enterprise managed by foreign venture capitals. It can be
registered onshore or offshore and established in any organisational
structures, including limited partnership and limited company.
2. Sino-foreign Joint Venture Capital Firm (SJVCF): It is a venture capital
enterprise consisting of Chinese investors where the Chinese
(central/local) government exerts direct or indirect influence over
investment activities. Generally, the Chinese government has relatively
larger shares of holding in the firm in a direct or indirect way.
3. Chinese Government-controlled Venture Capital Firm (GVCF): It is a venture
capital enterprise consisting of Chinese investors where the Chinese
(central/local) government exerts direct or indirect influence over
investment activities. Generally, the Chinese government has relatively
larger shares of holding in the firm in a direct or indirect way.
4. Non-Chinese Government-Controlled Venture Capital Firm (NGVCF): It is a
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venture capital enterprise invested by Chinese investors, not limited to
private or state investors. State interests in the firm are much smaller than
the rest held by private Chinese investors. Government influence is
therefore confined to the shares of holding (minority interests) or seat(s)
in the board of directors.
5.1.3 Investment Criteria Used by VCs in China
Summary of Findings
"Government Influence" is the most important first-tier criterion for
venture capitalists of FVCFs and rates as the runner-up, sixth and sixth
place among first-tier investment criteria in NGVCFs, SJVCFs and GVCFs
respectively. Breaking it down, "Free from Government Restrictions" is
most critical to the accept/reject decision of FVCFs as foreign investments in
China are all guided by the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign
Investment Industries, amended in 2006, which classified Chinese industries
against foreign investments into three categories: the "Encouraged",
"Restricted" and "Prohibited". Many popular industries of venture capital
investments in developed VC markets including Internet portal, media,
retailing, telecommunications, etc. and those defined as "national
industries", are either restricted from or prohibited from receiving foreign
investments. As investing in "Government Supported/Protected Industries"
implies the latent benefits both the investor and investee will receive, it is
the third important criteria for NGVCFs. Such regulatory force has
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substantially influenced the investment direction of venture capitals.
A venture in an industry supported/protected by government policy
can enjoy a beneficial tax rate for a certain period of time and be provided
with preferential rents in land that facilities acquirement or even direct
financial subsidy, while the investor will also enjoy tax deduction or refund
up to 70% of total investments. As well, taxes paid at the firm level will not
be double taxed at the individual level according to the newly issued
"Regulations on Venture Capital Investments". Such a preferential policy is
most straight forward from a financial management standpoint. In fact,
investing in ventures of industries supported/protected by the government
and keeping a distance from those prohibited is a central premise for all
Chinese individuals or companies while it is a must-have lesson for FVCFs.
Furthermore, reflecting the ownership nature of GVCFs, venture
capitalists in GVCFs are generally directed and guided to invest in ventures
of national/local government-supported projects aiming at next generation
technology or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) undertaken by related
government organisations, universities or research affiliates with the
purpose to promote social welfare or economic development. The common
characteristics of these ventures are that they are generally developed in the
seed or start-up stage, located in government-funded science parks and
receive direct government subsidy or equity investments. With these
preconditions and government influence, these ventures tend not to accept
the term sheets offered by FVCFs and NGVCFs but will more readily accept
those of GVCFs. If the venture conforms to the essential requirements of
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SJVCFs established between the Chinese government and foreign
governments, they may also be invested in by SJVCFs through the referral
of related government organisation.
In comparison, the study concludes that the influence of regulatory
force on VCs' investment criteria in China is enormous and that echoes to
the arguments that the government views regulatory force an important tool
for connecting scientific and technological capabilities and outputs on the
one hand, with national and regional/provincial economic and social
development on the other (White et al. 2000) although such regulatory
institution remain weak in China (Guo 2008). In addition, the first-tier
criterion "Government Influence" was also mentioned in the study on
Poland conducted by Bliss (1999), with different connotations and
similarities. Bliss argued that government's involvement in a deal as a
"yellow flag" i.e. a signal that the quality of the deal is poor. Polish VCs are
similar to their peers in GVCFs that they had to cultivate connections with
related government officials in order to solicit new deals - generally
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, "Government Influence" is not
accented in VCs' investment criteria in Hungary (Karsai et al. 1997).
Overall, the importance of "Government Influence" is not stressed in
any previous study on developed economies, as summarized in Table 2.2,
where government generally plays a relatively smaller role in many
economy aspects than the socialist or the less-developed economies, to the
researcher's knowledge.
The presence of "Managerial Capabilities" to the accept/reject decision
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of VCs has been frequently stressed in many past studies in various terms or
phrases as summarized in Table 2.2. In this study the importance of
"Managerial Capabilities" is also validated in FVCFs (2nd), SJVCFs (1st) and
NGVCFs (3rd) among the nine first-tier criteria. Particularly, the weight of
"Administrative Skills of Team" ranked second among all second-tier
investment criteria for both FVCFs and SJVCFs. In fact, a lot of interviewees
of FVCFs were either directly trained in the US or educated to follow
investment disciplines of US or other fund-originated countries. Therefore
the results are consistent with the conclusions on Managerial Capabilities in
past studies based on developed markets and a recent report suggesting
that 80.94% of total foreign venture capital pool available for investment in
mainland China is from the US (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2007). SJVCFs
are mostly managed by foreign partners (Kang 2007) due to the lack of local
investment talents and greater trust based on the longer track record of
foreign partners. Overall the importance of "Managerial Capabilities" can
also be validated in both FVCFs and SJVCFs whose investment value are
originally from developed countries as evidenced in the literature.
GVCFs in China are mostly investment affiliates to local governments.
Financial rewards and management team are usually not first considered by
GVCFs when making investment decisions as the company incorporation
constitution generally states that promoting the social welfare and economic
development of the nation/province/municipal city are of the utmost
importance (Zero2IPO Research Centre 2002). Senior management of SOEs
are often appointed directly by the government, rather than professional
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managers, while the quality of management is the main concern for GVCFs.
Findings show that "Market Prospect" ranked the 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th of
the nine generic criteria by FVCFs, SJVCFs, NGVCFs and GVCFs
respectively On the other hand, FVCFs are burdened with targets like
financial rewards and NGVCFs (mostly funded by private enterprises and
rich individuals) market share consolidation or advanced technology
acquisition required by their fund investors. Therefore "Ease of Market
Entry" and "Leadership in the Market" are more stressed by FVCFs (the 5th)
and NGVCFs (the 7th) respectively among the 26 second-tier investment
criteria.
Further, venture capitalists of GVCFs are usually guided to invest in
government-supported projects, which are characterised by high-tech or
next-generation concepts. This finding on GVCFs is the same as that
conducted by MacMillian et al (1985). This phenomenon is also reflected in
the findings on the selection value of GVCFs. "Product/Service
Differentiation" ranked the 2nd place among the nine first-tier investment
criteria of GVCFs, because government-initiated projects are the main
investment candidates. Many of these projects are "Related to the Concept
of High-tech" (ranked the 7th among the 26 second-tier investment criteria).
In comparison, findings show that both FVCFs and NGVCFs do not
attach high importance to the criterion "Related to the Concept of
High-tech", which ranked the 14th and 17th among all second-tier investment
criteria. Findings suggest that the main reason is the relatively low level of
economic development with many investment opportunities hidden in
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non-high-tech or traditional industries. The underdeveloped protection of
property rights (Luo 1997) has a dominant impact on venture capital
industry (White et al. 2002) and VCs' investment behaviour (Feng 2004).
Moreover, the research findings appear significantly different from the
results suggested by GVCFs and that of Guo (2008), in which ventures with
high-tech concept are most favoured by venture capitalists. The results also
echo to the findings of Knight (1994) that investment criteria used by VCs in
Canada, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are not as popular with VCs in
the rest of the world as they are in the US as argued by MacMillan et al.
(1985). However, whether the definition of "high tech" may be responsible
for the difference of the two contractive results requires further research.
In addition, a combination of factors are also suggested for plagiarism
in China, that include a prevailing lack of respect for intellectual property, a
weak regulatory system against plagiarism and miniscule penalties and
punishment for pirates and counterfeiters (White et al. 2002, Guo 2008).
Therefore "Proprietary Product/Service" ranked fourth of all second-tier
investment criteria by both FVCFs and SJVCFs.
The "Exit" category comprises two subordinate criteria - "Possibility to
Exit during a Tolerable Period of Time" and "Exit Option Practicable in the
Future". The reason is that venture capitalists of SJVCFs are more strongly
directed to liquidate all investments by the fund termination date for they
are mostly project or budget-based in order to meet the fund schedule
predetermined by two sides, except for the three SJVCFs co-initiated by
Chinese government and foreign governments with both diplomatic and
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economic cooperation motives, than the other three types of venture capital
firms. The Chinese bureaucratic system is also featured by such a strong
reporting tradition (Zhuang 2003). Therefore SJVCFs place "Exit" and
"Possibility to Exit During a Tolerable Period of Time" as the most
important generic and second-tier investment criteria respectively. Further,
there are three fundamental problems confronting all venture capital exits in
China. These include regulatory constraints (Guo 2008) and the lack of an
onshore over-the-counter market as well as the shortage of equity certificate
options viable for venture capital investments (Zero2IPO Research Centre
2006, Kang 2007). Therefore FVCFs turn to seek for ventures that have
established overseas shareholding vehicle providing the "Exit option
practicable in the future" i.e. exiting through the "red chip" model (Kang
2007). In the next few years, foreign venture capitals will seek raise new
rounds of funds denominated in Chinese Yuan and register onshore to
adapt themselves to the disadvantageous environments.
The category of "Financial Considerations" consists of "Expected
Investment Returns" and "Level of Venture Equity Valuation". Findings
show GVCFs ranked them the 4th and 3rd respectively and overall the 3rd.
GVCFs have stressed so much the importance of these two criteria that seem
to be in conflict with their investment decision making style - a top-down
management system where venture capitalists generally follow government
policy and internal referral system for deal origination and investment
decision making. The explanation is that it is simply the consequence of
how thoughts and behaviours of an individual in SOEs are affected by the
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bureaucrat-oriented tradition under a socialist ruling system (Zer2IPO
Research Centre 2005). Personal promotion in a communist system,
including GVCFs, is usually based not only on personal accomplishment
but also on "mian zi" incurred on the organization and the "boss"(Kang
2007). In comparison, findings identify "Level of Venture Equity Valuation"
as the second most critical criterion for NGVCFs among the second-tier
investment criteria to their accept/reject decision. The reason is that
NGVCFs are generally funded by Chinese private enterprises and rich
individuals who tend to haggle over every financial performance index of
funded firms (Kang 2007).
Overall, findings show that "Shareholding Structure" is not highly
rated by FVCFs and SJVCFs, yet it is the most important first-tier criteria for
NGVCFs. The suggested cause is that many NGVCFs are given strategic
assignments and the investment candidates may be involved with various
kinds of business relationships/Guanxi or strength that fund investors
would value and need. Especially, the criteria "Background of Venture
Shareholders" is hence viewed as the most important criteria among all
second-tier criteria by NGVCFs. This special attention to the background of
venture shareholders has never been mentioned in past studies. From the
perspectives of venture capitalists, guanxi, relationship or social ties are also
presented in the Western context. VCs frequently seeking advice from other
counterparts on a wide variety of issues is a common practice for VC
professionals (Fried and Hisrich 1994). However, evidence has never been
found in the evaluation of venture entrepreneurs.
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Such a business relationship is also one of the basic concerns (6th) of
GVCFs. In addition, findings also suggest that GVCFs generally do not want
to conduct syndication investments with FVCFs or NGVCFs for the many
differences in nature, such as investment values, fund origins, incorporation
structure, etc.
The generic criterion "Guanxi" is broken down into "Referred by
Relevant Government Official Other Than Fund Investor", "Referred by
Fund Investor Other Than Government", "Referred by Other Connections
Other Than Government and Fund Investor" and "Background of
Entrepreneur". Findings show that GVCFs view "Guanxi" as the most
important generic criterion among all first-tier criteria and the rankings of
its subordinate criteria are also higher than those of other venture capital
firms. Findings verify that cognitive institutions impact nearly all aspects of
foreign venture capitalists' investing activities in China (Kang 2007, Guo
2008). This is the first time that "Guanxi" overall has been empirically
recognised in the accept/reject decision of venture capitalists.
In comparison, the findings on the entry modes of foreign venture
capitals, as summarised in Table 4.1, indicate that the decision values of
FVCFs inherently remain "foreign" and that of SJVCFs is mixed. In addition,
NGVCFs are mainly funded by rich individuals and/or non-Chinese
government-controlled organisations. Therefore the finding can be
interpreted as the consequence of their initial funding motives: they invest
in venture capital fund pursuing either financial rewards or strategic targets
of organisations, while relying on "Guanxi" may not help satisfy such goals.
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Particularly, "The Ventures Referred by Other Connections Other Than
Government Officials or Fund Investors" is most valued by GVCFs. The
reason is that these candidates are generally located in local science parks
established by local governments/municipal cities. Venture capitalists of
GVCFs have generally the access to the database of ventures located in the
respective province/municipal city. Investing in these ventures is basically a
"yes" investment decision for venture capitalists of GVCFs from the
standpoints of fund investors (Venture Capital Development Report in
China 2004). In comparison, findings show that the "Background of
Entrepreneur" is also accented by GVCFs (5th), SJVCFs (6th) and NGVCFs
(8th) amongst all second-tier criteria in order to gain advantages such as
favourable policy benefits, orders from government-affiliates or even direct
government subsidy, etc. Background of a person in China is often viewed a
critical factor to the business success in China. Investing in an influential
person is investing in their own benefits, such as the expansion of
relationships with the Chinese authorities, to render their investee
companies more substantial help (Kang 2007). The cognitive value "Guanxi"
is very stressed in such a Confucian society (Guo 2008) that the recognition
on Background/Guanxi of a person explains why many multinational
companies in China invited well-known Chinese people with strong
political connections as partners or consultants having no experience in the
industries.
The criterion "A Proven Business Model in Developed Economies" tests
whether VCs will invest in a business model in China (a transition economy)
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that has been proved successful in other (developed) countries. This
criterion has never been tested in past studies on VCs' investment criteria in
both developed VC markets and transition economies. Findings suggest that
such connection does not exist in China. The results show that investing in a
venture that has been proved successful in a developed economy is least
important to the accept/reject decision for all types of VCs in China due to
the huge and cheap labour force in China and the threats of imitation.
Therefore it can be inferred that the success of a business model developed
in a developed economy may not be transferrable to an economy in
transition due to the discrepancy in institutional environments. However, it
cannot be presumed that a successful business model is not transferrable
between developed VC markets, especially between the US and (Western)
European countries, given the similarities in venture capital industry
between the US and (Western) Europe (Sapienza et al. 1996).
Comparisons with Previous Research
Overall, this research has its features that should be compared to
previous studies on both developed countries and transition economies.
Firstly, the study has identified various entry strategies of foreign venture
capitals regarding China - the worldwide largest developing and socialist
country, with coding techniques. It is of prior importance before any
research can conduct an in-depth study on a transition economy. Based on
the results, the researcher can further classify foreign venture capitals
operating in China into FVCF and SJVCF. The results on SJVCF appear a
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different scenario of investment criteria and philosophy from that of FVCF
as discussed above. Without such a classification of foreign venture capitals,
the research concludes it results in an undefined broad way. Such detailed
classification of venture capitals has never been found in any previous
research on either developed countries or transition economies.
In addition, the investment criteria used by venture capitalists in China
identified in this study appear distinctive features from those discovered in
past studies based on both developed VC markets and transition economies,
although some similarities are shared to various degree among venture
capitalists of the four ownership categories, such as the stress on Managerial
Capabilities, Product/Service Differentiation or Market Prospect as reviewed
in the literature.
On the other hand, some unique Chinese factors that have not been
mentioned in most past studies are proved to be significant to the
accept/reject decision of venture capitalists. For example, findings suggest
the first-tier investment criterion "Government Influence" is most important
to the accept/reject decision of FVCFs operating in China, while
"Managerial Capabilities" is still most critical to SJVCFs. The stress on
government influence by FVCFs echoes to the conclusion of Guo (2008) that
regulatory forces have significantly influenced the investment strategies of
China venture capitalists. FFowever, Guo (2008) only divided China venture
capital firms into two categories: foreign venture capital firms and Chinese
venture capital firms, while ignoring the diverse nature within each of the
two categories and to what extent the regulatory force or government
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influence will impact on VCs' investment criteria. This study solved this
problem with the clear definitions on each category of China venture capital
firms according to their diverse nature. Each category is also provided each
category a measurable order for the impacts of government influence on
investment criteria.
In addition, "Shareholding Structure" and "Guanxi" have never been
stressed in previous studies while they are the most important criteria for
NGVCFs and GVCFs respectively. The importance of "Guanxi" in VCs'
investment activities has been acknowledged in some past studies on China
venture capitals (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003, Guo 2008). However, these
researches did not explore the sub-essence of "Guanxi" nor distinguish VCs'
ownership category and sequentially to what extent "Guanxi" will impact
on their investment activities of each category. In contrast, this research has
clearly divided "Guanxi" into four sub-categories or second-tier investment
criteria into "Deals Referred by other connections other than government
and fund investor", "Deals Referred by fund investor other than
government", "Deals Referred by relevant government official other than
fund investor" and "Background of entrepreneur", and distinguished the
relative importance of the four criteria kept by each category of venture
capitalists.
Overall, based on the analysis on the second-tier investment criteria, the
most important criterion for GVCFs, NGVCFs, SJVCFs and FVCFs is
"Referred by Other Connections Other Than Government and Fund
Investors", "Background of Venture Shareholder", "Possibility to Exit
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during a Tolerable Period of Time" and "Free from Government
Restrictions". These most valued criteria for each type of venture capitalists
have not been distinguished in past studies either. Therefore this study
verifies that investment criteria used by venture capitalists should vary from
country to country due to the discrepancy in institutional environments
between countries. Venture capitalists make necessary changes in evaluation
criteria originally held in their home country to adapt to local environments.
In addition, the researcher initially proposed the criterion "A Proven
Business Model in Developed Countries" to test whether venture capitalists
will invest in a same business model in China (a transition economy) that
has been proved successful in other (developed) countries. Findings also
proved that venture capitalists will use different or local criteria to evaluate
ventures of same business models given the difference of institutional
environments. This conclusion has never been mentioned in any studies on
transition economies.
It is also worth attention that "Geographical Location of Venture" as
suggested by Guo (2008) was not presented in the final list of VCs'
investment criteria in China, although it was once mentioned in pilot study.
This researcher suggests only GVCFs may consider this factor at the initial
screening stage due to the fact that most GVCFs are funded by local




The access to sufficient data and venture capitalists operating in China
is the key to successfully complete the study. Although the researcher has
possessed good Guanxi to access venture capitalists and the rich research
resources of Zero2IPO Research Centre, some limitations were still
encountered, divided into three dimensions. Firstly, in Chinese culture,
"mian zi" of each one of same group will be hurt when discord or conflict
takes place between comrades or colleagues (venture capitalists) in front of
a stranger (the researcher) (Chen 2001). Therefore there may be
disagreements between venture capitalists of the same venture capital firm
regarding the same question during the interviews but it is hard for the
researcher to detect whether such disagreements exist. In the Chinese
context, a harmonious relationship should be subtly and carefully
maintained in appearance. (Luo 1997) Therefore the researcher may miss
some useful contradictory information when interviewing two venture
capitalists and above at a time. Secondly, the researcher were not able to
judge whether venture capitalists gave true answers on some sensitive
questions, for example, involving inside the government policy, especially
for those VCs in GVCFs and NGVCFs. Especially, some venture capitalists
of GVCFs gave answers mixed of generalities or official jargons, which
brought about the difficulty in data interpretation and analysis. At last, the
importance of the criterion "Government Influence" to venture capitalists of
GVCFs and NGVCFs may be underestimated as it is viewed as a
taken-for-granted criterion and not to be mentioned.
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5.3 Research Contributions
By and large, findings of this research have contributed to the body of
knowledge on the decision science of venture capitalists in two aspects.
Firstly, the study validates that country-specific factors significantly
influence the accept/reject decision of venture capitalists. Although
investment criteria are transferrable from one country to another with the
globalisation of venture capitals, they have to be revised in order to adapt to
local institutional environments. Therefore, venture capitalists of diverse
nature (categories) investing in the same nation use distinctive investment
criteria or the same investment criteria with different accents depending on
the attribute of the venture capitalists i.e. what type of venture capitalists
manage the funds. Hence it can be concluded that investment criteria of
venture capitalists vary with the fund type in a nation and as a whole vary
from country to country.
Based on empirical evidence, findings suggest "Government Influence"
is one of the most important criteria for all type of venture capitalists
investing in China. "Guanxi" is taken as the most valued criterion for
GVCFs. This is the first time that the importance of "Guanxi" is recognised
in the accept/reject decision of venture capitalists in China - a transition
economy. In addition, the value of "Background of Venture Shareholders"
for NGVCFs is also first verified in this study because Chinese investors of
the private sector strive to create business networks all on their own.
The study also first proposed to test whether venture capitalists will
invest in a business model in China (a transition economy) that has been
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proved successful in developed countries. The results show that such
"sheep flock" effect can not be applied to venture capitalists operating in
China. This conclusion again verifies that venture capitalists do not apply
the same investment values across borders. The success of a business model
developed in a developed economy may not be transferrable to a transition
economy due to the discrepancy in institutional environments.
Secondly, with the grounding results, the study generated ten entry
strategies utilised by foreign venture capitals to conduct investments in
China. This finding provides a primary and dependable classification of
venture capital firms for future researches on China venture capitals.
Without this classification, any finding on China venture capital industry
can not be properly defined and interpreted. Such a way to classify venture
capitals can also be applied to any venture capital research on transition
economies. This classification can also offer an introductory guide to foreign
venture capital practitioners who intend to tap China market and the basis
to form their China entry and investment strategy.
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5.4 Suggestions for Future Study
Transition economies, including China, have institutional environments
very different from those in developed countries. Many past studies
regarding decision sciences of venture capitalists simply apply findings to
all while ignore the diverse nature between countries. For example, the
being of SJVCFs is adopted by foreign venture capital investors as one of the
investment strategies in China. With this transformation, findings suggest
that the investment criteria stressed by SJVCFs are not the same as that of
FVCFs. Therefore the researcher suggests that further researches focusing
on venture capitals of transition economies should first attempt to classify
venture capital firms operating in the target nation.
For those researches with China, as FVCFs in China have been
rewarded better returns than those of GVCFs and NGVCFs with the
measurement index IRR in the past decade (China Venture Capital
Performance 1994-2005, 2006), hence the question is whether the divergence
in investment criteria will affect the performance of venture capital firms in
China.
At last, affected by the overall hostile regulatory environments in China,
foreign venture capital exits through the so-called "red chip" model have
shaded. The researcher hence suggests future researchers investigating the
practical issue - what countermeasures that foreign venture capital firms


























































































































Appendix II Interview Guidelines








No Question Answer Notes
How old are you?
How many years in VC industry?
How many years in the company/fund?
Where is the fund originated?
Where is the fund registered (offshore)?
Where is the fund registered (onshore)?
Who are their fund investors?
What is the size globally?
What is the size available for China?
What is the incorporation form?
Part II. How do they invest in China?
Do you have an offshore vehicle? If Yes,
where is the offshore vehicle?
Do you manage the fund yourself? If
no, who manage it for you? Please
describe in details how they manage it
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for you.
Do you manage the fund for other
venture capitals? If yes, who do you
manage it for? Please describe in details
how you manage it for them.
Please describe in details how you
invest in China from deal origination to
closing.
How is the decision-making committee
structured? Or what is the
decision-making mechanism?
How do you manage the portfolio?
What value-added activities do you
provide to portfolio companies?
How do you exit?
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Appendix VII Questionnaires (Partial, Cover Page Omitted)
Part I. Generic Investment Criteria Evaluation
Please give scores from 1 to 9 or 1(1/1) to 1/9 to each of the blank based
on your preferences based on the scale table as shown below.
Scaling Definition Explanations
1 Equal Importance Two options have same contributions.
3 Weak Importance
One of the two options is moderately
favoured over the other.
5 Essential Importance
One of the two options is strongly favoured
over the other.
7 Demonstrated Importance
One of the two options is very strongly
favoured over the other.
9 Absolute Importance
One of the two options is extremely favoured
over the other.
2,4, 6, 8 Intermediate Value When compromise is needed.
For example, if you consider "Market Prospect" is moderately favoured
than "Managerial Capabilities", you fill "3" in the blank C3 and "1/3" if vice
versa. If you consider "Market Prospect" is very strongly favoured than
"Managerial Capabilities", you fill "7" in the blank C3 and "1/7" if vice versa.
Those shadowed spaces are automatically calculated, so you do not need to
worry about it. If you consider the degree of preference is located between 1,












Managerial Capabilities MarketProspec Product/service Differentiation Exit Government Influence Financial Considerations Shareholding structure Guanxi Others
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Part II. Second-tier Investment Criteria Evaluation
Please give scores from 1 to 9 to each of the cards, with 9 represents the
most preferred and 1 the least. You can give equal score to different cards.
| Managerial Capabilities Score
Card 1
Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Fair
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Medium
Administrative skills of team Fair
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 2
Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Weak
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Weak
Card 3
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Fair
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Weak
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Medium
Card 4
Team sense of business environmental risks Low
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Poor
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Weak
Administrative skills of team Poor
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 5
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
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Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 6
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Medium
Administrative skills of team Poor
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 7
Team sense of business environmental risks Low
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Medium
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Weak
Card 8
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Poor
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Fair
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Weak
Card 9
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Poor
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Medium
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Medium
Card 10
Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Poor
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
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Card 11
Team sense of business environmental risks Low
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Fair
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Medium
Card 12
Team sense of business environmental risks Moderate
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Poor
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Medium
Card 13
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Weak
Administrative skills of team Fair
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 14
Team sense of business environmental risks Low
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Fair
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 15
Team sense of business environmental risks High
Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Good
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Good
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Strong
Card 16
Team sense of business environmental risks High
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Outside appraisal of entrepreneur Fair
Relevant experience and recognised expertise of team Strong
Administrative skills of team Poor
Leadership potential of entrepreneur Weak
Market Prospect Score
Card 1
Ease of market entry Moderate
A fast-growing market in several years Medium
Leadership in the market Strong
Card 2
Ease of market entry Difficult
A fast-growing market in several years Medium
Leadership in the market Weak
Card 3
Ease of market entry Easy
A fast-growing market in several years Low
Leadership in the market Weak
Card 4
Ease of market entry Difficult
A fast-growing market in several years High
Leadership in the market Medium
Card 5
Ease of market entry Easy
A fast-growing market in several years Medium
Leadership in the market Medium
Card 6
Ease of market entry Easy
A fast-growing market in several years High
Leadership in the market Strong
Card 7
Ease of market entry Moderate
A fast-growing market in several years Low
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Leadership in the market Medium
Card 8
Ease of market entry Moderate
A fast-growing market in several years High
Leadership in the market Weak
Card 9
Ease of market entry Difficult
A fast-growing market in several years Low
Leadership in the market Strong
Product/Service Differentiation Score 1
Card 1
Product/service of distinction High
Product/service margin High
Proprietary product/service High
Related to the concept of high tech Yes
Card 2
Product/service of distinction Fair
Product/service margin Low
Proprietary product/service High
Related to the concept of high tech Yes
Card 3
Product/service of distinction Low
Product/service margin Medium
Proprietary product/service High
Related to the concept of high tech No
Card 4
Product/service of distinction Low
Product/service margin High
Proprietary product/service Medium
Related to the concept of high tech Yes
Card 5




Related to the concept of high tech Yes
Card 6
Product/service of distinction Fair
Product/service margin High
Proprietary product/service Low
Related to the concept of high tech No
Card 7
Product/service of distinction Fair
Product/service margin Medium
Proprietary product/service Medium
Related to the concept of high tech Yes
Card 8
Product/service of distinction High
Product/service margin Low
Proprietary product/service Medium
Related to the concept of high tech No
Card 9
Product/service of distinction Low
Product/service margin Low
Proprietary product/service Low
Related to the concept of high tech Yes
1 Exit Score
Card 1
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time High
Exit option practicable in the future Flexible
Card 2
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time Medium
Exit option practicable in the future Limited
Card 3
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time Low
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Exit option practicable in the future Flexible
Card 4
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time Low
Exit option practicable in the future Limited
Card 5
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time Medium
Exit option practicable in the future Flexible
Card 6
Possibility to exit during a tolerable period of time High
Exit option practicable in the future Limited
Government Influence Score
Card 1
Government supported/protected industries No
Free from government restrictions Yes
Card 2
Government supported/protected industries Yes
Free from government restrictions Yes
Card 3
Government supported/protected industries No
Free from government restrictions No
Card 4
Government supported/protected industries Yes
Free from government restrictions No
Financial Considerations Score
Card 1
Expected investment returns High
Level of venture equity valuation Medium
Card 2
Expected investment returns Low
Level of venture equity valuation High
Card 3
Expected investment returns Medium
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Level of venture equity valuation Medium
Card 4
Expected investment returns Medium
Level of venture equity valuation Low
Card 5
Expected investment returns High
Level of venture equity valuation Low
Card 6
Expected investment returns Medium
Level of venture equity valuation High
Card 7
Expected investment returns Low
Level of venture equity valuation Medium
Card 8
Expected investment returns Low
Level of venture equity valuation Low
Shareholding Structure Score
Card 1
Background of venture shareholders Indifferent
Degree of control over venture High
Ration of venture stake Unsatisfactory
Card 2
Background of venture shareholders Indifferent
Degree of involved in venture Moderate
Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 3
Background of venture shareholders Desirable
Degree of involved in venture Moderate
Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 4
Background of venture shareholders Indifferent
Degree of involvement in venture Low
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Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 5
Background of venture shareholders Undesirable
Degree of involvement in venture Low
Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 6
Background of venture shareholders Undesirable
Degree of involvement in venture High
Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 7
Background of venture shareholders Undesirable
Degree of involvement in venture Moderate
Ration of venture stake Unsatisfactory
Card 8
Background of venture shareholders Desirable
Degree of involvement in venture High
Ration of venture stake Satisfactory
Card 9
Background of venture shareholders Desirable
Degree of involvement in venture Low
Ration of venture stake Unsatisfactory
Guanxi Score 1
Card 1
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor No
Referred by fund investor other than government Yes
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor Yes
Background of entrepreneur Medium
Card 2
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor Yes
Referred by fund investor other than government No
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor No
Background of entrepreneur Medium
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Card 3
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor No
Referred by fund investor other than government Yes
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor No
Background of entrepreneur Strong
Card 4
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor Yes
Referred by fund investor other than government Yes
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor No
Background of entrepreneur Medium
Card 5
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor No
Referred by fund investor other than government No
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor No
Background of entrepreneur Strong
Card 6
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor Yes
Referred by fund investor other than government No
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor Yes
Background of entrepreneur Strong
Card 7
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor No
Referred by fund investor other than government No
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor Yes
Background of entrepreneur Medium
Card 8
Referred by other connections other than government and fund investor Yes
Referred by fund investor other than government Yes
Referred by relevant government official other than fund investor Yes
Background of entrepreneur Strong
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